Difference between revisions of "Bayesian Probability"

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'''Bayesian probability''' is a particular calculus of inductive plausible reasoning based on the works of [[Jacob Bernoulli|Bernoulli]], [[Rev Thomas Bayes|Bayes]], [[Pierre Simon de Laplace|Laplace]] (and more recently of [[Sir Harold Jeffreys|Jeffreys]], [[Richard T. Cox|Cox]], and [[Edwin T. Jaynes|Jaynes]]) in which probability is interpreted as the degree that a proposition/hypothesis/model is true ranging from complete certainty to complete certainty of its falsehood and all intermediate values.  Unlike frequentist statistics, Bayesian statistics starts from initial "estimates" of probabilities, which may reflect anecdotal evidence and/or ideology.  Probabilities are revised as evidence is accumulated.
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'''Bayesian probability''' is a particular calculus of inductive plausible reasoning based on the works of [[Jacob Bernoulli|Bernoulli]], [[Rev Thomas Bayes|Bayes]], [[Pierre Simon de Laplace|Laplace]] (and more recently of [[Sir Harold Jeffreys|Jeffreys]], [[Richard T. Cox|Cox]], and [[Edwin T. Jaynes|Jaynes]]) in which probability is interpreted as the degree that a proposition/hypothesis/model is true ranging from complete certainty to complete certainty of its falsehood and all intermediate values.
  
[[category:Probability and Statistics]]
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[[Category:Probability and Statistics]]

Latest revision as of 02:59, July 13, 2016

Bayesian probability is a particular calculus of inductive plausible reasoning based on the works of Bernoulli, Bayes, Laplace (and more recently of Jeffreys, Cox, and Jaynes) in which probability is interpreted as the degree that a proposition/hypothesis/model is true ranging from complete certainty to complete certainty of its falsehood and all intermediate values.