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*The third and most prevalent form of backdoor is a mandatory entitlement of specified payments to eligible beneficiaries. Most entitlements are open-ended: their cost depends on the varying number of claimants and amounts allowable to each, rather than on current legislative decisions.<ref>See [[Discretionary spending]] The political philosopher and journalist [[George Will]]  contends all government spending is discretionary, with the exception of debt service. [http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/02/george_will_on.html Econtalk], George Will, Feb-28-2011.</ref> Most entitlements are also in the form of permanent appropriations that bypass the appropriations committees altogether. Even when the entitlements go through the regular appropriations process (as is the case with public assistance and veterans' benefits) the appropriations committees have no real say over the amounts that are to be spent. <ref>[http://people.brandeis.edu/~woll/schickbudget.pdf The Battle of the Budget], Allen Schick, ''Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science'', Vol. 32, No. 1, Congress against the President, (1975), pp. 51-70. Published by: The Academy of Political. JSTOR.</ref>

*The third and most prevalent form of backdoor is a mandatory entitlement of specified payments to eligible beneficiaries. Most entitlements are open-ended: their cost depends on the varying number of claimants and amounts allowable to each, rather than on current legislative decisions.<ref>See [[Discretionary spending]] The political philosopher and journalist [[George Will]]  contends all government spending is discretionary, with the exception of debt service. [http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/02/george_will_on.html Econtalk], George Will, Feb-28-2011.</ref> Most entitlements are also in the form of permanent appropriations that bypass the appropriations committees altogether. Even when the entitlements go through the regular appropriations process (as is the case with public assistance and veterans' benefits) the appropriations committees have no real say over the amounts that are to be spent. <ref>[http://people.brandeis.edu/~woll/schickbudget.pdf The Battle of the Budget], Allen Schick, ''Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science'', Vol. 32, No. 1, Congress against the President, (1975), pp. 51-70. Published by: The Academy of Political. JSTOR.</ref>

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 originally was intended to limit and reform backdoor authority<ref>http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/202440.html</ref><ref>http://appropriations.house.gov/about/</ref>, however by 2010, [[President Obama]]'s Simpson-Bowles Commission reported the that tax code had become riddled with $1.1 trillion (roughly equal to annual projected deficits) in backdoor spending as hidden "[[tax expenditure]]s.<ref>[http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf The Moment of Truth: Report of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform]. December 2010. The White House. P. 29, pdf.</ref>

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 originally was intended to limit and reform backdoor authority<ref>http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/202440.html</ref><ref>http://appropriations.house.gov/about/</ref>, however by 2010, [[President Obama]]'s Simpson-Bowles Commission reported the that tax code had become riddled with $1.1 trillion (roughly equal to annual projected deficits) in backdoor spending as hidden "[[tax expenditure]]s."<ref>[http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf The Moment of Truth: Report of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform]. December 2010. The White House. P. 29, pdf.</ref>

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