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House played a major role as the chief American negotiator and Wilson's chief advisor at the Paris peace conference in 1919.  He adopted much of the French hard-line anti-German position.<ref>Floto (1973)</ref> During and after the war House misled the Italian premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, by accepting the borders established for Italy in the secret 1915 [[Treaty of London]], which the United States had not signed. Without mentioning his meeting with Orlando, House assured Wilson that nothing would embarrass the president or compromise his principles for peace. When an agreement seemed reachable at the Paris, Wilson, urged by the American delegates who denounced the "immorality" of the Italian demands, withdrew his support for House's plans. House thus exhibited indifference, ignorance, distrust, and miscommunication that worsened relations with Italy and, ultimately leading to the Fiume crisis at the peace conference.<ref>Daniela Rossini, "'For Sheer Deviltry': Colonel House and Italian-American Relations During World War I.' ''Annales du Monde Anglophone'' 1999 (2): 175-203. Issn: 1259-5098</ref>

House played a major role as the chief American negotiator and Wilson's chief advisor at the Paris peace conference in 1919.  He adopted much of the French hard-line anti-German position.<ref>Floto (1973)</ref> During and after the war House misled the Italian premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, by accepting the borders established for Italy in the secret 1915 [[Treaty of London]], which the United States had not signed. Without mentioning his meeting with Orlando, House assured Wilson that nothing would embarrass the president or compromise his principles for peace. When an agreement seemed reachable at the Paris, Wilson, urged by the American delegates who denounced the "immorality" of the Italian demands, withdrew his support for House's plans. House thus exhibited indifference, ignorance, distrust, and miscommunication that worsened relations with Italy and, ultimately leading to the Fiume crisis at the peace conference.<ref>Daniela Rossini, "'For Sheer Deviltry': Colonel House and Italian-American Relations During World War I.' ''Annales du Monde Anglophone'' 1999 (2): 175-203. Issn: 1259-5098</ref>

When Wilson returned home in February 1919, House took his place on the Council of Ten where he negotiated deals unacceptable to Wilson. Even worse were personality conflicts, as House became too independent and was less and less the spokesman for Wilson.  Wilson himself became much more intolerant and systematically broke with one after another of his closest advisors, perhaps as a result of his medical condition (Wilson suffered several small strokes before his major one in Sept. 1919).  In mid-March, Wilson returned to Paris and lost confidence in House, and never saw him again.  

When Wilson returned home in February 1919, House took his place on the Council of Ten where he negotiated deals unacceptable to Wilson. Even worse were personality conflicts, as House became too independent and was less and less the spokesman for Wilson.  Wilson himself became much more intolerant and systematically broke with one after another of his closest advisors, perhaps as a result of his medical condition (Wilson suffered several small strokes before his major one in Sept. 1919).  In mid-March, Wilson returned to Paris and lost confidence in House, and never saw him again.

 

==House's integrity==

==House's integrity==

Historians agree that House manipulated Wilson, and provided misleading information; they debate whether House was disloyal to the president because, contrary to Wilson's explicit instructions, he had tentatively approved French demands for the separation of the Rhineland from Germany, and the separation of the League of Nations from the peace treaty with Germany.<ref>Floto (1973) and [[Arthur Link]] conclude there was disloyalty, a charge rejected by Arthur Walworth, "Considerations on Woodrow Wilson and Edward M. House," ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 1994 24(1): 79-86. Issn: 0360-4918</ref>  Until the end Wilson seems to have been uncritical of House, and unaware of how House misled everyone else and was himself misled by the British. To explain the relationship scholars have turned to psychology, but that approach has been controversial among traditional historians.<ref>George and George (1964); Esposito (1988)</ref>

Historians agree that House manipulated Wilson, and provided misleading information; they debate whether House was disloyal to the president because, contrary to Wilson's explicit instructions, he had tentatively approved French demands for the separation of the Rhineland from Germany, and the separation of the League of Nations from the peace treaty with Germany.<ref>Floto (1973) and [[Arthur Link]] conclude there was disloyalty, a charge rejected by Arthur Walworth, "Considerations on Woodrow Wilson and Edward M. House," ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 1994 24(1): 79-86. Issn: 0360-4918</ref>  Until the end Wilson seems to have been uncritical of House, and unaware of how House misled everyone else and was himself misled by the British. To explain the relationship scholars have turned to psychology, but that approach has been controversial among traditional historians.<ref>George and George (1964); Esposito (1988)</ref>

The book Philip Dru was a book authored by House that he published anonymously.  It is a unique title in that it can be viewed both as a [[dystopia]] as well as an [[utopia]]n novel.<ref>{{cite web|title=Progressivism's Revenge|url=http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2013/03/progressivisms_revenge.html|publisher=[[American Thinker]]| quote=House's book is "utopian" in the sense that he is fantasizing about being given the authority to achieve, in one fell swoop, the agenda wished and fought for by the progressives of his time, as of ours. }}</ref>

The book Philip Dru was a book authored by House that he published anonymously.  It is a unique title in that it can be viewed both as a [[dystopia]] as well as an [[utopia]]n novel.<ref>{{cite web|title=Progressivism's Revenge|url=http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2013/03/progressivisms_revenge.html|publisher=[[American Thinker]]| quote=House's book is "utopian" in the sense that he is fantasizing about being given the authority to achieve, in one fell swoop, the agenda wished and fought for by the progressives of his time, as of ours. }}</ref>

== Bibliography==

==Bibliography==

* Bailey, Thomas A. ''Wilson and the Peacemakers: Combining Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace and Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal.'' 1947. [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=61986422 online edition]

* Bailey, Thomas A. ''Wilson and the Peacemakers: Combining Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace and Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal.'' 1947. [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=61986422 online edition]

* Esposito, David M.  ''Imagined Power: The Secret Life of Colonel House.'' ''The Historian.'' (1988) 60#4 pp 741+. [http://www.questia.com/read/5001364183 online edition], a strongly negative psychological appraisal

* Esposito, David M.  ''Imagined Power: The Secret Life of Colonel House.'' ''The Historian.'' (1988) 60#4 pp 741+. [http://www.questia.com/read/5001364183 online edition], a strongly negative psychological appraisal

* Link, Arthur C. ed. ''The Papers of Woodrow Wilson'' (69 vol), included hundreds of letters and memoranda between House and Wilson; available in large academic libraries

* Link, Arthur C. ed. ''The Papers of Woodrow Wilson'' (69 vol), included hundreds of letters and memoranda between House and Wilson; available in large academic libraries

====notes====

==References==

==External links==

==External links==