Changes

==Subversion in China==

==Subversion in China==

In 1944, Service was Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Chungking, [[China]]. There he shared a house with two [[Communist]] agents: [[Department of the Treasury|U.S. Treasury]] attaché [[Solomon Adler]]<ref>FBI [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Recording_Summary-Jaffe-06.10.45-04.19.46.pdf recording summary], Philip Jacob Jaffe, April 19, 1945 (FBI file: Amerasia, Section 39); "A highly confidential source has advised that Sol Adler was the roommate in Chungking, China, of  John Stewart Service." (FBI summary: [http://Ultra-Secret.info/PDFs/COMRAP%20SUMMARY.pdf The Comintern Apparatus], March 6, 1946, [ftp://education-research.org/PDFs/splitfiles/splitprocessed/COMRAP%2520SUMMARY_Folder/COMRAP%2520SUMMARY_page24.pdf p. 20 [PDF p. 24]]); "I moved into an apartment in the city [Chungking] with Solomon Adler." United States Department of State Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John S. Service, May 26, 1950, [http://ia341005.us.archive.org/2/items/statedepartmente195002unit/statedepartmente195002unit_bw.pdf State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation]: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), Part 2: Appendix, p. 1967 (PDF p. 491); ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 592</ref> and Chinese Ministry of Finance official [[Chi Chao-ting]] (Ji Chaoding).<ref>"During 1944, Service was sharing a house in Chungking with Solomon Adler... Upstairs, in a separate flat, lived Chi Cha’o-ting." Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tfrTpBLdl50C The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism]'' (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996) ISBN 978-0807822456, p. 21</ref>

In 1944, Service was Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Chungking, [[China]]. There he shared a house with two [[Communist]] agents: [[Department of the Treasury|U.S. Treasury]] attaché [[Solomon Adler]]<ref>FBI [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Recording_Summary-Jaffe-06.10.45-04.19.46.pdf recording summary], Philip Jacob Jaffe, April 19, 1945 (FBI file: Amerasia, Section 39); "A highly confidential source has advised that Sol Adler was the roommate in Chungking, China, of  John Stewart Service." (FBI summary: [http://Ultra-Secret.info/PDFs/COMRAP%20SUMMARY.pdf The Comintern Apparatus], March 6, 1946, [ftp://education-research.org/PDFs/splitfiles/splitprocessed/COMRAP%2520SUMMARY_Folder/COMRAP%2520SUMMARY_page24.pdf p. 20 [PDF p. 24]]); "I moved into an apartment in the city [Chungking] with Solomon Adler." United States Department of State Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John S. Service, May 26, 1950, [http://ia341005.us.archive.org/2/items/statedepartmente195002unit/statedepartmente195002unit_bw.pdf State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation]: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), Part 2: Appendix, p. 1967 (PDF p. 491); ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 592</ref> and Chinese Ministry of Finance official [[Chi Chao-ting]] (Ji Chaoding).<ref>"During 1944, Service was sharing a house in Chungking with Solomon Adler... Upstairs, in a separate flat, lived Chi Cha’o-ting." Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tfrTpBLdl50C The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism]'' (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996) ISBN 978-0807822456, p. 21</ref>

During the early war years, Service and Adler wrote favorable reports on the [[Kuomintang]] and [[Chiang Kai-shek]], which were keeping the Japanese busy, so they could not attack the Soviet Union. But once the defeat of Japan became likely, Soviet policy shifted to hostility toward the Nationalist government, and support for the Communist rebels seeking to overthrow it. Service began an increasingly harsh series of attacks on the Chinese government as "fascist" and "Gestapo-like,"<ref>Senate Internal Security Committee, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 577, 592, 1015</ref> writing that "the Kuomintang intensifies its drive for 'Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer'."<ref>Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., [http://ia341005.us.archive.org/1/items/instituteofpacif03unit/instituteofpacif03unit_bw.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 3] (Washington: GPO, 1951), pp. 817, 818</ref>

During the early war years, Service and Adler wrote favorable reports on the [[Kuomintang]] and [[Chiang Kai-shek]], which were keeping the Japanese busy, so they could not attack the Soviet Union. But once the defeat of Japan became likely, Soviet policy shifted to hostility toward the Nationalist government, and support for the Communist rebels seeking to overthrow it. Service began an increasingly harsh series of attacks on the Chinese government as "fascist" and "Gestapo-like,"<ref>Senate Internal Security Committee, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 577, 592, 1015</ref> writing that "the Kuomintang intensifies its drive for 'Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer'."<ref>Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., [http://ia341005.us.archive.org/1/items/instituteofpacif03unit/instituteofpacif03unit_bw.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 3] (Washington: GPO, 1951), pp. 817, 818</ref>

In contrast, Service praised the Communists as "progressive" and "democratic."<ref>Senate Internal Security Committee, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', January 26, 1970, pp. 406, 410, 577, 579, 589, 1014</ref> According to Service, the Communist (or as Service put it, "the so-called Communist") rebels merely advocated "agrarian reform, civil rights, the establishment of democratic institutions."<ref>Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., [http://ia341005.us.archive.org/1/items/instituteofpacif03unit/instituteofpacif03unit_bw.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 3] (Washington: GPO, 1951), p. 828</ref> "[T]he Communist political program is simple democracy," he wrote. "This is much more American than Russian in form and spirit."<ref>Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=gnmxDpX7ZlsC Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations]'' (University Press of America, 1998) ISBN 0761811583, p. 182; Michael M. Sheng, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=HZJcxq1DIOYC Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States]'' (Princeton University Press, 1997), ISBN 0691016356, p. 78</ref> He reassured Washington that Mao's policy involved "abandonment of any purely Communist program."<ref>United States. Department of State, ''[http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1944v06&entity=FRUS.FRUS1944v06.p0576 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 6]'' (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1944), p. 562</ref>

In contrast, Service praised the Communists as "progressive" and "democratic."<ref>Senate Internal Security Committee, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', January 26, 1970, pp. 406, 410, 577, 579, 589, 1014</ref> According to Service, the Communist (or as Service put it, "the so-called Communist") rebels merely advocated "agrarian reform, civil rights, the establishment of democratic institutions."<ref>Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., [http://ia341005.us.archive.org/1/items/instituteofpacif03unit/instituteofpacif03unit_bw.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 3] (Washington: GPO, 1951), p. 828</ref> "[T]he Communist political program is simple democracy," he wrote. "This is much more American than Russian in form and spirit."<ref>Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=gnmxDpX7ZlsC Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations]'' (University Press of America, 1998) ISBN 0761811583, p. 182; Michael M. Sheng, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=HZJcxq1DIOYC Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States]'' (Princeton University Press, 1997), ISBN 0691016356, p. 78</ref> He reassured Washington that Mao's policy involved "abandonment of any purely Communist program."<ref>United States. Department of State, ''[http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1944v06&entity=FRUS.FRUS1944v06.p0576 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 6]'' (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1944), p. 562</ref> The Communists "are carrying out democratic policies," insisted Service, "which they expect the United States to approve and sympathetically support."<ref>Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st-2d sess.,  

 

''[http://books.google.com/books?id=Y2UsAAAAMAAJ Institute of Pacific Relations]'' (U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1952), p. 5419</ref>

When [[Vice President]] [[Henry Wallace]] visited China in June 1944, he was given a 68-page briefing, officially written by Service, although Service would later admit he actually co-wrote it with the Soviet agent [[Solomon Adler]].<ref>M. Stanton Evans, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tQt3AAAAMAAJ Blacklisted by History: The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy and His Fight Against America's Enemies]'' (New York: Crown Forum, 2007) ISBN 978-1-4000-8105-9, p. 105, fn.</ref>

Service and his Soviet agent roommate Adler wrote that the Communists were doing most of the fighting against the Japanese, while the Nationalists were sitting out the war or actually collaborating.<ref>Edward M. Collins, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=YRa3Y2m_wrwC Myth, Manifesto, Meltdown: Communist Strategy, 1848-1991]'' (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger/Greenwood, 1998) ISBN 0275959384, p. 93</ref> Service and Adler even collaborated on some reports.<ref>"I worked on the translation and also provided some of the material and assisted in drafting the memorandum of comment on the book. However, the major part of the comment and the summary was done by Mr. Adler." [http://ia341005.us.archive.org/2/items/statedepartmente195002unit/statedepartmente195002unit_bw.pdf Report of the United States Senate Subcommittee on the Investigation of Loyalty of State Department Employees, 1950, Vol. 2], appendix, p. 2456 (PDF p. 980)</ref> For example, Adler reported (attributing information to Service): "The Communists have successfully resisted the Japanese for seven years... with no active support from Chungking."<ref>M. Stanton Evans, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tQt3AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 Blacklisted by History: The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy and His Fight Against America's Enemies]'' (New York: Crown Forum, 2007) ISBN 978-1-4000-8105-9, pp. 99-106</ref> In contrast, General Albert Wedemeyer, [http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/obituaries/gen-albert-c-wedemeyer-92-noted-military-planner-for-us.html commander of American forces in China] reported: "No Communist Chinese forces fought in any major battles of the Sino-Japanese war.... Chinese Communist leaders were not interested in fighting the Japanese," he wrote; "their main interest was to occupy the territory which the Nationalist forces evacuated in their retreat."<ref>Albert C. Wedemeyer, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=64s_HgAACAAJ Wedemeyer Reports]'' (Holt, 1958), p. 285</ref>

When [[Vice President]] [[Henry Wallace]] visited China in June 1944, he was given a 68-page briefing, officially written by Service, although Service would later admit he actually co-wrote it with the Soviet agent [[Solomon Adler]].<ref>M. Stanton Evans, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tQt3AAAAMAAJ Blacklisted by History: The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy and His Fight Against America's Enemies]'' (New York: Crown Forum, 2007) ISBN 978-1-4000-8105-9, p. 105, fn. Cf. "I worked on the translation and also provided some of the material and assisted in drafting the memorandum of comment on the book. However, the major part of the comment and the summary was done by Mr. Adler." [http://ia341005.us.archive.org/2/items/statedepartmente195002unit/statedepartmente195002unit_bw.pdf Report of the United States Senate Subcommittee on the Investigation of Loyalty of State Department Employees, 1950, Vol. 2], appendix, p. 2456 (PDF p. 980)</ref> Service and his Soviet agent roommate Adler wrote that the Communists were doing most of the fighting against the Japanese, while the Nationalists were sitting out the war or actually collaborating.<ref>Edward M. Collins, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=YRa3Y2m_wrwC Myth, Manifesto, Meltdown: Communist Strategy, 1848-1991]'' (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger/Greenwood, 1998) ISBN 0275959384, p. 93</ref> For example, Adler reported (attributing information to Service): "The Communists have successfully resisted the Japanese for seven years... with no active support from Chungking."<ref>M. Stanton Evans, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tQt3AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 Blacklisted by History: The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy and His Fight Against America's Enemies]'' (New York: Crown Forum, 2007) ISBN 978-1-4000-8105-9, pp. 99-106</ref> In contrast, General Albert Wedemeyer, [http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/obituaries/gen-albert-c-wedemeyer-92-noted-military-planner-for-us.html commander of American forces in China] reported: "No Communist Chinese forces fought in any major battles of the Sino-Japanese war.... Chinese Communist leaders were not interested in fighting the Japanese," he wrote; "their main interest was to occupy the territory which the Nationalist forces evacuated in their retreat."<ref>Albert C. Wedemeyer, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=64s_HgAACAAJ Wedemeyer Reports]'' (Holt, 1958), p. 285</ref>

"[T]he war was to [Mao] an opportunity to have Chiang destroyed by the Japanese," agreed Jung Chang, a former member of Mao's Red Guards. "He ordered Red commanders to wait for Japanese troops to defeat the Nationalists, and then, to seize territories below the Japanese line."<ref>Jung Chang, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3EZwAAAAMAAJ Mao: The Unknown Story]'' (Jonathan Cape, 2005) ISBN 0-224-07126-2, p. 211</ref> As Mao put it, “Our determined policy is 70 percent self-development, 20 percent compromise, and 10 percent fight the Japanese”; in July-August 1943, 20,000 Chinese troops were wiped out at Shantung when attacked simultaneously by the Japanese from the north and the Communist rebels from the south.<ref>Robert Henry Winborne Welch, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=V_i2OwAACAAJ Again, May God Forgive Us]'' (Belmont, Wash.: Belmont Pub. Co., 1971), cited in James Perloff, "[http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/history/world/1464 China Betrayed Into Communism]," ''The New American,'' July 24, 2009; cf. Felix Wittmer, ''[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html The Yalta Betrayal: Data on the Decline and Fall of Franklin Delano Roosevelt]'' (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1961) p. 37</ref> Indeed, in May 1945, an [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS) team code-named "Spaniel" that parachuted into China to link up with Communist forces was instead taken prisoner by the Communists, whom they found coexisting with Japanese troops. The Americans were held incommunicado until October, some two months after the end of the war. When finally freed, they reported, "The amount of actual fighting being carried on by the 8th R.A. [the “Eighth Route Army,” i.e., Communist Chinese rebels] has been grossly exaggerated. It was their policy to undertake no serious campaign against the Japanese..."<ref>Maochun Yu, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=NJcolGHWfzoC OSS in China]'' (Yale University Press, 1997) ISBN 0300066988, pp. 220-223</ref> Even so [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0508&week=b&msg=TnHrvJBDZ3%2buWcV2D1Mwgw&user=&pw= ardent a pro-Communist] as Theodore White<ref>[[Edward C. Carter|Edward Carter]], head of the [[Attorney General's list|Communist front]] [[American Russian Institute]] confided to White&mdash;in the midst of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]&mdash;"A trusted member of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations|IPR]] staff is about to take a journey on my behalf to certain countries that are not too popular at the moment in [[Wall Street]] or in [[Jewish]] circles." (Edward C. Carter to Theodore H. White, January 8, 1940 [FBI file: [http://education-research.org/PDFs/IPR54.11.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol. 54, Sec. 11], PDF p. 120])</ref> would have to admit, "The Communists...claimed that they held down most of the Japanese troops in China and that they bore the main weight of resistance; this was untrue." In fact, wrote White, "it was the weary soldiers of the Central Government who bore the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died."<ref>Theodore Harold White, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=ipdPd6kY7XwC Thunder out of China]'' [Da Capo Press, 1980] ISBN 0306801280, p. 210)</ref>

"[T]he war was to [Mao] an opportunity to have Chiang destroyed by the Japanese," agreed Jung Chang, a former member of Mao's Red Guards. "He ordered Red commanders to wait for Japanese troops to defeat the Nationalists, and then, to seize territories below the Japanese line."<ref>Jung Chang, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3EZwAAAAMAAJ Mao: The Unknown Story]'' (Jonathan Cape, 2005) ISBN 0-224-07126-2, p. 211</ref> As Mao put it, “Our determined policy is 70 percent self-development, 20 percent compromise, and 10 percent fight the Japanese”; in July-August 1943, 20,000 Chinese troops were wiped out at Shantung when attacked simultaneously by the Japanese from the north and the Communist rebels from the south.<ref>Robert Henry Winborne Welch, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=V_i2OwAACAAJ Again, May God Forgive Us]'' (Belmont, Wash.: Belmont Pub. Co., 1971), cited in James Perloff, "[http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/history/world/1464 China Betrayed Into Communism]," ''The New American,'' July 24, 2009; cf. Felix Wittmer, ''[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html The Yalta Betrayal: Data on the Decline and Fall of Franklin Delano Roosevelt]'' (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1961) p. 37</ref> Indeed, in May 1945, an [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS) team code-named "Spaniel" that parachuted into China to link up with Communist forces was instead taken prisoner by the Communists, whom they found coexisting with Japanese troops. The Americans were held incommunicado until October, some two months after the end of the war. When finally freed, they reported, "The amount of actual fighting being carried on by the 8th R.A. [the “Eighth Route Army,” i.e., Communist Chinese rebels] has been grossly exaggerated. It was their policy to undertake no serious campaign against the Japanese..."<ref>Maochun Yu, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=NJcolGHWfzoC OSS in China]'' (Yale University Press, 1997) ISBN 0300066988, pp. 220-223</ref> Even so [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0508&week=b&msg=TnHrvJBDZ3%2buWcV2D1Mwgw&user=&pw= ardent a pro-Communist] as Theodore White<ref>[[Edward C. Carter|Edward Carter]], head of the [[Attorney General's list|Communist front]] [[American Russian Institute]] confided to White&mdash;in the midst of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]&mdash;"A trusted member of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations|IPR]] staff is about to take a journey on my behalf to certain countries that are not too popular at the moment in [[Wall Street]] or in [[Jewish]] circles." (Edward C. Carter to Theodore H. White, January 8, 1940 [FBI file: [http://education-research.org/PDFs/IPR54.11.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol. 54, Sec. 11], PDF p. 120])</ref> would have to admit, "The Communists...claimed that they held down most of the Japanese troops in China and that they bore the main weight of resistance; this was untrue." In fact, wrote White, "it was the weary soldiers of the Central Government who bore the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died."<ref>Theodore Harold White, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=ipdPd6kY7XwC Thunder out of China]'' [Da Capo Press, 1980] ISBN 0306801280, p. 210)</ref>