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The Berlin Airlift began in October, 1949, when the [[U.S.S.R.]] imposed a blockade on the sectors of [[Berlin]] occupied by the Western powers, and ended in May 1950 when the blockade ceased.  [[America]] and her capitalist allies flew supplies into the city daily, effectively foiling the blockade.
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The '''Berlin Airlift''' began in October, 1949, when the [[U.S.S.R.]] imposed a blockade on the sectors of [[Berlin]] occupied by the Western powers, and ended in May 1950 when the blockade ceased.  [[America]] and her capitalist allies flew supplies into the city daily, effectively foiling the blockade.
    
According to [[Paval Sudoplatov]], Director of [[Red Army]] counterintelligence unit called [[SMERSH]] (acronym for 'Smertzy Shpyionam', or 'Death to Spies'), Stalin provoked the Berlin crisis deliberately to divert attention from the crucial struggle for power in China. Atomic espionage had proven as valuable to in the political and diplomatic spheres as it was in the military. [[Klaus Fuchs]] had provided key data on the production of uranium 235. Fuchs revealed that American production was one hundred kilograms of U-235 a month and twenty kilos of plutonium per month. From this information Soviet intelligence could calculate the number of atomic bombs possessed by the Americans. The Soviet Intelligence was able to determine that the United States was not prepared for a nuclear war with the Soviet Union at the end of the 1940s or even in the early 1950s.  
 
According to [[Paval Sudoplatov]], Director of [[Red Army]] counterintelligence unit called [[SMERSH]] (acronym for 'Smertzy Shpyionam', or 'Death to Spies'), Stalin provoked the Berlin crisis deliberately to divert attention from the crucial struggle for power in China. Atomic espionage had proven as valuable to in the political and diplomatic spheres as it was in the military. [[Klaus Fuchs]] had provided key data on the production of uranium 235. Fuchs revealed that American production was one hundred kilograms of U-235 a month and twenty kilos of plutonium per month. From this information Soviet intelligence could calculate the number of atomic bombs possessed by the Americans. The Soviet Intelligence was able to determine that the United States was not prepared for a nuclear war with the Soviet Union at the end of the 1940s or even in the early 1950s.  
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