Block, SkipCaptcha, Upload, Automoderated users, edit, rollback
14,706
edits
Changes
mLine 50:
Line 50: − +
→Critical rationalism: typo
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
The view is criticized by those who hold that knowledge must have foundations, basic beliefs that are both true and justified, from which other propositions are derived. In ''The Open Society and its Enemies'', Popper refutes naive versions of this theory by pointing out that simply as a matter of logic such beliefs cannot be invoked to justify themselves; hence, the foundation stands in need of a foundation. He proceeds to add weight to this argument using the example of mathematics, citing Godel's Incompleteness Theorum and extending the principle to every science (eg physics) that depends on even basic arithmetic. Popper felt that he had refuted foundationalism decisively - but the urge to 'foundationalize' mathematics has not abated and, more generally, a number of significant thinkers (notably Quine, arguably Wittgenstein) have advanced various 'holisms' to provide epistemology with a foundation that isn't subject to Popper's apparently decisive refutation of naive foundationalism.
The view is criticized by those who hold that knowledge must have foundations, basic beliefs that are both true and justified, from which other propositions are derived. In ''The Open Society and its Enemies'', Popper refutes naive versions of this theory by pointing out that simply as a matter of logic such beliefs cannot be invoked to justify themselves; hence, the foundation stands in need of a foundation. He proceeds to add weight to this argument using the example of mathematics, citing Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem and extending the principle to every science (eg physics) that depends on even basic arithmetic. Popper felt that he had refuted foundationalism decisively - but the urge to 'foundationalize' mathematics has not abated and, more generally, a number of significant thinkers (notably Quine, arguably Wittgenstein) have advanced various 'holisms' to provide epistemology with a foundation that isn't subject to Popper's apparently decisive refutation of naive foundationalism.
==References==
==References==