Difference between revisions of "Godel's Incompleteness Theorems"
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(New page: Gödel's incompleteness theorems are 2 theorems published in 1931 by Kurt Gödel that reveals the limitations of the axiomatic approch to mathematics. '''Godel's First Incompleteness...) |
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Revision as of 06:48, March 31, 2007
Gödel's incompleteness theorems are 2 theorems published in 1931 by Kurt Gödel that reveals the limitations of the axiomatic approch to mathematics.
Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem: Peano Arithmetic or any extension of Peano Arithmetic is either incomplete or inconsistent.
Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem: Any set of axioms that asserts its own consistency is inconsistent.