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| | *[[Essay: Xodfdlofjldjflodej]] | | *[[Essay: Xodfdlofjldjflodej]] |
| | *[[Essay: Shockofgod's video "Atheism a house divided and in global decline"]] | | *[[Essay: Shockofgod's video "Atheism a house divided and in global decline"]] |
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| − | == Workspace ==
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| − | Russia's long-term economic forecast.
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| − | On March 25, 2024, the Bank of Finland Institute For Emerging Economies indicated with a note of caution regarding their forecast due to Russia publishing less publically available economic data during the war in Ukraine: "Russian economic growth will decelerate this year. High growth of the second half of 2023 is still sufficient to boost on-year growth this year to around 2 %, even if quarterly growth were to cease altogether in 2024. In the absence of a surprising event, the Russian economy in 2025 and 2026 should grow at around 1 % a year, close to its long-term potential growth rate."<ref>[BOFIT Forecast for Russia 2024–2026], Bank of Finland Institute For Emerging Economies, 25 March 2024</ref>
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| − | There are other notable factors mentioned above which could make the above long-term forecast worse such as China's financial difficulties causing it to buy less Russian oil in the future and Russia being less able to produce oil post 2035 (See: [[Essay: Russia's economy and gas and oil profits will be BADLY damaged when China's economy declines|Russia's economy and gas and oil profits will be BADLY damaged when China's economy declines]] and [[Essay: Russian oil: Lower future production/profits due to future higher extraction costs and other inefficiencies|Russian oil: Lower future production/profits due to future higher extraction costs and other inefficiencies]]).
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| − | Prior to the war in Ukraine, Russia practiced fiscal discipline and built up a reserve in order to make it more resilient to Western sanctions.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75GP_tKHZWA Is Russia's economy under pressure?], Roundtable video, March 5, 2024</ref> However, the war is causing labor shortages, some inflation, and war time economies hurt a country's longer-term economic prospects because the money spent on the military is not spent on education, research and development, other factors which help labor productivity and other items which help long term economic growth.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75GP_tKHZWA Is Russia's economy under pressure?], Roundtable video, March 5, 2024</ref><ref>[https://theins.ru/en/opinion/igor-lipsitz/267664 The “no human” factor: How Russia’s workforce shortage rolls back its economic development]</ref> In addition, Western sanctions on Wester technology hurts the Russian economy, but this a more slow and long-term as far as its effects.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75GP_tKHZWA Is Russia's economy under pressure?], Roundtable video, March 5, 2024</ref>
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| − | Currently, Russia is under a wartime economy and is running a deficit.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75GP_tKHZWA Is Russia's economy under pressure?], Roundtable video, March 5, 2024</ref>
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| − | From 2017 until early 2022, Alexandra Prokopenko worked at the Central Bank of Russia and at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Moscow. She is a former columnist for Vedomosti.
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| − | According to Prokopenko, Russia faces an economic trilemma which involves juggling the three balls of: funding the war in Ukraine, maintaining his populace’s living standards, and safeguarding macroeconomic stability.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slzS7pxavi0 How long can Putin afford to wage war in Ukraine?], DW News 4-19-2024.</ref> Prokopenko indicates that after 3 years, the Russians will drop one of these balls and the ball that Russia will most likely pick will be the lowering of his populace's living standards.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slzS7pxavi0 How long can Putin afford to wage war in Ukraine?], DW News 4-19-2024.</ref>
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| − | On April 28, 2024, ''The Japan Times'' reported:
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| − | {{Cquote|President Vladimir Putin of Russia appears on track to institute a rare tax increase on corporations and high earners, a move that reflects both the burgeoning costs of his war in Ukraine and the firm control he has over the Russian elite as he embarks on a fifth term in office.
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| − | Financial technocrats in Putin’s government are searching for new ways to fund not just the war but also a broader confrontation with the West that is likely to remain costly for years. Russia is allocating nearly one-third of its overall 2024 budget to national defense spending this year, a huge increase, adding to a deficit that the Kremlin has taken pains to keep in check...
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| − | Most Russians pay income tax at a flat rate of 13%, significantly lower than what taxpayers in the United States and Western Europe typically pay. In an interview in March, Putin said he planned to introduce a new progressive tax scale in part to alleviate poverty — a popular message among many Russians who support increasing taxes on the country’s rich, which have historically been low.
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| − | A tax that largely spares lower income earners could also help mute discontent over the war among poorer Russians, who are providing much of the manpower for the army and bearing the brunt of the casualties. Putin has signaled that the tax overhaul will include special incentives for certain groups, which could include Russians directly involved in the war effort or families with three or more children.<ref>[Putin’s war will soon reach Russians’ tax bills], ''The Japan Times'', April 28, 2024</ref>}}
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| | == workspace 2 == | | == workspace 2 == |