Changes

As explained by Judge Straub in dissent in ''All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev.'', 651 F.3d 218, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2011):

As explained by Judge Straub in dissent in ''All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev.'', 651 F.3d 218, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2011):

{{cquote|In ''Rust'', recipients of the family planning grants argued that the regulations restricting federal funds from being used for abortion services constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination in favor of an anti-abortion position. 500 U.S. at 192. Relying on ''Taxation With Representation'', they argued that because the government "continue[d] to fund speech ancillary to pregnancy testing in a manner that is not evenhanded with respect to views and information about abortion, it invidiously discriminates on the basis of viewpoint." ''Id.'' (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court rejected this challenge and found that Congress had not discriminated in favor of an anti-abortion position, but had "merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other." ''Id.'' at 193. The Court reiterated that "'[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.'" ''Id.'' (quoting ''Maher v. Roe'', 432 U.S. 464, 475, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 53 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1977)). In other words, Rust was "not a case of the Government 'suppressing a dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside of the project's scope," ''id.'' at 194. This was so even though it cannot be denied that the scope of the government-funded project in ''Rust'' necessarily limited recipients' ability to advocate a pro-abortion viewpoint within the scope of the government program.}}

{{cquote|In ''Rust'', recipients of the family planning grants argued that the regulations restricting federal funds from being used for abortion services constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination in favor of an anti-abortion position. 500 U.S. at 192. Relying on ''Taxation With Representation'', they argued that because the government "continue[d] to fund speech ancillary to pregnancy testing in a manner that is not evenhanded with respect to views and information about abortion, it invidiously discriminates on the basis of viewpoint." ''Id.'' (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court rejected this challenge and found that Congress had not discriminated in favor of an anti-abortion position, but had "merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other." ''Id.'' at 193. The Court reiterated that "'[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.'" ''Id.'' (quoting ''Maher v. Roe'', 432 U.S. 464, 475, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 53 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1977)). In other words, Rust was "not a case of the Government 'suppressing a dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside of the project's scope," ''id.'' at 194. This was so even though it cannot be denied that the scope of the government-funded project in ''Rust'' necessarily limited recipients' ability to advocate a pro-abortion viewpoint within the scope of the government program.}}

[[Category:United States Supreme Court Cases]]

[[Category:United States Supreme Court Cases]]

[[Category:Abortion]]

[[Category:Abortion]]

[[Category:Judicial Restraint]]

[[Category:Judicial Restraint]]