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Of all Russian speaking [[Slav]]s, the Galicians or "Ukrainians" as they have come to be called, are perhaps the most "[[Western Civilization|Westernized]]" [[cultural]]y of the Russian peoples while holding to their [[Eastern Rite]] faith.
 
Of all Russian speaking [[Slav]]s, the Galicians or "Ukrainians" as they have come to be called, are perhaps the most "[[Western Civilization|Westernized]]" [[cultural]]y of the Russian peoples while holding to their [[Eastern Rite]] faith.
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==Vladimir Putin explained to Tucker Carlson the origin of the Ukrainian state==
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==Historiography==
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The scholarly study of the Ukraine's history emerged from romantic impulses in the late 19th century.  The outstanding leaders were Volodymyr Antonovych (1834-1908), based in Kiev,  and  his student Michael Hrushevsky (1866-1934).<ref>Serhii Plokhy, ''Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History'' (2005)</ref> For the first time full-scale scholarly studies based on archival sources, modern research techniques, and modern historical theories became possible. However, the demands of government officials—especially Soviet, but also Czarists and Polish—made it difficult to disseminate ideas that ran counter to the central government. Therefore, exile schools of historians emerged in central Europe and Canada after 1920.<ref>KubijovyČ, ed. ''Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia'' (1963) 1:559-74</ref>
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[[File:Coin of the Kievan Rus.jpg|thumbnail|275px|The Ukrainophile view of history talks about the [[Kievan Rus']] as the precedent of Ukraine as a state and uses the personal tamga or sign of Vladimir (trident or ''tryzub'') shown in the coin as the national Coat of Arms.<ref name=KievanRusCoins>[https://www.cointalk.com/threads/coins-of-the-kievan-rus.394099/ Coins of the Kievan Rus]</ref>]]
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Strikingly different interpretations of the medieval state of [[Kievan Rus']] appear in the four schools of historiography within Ukraine: Russophile, Sovietophile, Eastern Slavic, and Ukrainophile. The Sovietophile and Russophile schools have become marginalized in independent Ukraine, with the Ukrainophile school being dominant in the early 21st century.  The Ukrainophile school promotes an identity that is mutually exclusive of Russia. It has come to dominate the nation's educational system, security forces, and national symbols and monuments, although it has been dismissed as nationalist by Western historians. The East Slavic school, an eclectic compromise between Ukrainophiles and Russophilism, has a weaker ideological and symbolic base, although it is preferred by Ukraine's centrist former elites.<ref>Taras Kuzio, "National Identity and History Writing in Ukraine," ''Nationalities Papers'' 2006 34(4): 407-427, online in [[EBSCO]]</ref>
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Many historians in recent years have sought alternatives to national histories, and Ukrainian history invited approaches that looked beyond a national paradigm. Multiethnic history recognizes the numerous peoples in Ukraine; transnational history portrays Ukraine as a border zone for various empires; and area studies categorizes Ukraine as part of Eurasia, or more often as part of East-Central Europe. Plokhy (2007) argues that looking beyond the country's national history has made possible a richer understanding of Ukraine, its people, and the surrounding regions.<ref>Serhii Plokhy, "Beyond Nationality" ''Ab Imperio'' 2007 (4): 25-46,</ref>
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After 1991, historical memory was a powerful tool in the political mobilization and legitimation of the post-Soviet Ukrainian state, as well as the division of selectively used memory along the lines of the political division of Ukrainian society. Ukraine did not experience the restorationist paradigm typical of some other post-Soviet nations, including the Baltic states, although the multifaceted history of independence, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, Soviet-era repressions, mass famine, and World War II collaboration were used to provide a different constitutive frame for the new Ukrainian nation. The politics of identity (which includes the production of history textbooks and the authorization of commemorative practices) has remained fragmented and tailored to reflect the ideological anxieties and concerns of individual regions of Ukraine.<ref>See Andryi Portnov, "Exercises with history Ukrainian style (notes on public aspects of history's functioning in post-Soviet Ukraine)," ''Ab Imperio'' 2007 (3): 93-138, in Ukrainian</ref>
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==Coat of Arms==
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[[File:Mother Ukraine in 2023 without Marxist symbols.jpg|thumbnail|200px|Mother Ukraine statue in [[Kyiv]] in 2023 without Marxist symbols after their remotion.<ref name=Motherland>{{cite web|url=https://www.foxnews.com/world/ukraine-strips-hammer-sickle-gigantic-motherland-monument-replace-state-trident|title=Ukraine strips hammer and sickle from gigantic 'Motherland' monument, replace with state trident|date=August 8, 2023|publisher=Fox News}}</ref>]]
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Ukraine uses the symbol in reference to its historical kinship with [[Kievan Rus]] which used it as Coat of Arms which was the personal tamga or sign of Vladimir. The symbol, also known as ''tryzub'' or trident can be found in the coins found by archeologists.<ref name=KievanRusCoins/>
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According the [[BBC]], the trident is a symbol associated with [[white supremacy]] in the UK police counter-extremism guide and also used by Ukraine's [[neo-nazi]] [[Svoboda party]].<ref name=AntiTerror>[https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-51174898 Ukraine coat of arms in UK anti-terror list furore], By Georgina Rannard, [[BBC News]], 21 January 2020.</ref>
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A Counter Terrorism Policing official told BBC News after the controversy of the inclusion of the symbol: "We regret any offence caused, unfortunately, far-right groups have a history of misappropriating national symbols as part of their identity and this is the reason why some national flags and symbols appear in our document".
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==Vladimir Putin point of view about the origin of the Ukrainian state explained to Tucker Carlson==
 
In his interview with [[Tucker Carlson]] on February 8, 2024, Russian President [[Vladimir Putin]] explained the origins of the Ukrainian state with the following statements.<ref>https://theduran.com/full-transcript-the-interview-of-president-putin-with-tucker-carlson-video/</ref>
 
In his interview with [[Tucker Carlson]] on February 8, 2024, Russian President [[Vladimir Putin]] explained the origins of the Ukrainian state with the following statements.<ref>https://theduran.com/full-transcript-the-interview-of-president-putin-with-tucker-carlson-video/</ref>
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When called out on the [[lie]]s, Ukrainian dictator Volodymyr Zelensky doubled down.  Both socialist premier Joe Biden and NATO chief warlord Jens Stoltenberg blamed Ukraine for the attack.  Zelensky refuted the Western leaders' statements that the missile which killed two innocent civilians in Poland was Ukrainian. "I have no doubt that it was not our missile or our missile strike."  Zelensky insisted that he received reports from the corrupt Armed Forces of Ukraine command that told him the missile attacks did not come from Ukraine," he told the people in a live nationwide address on Ukrainian state-controlled media.<ref>https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/11/16/7376663/</ref>  The [[Russophobic]] ''Financial Times'' of [[London]] quoted a [[diplomat]] from a NATO country in Kyiv saying: “This is getting ridiculous. The Ukrainians are destroying [our] confidence in them. Nobody is blaming Ukraine and they are openly lying. This is more destructive than the [[missile]].”<ref>https://archive.ph/mxQ5K#selection-2029.34-2029.282</ref>
 
When called out on the [[lie]]s, Ukrainian dictator Volodymyr Zelensky doubled down.  Both socialist premier Joe Biden and NATO chief warlord Jens Stoltenberg blamed Ukraine for the attack.  Zelensky refuted the Western leaders' statements that the missile which killed two innocent civilians in Poland was Ukrainian. "I have no doubt that it was not our missile or our missile strike."  Zelensky insisted that he received reports from the corrupt Armed Forces of Ukraine command that told him the missile attacks did not come from Ukraine," he told the people in a live nationwide address on Ukrainian state-controlled media.<ref>https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/11/16/7376663/</ref>  The [[Russophobic]] ''Financial Times'' of [[London]] quoted a [[diplomat]] from a NATO country in Kyiv saying: “This is getting ridiculous. The Ukrainians are destroying [our] confidence in them. Nobody is blaming Ukraine and they are openly lying. This is more destructive than the [[missile]].”<ref>https://archive.ph/mxQ5K#selection-2029.34-2029.282</ref>
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==Historiography==
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The scholarly study of the Ukraine's history emerged from romantic impulses in the late 19th century.  The outstanding leaders were Volodymyr Antonovych (1834-1908), based in Kiev,  and  his student Michael Hrushevsky (1866-1934).<ref>Serhii Plokhy, ''Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History'' (2005)</ref> For the first time full-scale scholarly studies based on archival sources, modern research techniques, and modern historical theories became possible. However, the demands of government officials—especially Soviet, but also Czarists and Polish—made it difficult to disseminate ideas that ran counter to the central government. Therefore, exile schools of historians emerged in central Europe and Canada after 1920.<ref>KubijovyČ, ed. ''Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia'' (1963) 1:559-74</ref>
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Strikingly different interpretations of the medieval state of [[Kievan Rus']] appear in the four schools of historiography within Ukraine: Russophile, Sovietophile, Eastern Slavic, and Ukrainophile. The Sovietophile and Russophile schools have become marginalized in independent Ukraine, with the Ukrainophile school being dominant in the early 21st century.  The Ukrainophile school promotes an identity that is mutually exclusive of Russia. It has come to dominate the nation's educational system, security forces, and national symbols and monuments, although it has been dismissed as nationalist by Western historians. The East Slavic school, an eclectic compromise between Ukrainophiles and Russophilism, has a weaker ideological and symbolic base, although it is preferred by Ukraine's centrist former elites.<ref>Taras Kuzio, "National Identity and History Writing in Ukraine," ''Nationalities Papers'' 2006 34(4): 407-427, online in [[EBSCO]]</ref>
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Many historians in recent years have sought alternatives to national histories, and Ukrainian history invited approaches that looked beyond a national paradigm. Multiethnic history recognizes the numerous peoples in Ukraine; transnational history portrays Ukraine as a border zone for various empires; and area studies categorizes Ukraine as part of Eurasia, or more often as part of East-Central Europe. Plokhy (2007) argues that looking beyond the country's national history has made possible a richer understanding of Ukraine, its people, and the surrounding regions.<ref>Serhii Plokhy, "Beyond Nationality" ''Ab Imperio'' 2007 (4): 25-46,</ref>
  −
  −
After 1991, historical memory was a powerful tool in the political mobilization and legitimation of the post-Soviet Ukrainian state, as well as the division of selectively used memory along the lines of the political division of Ukrainian society. Ukraine did not experience the restorationist paradigm typical of some other post-Soviet nations, including the Baltic states, although the multifaceted history of independence, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, Soviet-era repressions, mass famine, and World War II collaboration were used to provide a different constitutive frame for the new Ukrainian nation. The politics of identity (which includes the production of history textbooks and the authorization of commemorative practices) has remained fragmented and tailored to reflect the ideological anxieties and concerns of individual regions of Ukraine.<ref>See Andryi Portnov, "Exercises with history Ukrainian style (notes on public aspects of history's functioning in post-Soviet Ukraine)," ''Ab Imperio'' 2007 (3): 93-138, in Ukrainian</ref>
      
==See also==
 
==See also==
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