Changes

Suppose God creates an agent with the intent that this agent freely chooses the good all the time. Now, if the agent is to <i>freely</i> choose some good, she must actually be free to choose it or to refrain from choosing it. Further suppose that there is a world - the world God wants to make actual - in which that agent does choose the good all the time. This world can only be made actual if its predecessor - a "world segment" that includes all of the world's states of affairs save the agent's choice - is first made actual (before it can be true that an agent chooses the right thing in a situation, the agent must be presented with the situation at hand).<br><br>

Suppose God creates an agent with the intent that this agent freely chooses the good all the time. Now, if the agent is to <i>freely</i> choose some good, she must actually be free to choose it or to refrain from choosing it. Further suppose that there is a world - the world God wants to make actual - in which that agent does choose the good all the time. This world can only be made actual if its predecessor - a "world segment" that includes all of the world's states of affairs save the agent's choice - is first made actual (before it can be true that an agent chooses the right thing in a situation, the agent must be presented with the situation at hand).<br><br>

But if a world segment is made actual, then, if the agent is free with respect to the decision that must be made, God cannot control whether the agent will <i>freely</i> choose to do right or wrong. The upshot, according to Plantinga, is that theological compatiblism must be false - for God to determine that an agent will do right all the time is inconsistent with that agent freely choosing to do right all the time. Plantinga thinks the proposition "God actualizes a world in which an agent always freely chooses to do right" is analogous to "God actualizes a world that contains a married bachelor."<br><br>

But if a world segment is made actual, then, if the agent is free with respect to the decision that must be made, God cannot control whether the agent will <i>freely</i> choose to do right or wrong. The upshot, according to Plantinga, is that theological compatiblism must be false - for God to determine that an agent will do right all the time is inconsistent with that agent freely choosing to do right all the time. Plantinga thinks the proposition "God creates an agent who always freely chooses to do right" is analogous to "God creates a married bachelor."<br><br>

Plantinga furthers his defense in ''God, Freedom and Evil.'' If it is <i>logically possible</i> that all agents are depraved (will go wrong with respect to some action or other) in any world in which they exist, then it is logically possible that God could, no matter which agents he caused to exist, never create a world with human freedom and no moral evil.<br><br>

Plantinga furthers his defense in ''God, Freedom and Evil.'' If it is <i>logically possible</i> that all agents are depraved (will go wrong with respect to some action or other) in any world in which they exist, then it is logically possible that God could, no matter which agents he caused to exist, never create a world with human freedom and no moral evil.<br><br>