Difference between revisions of "Robert C. Neville"
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==On politics and liberalism== | ==On politics and liberalism== | ||
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| − | However well the social contract practices of liberal democracies work in many instances, there is nevertheless a need to tie public obligations to personal responsibility in a different way from that of the contract tradition. For, when things go bad, that is just the time for personal responsibilities to become acute, not for them to be dissolved in a convenient return to nature. How can the values giving content to public obligations to be conserved, in Plato's sense, when it is no one's responsibility to do so, or even to think beyond personal interest? (page 249, ''The Highroad Around Modernism'')}} | + | However well the [[social contract]] practices of [[liberal democracy|liberal democracies]] work in many instances, there is nevertheless a need to tie public obligations to [[personal responsibility]] in a different way from that of the contract tradition. For, when things go bad, that is just the time for personal responsibilities to become acute, not for them to be dissolved in a convenient return to nature. How can the values giving content to public obligations to be conserved, in [[Plato]]'s sense, when it is no one's responsibility to do so, or even to think beyond personal interest? (page 249, ''The Highroad Around Modernism'')}} |
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
Revision as of 17:15, January 11, 2012
Robert C. Neville is an American theologian and philosopher. He graduated from Yale University in 1963 with a Ph.D. and wrote extensively on Confucianism and pragmatism. Currently he teaches at Boston University in the United States.
On politics and liberalism
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However well the social contract practices of liberal democracies work in many instances, there is nevertheless a need to tie public obligations to personal responsibility in a different way from that of the contract tradition. For, when things go bad, that is just the time for personal responsibilities to become acute, not for them to be dissolved in a convenient return to nature. How can the values giving content to public obligations to be conserved, in Plato's sense, when it is no one's responsibility to do so, or even to think beyond personal interest? (page 249, The Highroad Around Modernism) |
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