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the [[American Russian Institute]], the [[National Emergency Conference]] (and its successor, the [[National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights]]), the [[American Law Students Association]], and the [[American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations]]. According to the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]] (HUAC) each of these organizations was cited as [[Communist front]] groups at the time of Jessup's association with them. Although the Tydings Committee did not allow McCarthy to present his evidence against Jessup, the Tydings Committee did refer to some of McCarthy's evidence that were made on the floor of the Senate. Of course, as usual, the Tydings Committee either ignored the significance of the evidence or downplayed it. It was up to the [[United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security|McCarran Committee]] a year later to do the real investigating and in discussing the IPR, it stated, "The IPR was a vehicle used by Communists to orientate American Far Eastern policy toward Communist objectives." The McCarran Committee Hearings clearly indicate that the IPR was more than just a Communist front organization in that there was an active Communist "cell" that put the services of the IPR at the disposal of "Communist imperialism". And that this was achieved by "manipulating" the IPR's policy-making officials.<br>

the [[American Russian Institute]], the [[National Emergency Conference]] (and its successor, the [[National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights]]), the [[American Law Students Association]], and the [[American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations]]. According to the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]] (HUAC) each of these organizations was cited as [[Communist front]] groups at the time of Jessup's association with them. Although the Tydings Committee did not allow McCarthy to present his evidence against Jessup, the Tydings Committee did refer to some of McCarthy's evidence that were made on the floor of the Senate. Of course, as usual, the Tydings Committee either ignored the significance of the evidence or downplayed it. It was up to the [[United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security|McCarran Committee]] a year later to do the real investigating and in discussing the IPR, it stated, "The IPR was a vehicle used by Communists to orientate American Far Eastern policy toward Communist objectives." The McCarran Committee Hearings clearly indicate that the IPR was more than just a Communist front organization in that there was an active Communist "cell" that put the services of the IPR at the disposal of "Communist imperialism". And that this was achieved by "manipulating" the IPR's policy-making officials.<br>

The McCarran Committee reported that ten of the thirty-three individuals whom Jessup recommended as delegates to the IPR Hot Springs Convention in January 1945 have been named as members of the Communist Party. Jessup was well aware that Frederick Vanderbilt Field was a member of the Communist Party, and especially so when Field resigned from the IPR to devote full time to the Communist front organization, [[American Peace Mobilization]].<br>

The McCarran Committee reported that ten of the thirty-three individuals whom Jessup recommended as delegates to the IPR Hot Springs Convention in January 1945 have been named as members of the Communist Party. Jessup was well aware that Frederick Vanderbilt Field was a member of the Communist Party, and especially so when Field resigned from the IPR to devote full-time to the Communist front organization, [[American Peace Mobilization]].<br>

Jessup also presided over the State Department Policy Conference of October 1949 that was not only stocked with Jessup's pro-Communist associates but also, in the words of the McCarran Committee, which stated, "...the prevailing [majority] view at the conference advocated (a) the recognition of [[Communist China]]; (b) normal trade relations between the United States and Communist China; (c) encouragement of trade between Japan and Communist China; (d) economic assistance to Communist China; (e) recognition that Communist conquest in Asia was a natural and inevitable consequence of revolutionary ferment in Asia with its Communist nature being incidental." [[Harold Stassen]] and [[General Joseph Fortier]] have respectively testified that Jessup not only ignored advice to disregard the pro-Communist direction of the conference and that Jessup was in favor of recognizing Communist China. The above evidence clearly demonstrates that Jessup was at least a security risk and that the State Department Loyalty program failed to identify him as such.  

Jessup also presided over the State Department Policy Conference of October 1949 that was not only stocked with Jessup's pro-Communist associates but also, in the words of the McCarran Committee, which stated, "...the prevailing [majority] view at the conference advocated (a) the recognition of [[Communist China]]; (b) normal trade relations between the United States and Communist China; (c) encouragement of trade between Japan and Communist China; (d) economic assistance to Communist China; (e) recognition that Communist conquest in Asia was a natural and inevitable consequence of revolutionary ferment in Asia with its Communist nature being incidental." [[Harold Stassen]] and [[General Joseph Fortier]] have respectively testified that Jessup not only ignored advice to disregard the pro-Communist direction of the conference and that Jessup was in favor of recognizing Communist China. The above evidence clearly demonstrates that Jessup was at least a security risk and that the State Department Loyalty program failed to identify him as such.