Changes

Hiss had input even on China. During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, regarding the war with Japan, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to the formerly [https://archive.is/HTiIW Top Secret minutes], "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 229. The official State Department record resorts to the passive voice, obscuring Hiss's role in this incident: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 502] Press reports relying on this [https://books.google.com/books?id=kotPYEqx7kMC&q=memory+hole#v=snippet&q=memory%20hole&f=false bowdlerized] official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]." FDR apologists such as liberal "[https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/weekinreview/04tanenhaus.html court historian]" Arthur Schlesinger parroted this official version as dogma: "As for Yalta, Alger Hiss had nothing to do with the Far Eastern discussions, and knew nothing of their existence," etc. Arthur Meier Schlesinger, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=MegmQB1MxqkC The Politics of Hope: And, The Bitter Heritage: American Liberalism in the 1960s]'' (Princeton University Press, 2008) ISBN 0691134758, p. 237</ref> The British, due to their interests in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present (because they were [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/smenu.asp not at war with Japan]). The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that Acheson would subsequently use as a pretext to obstruct aid to China<ref>"Too much stress cannot be laid on the hope that our economic assistance be carried out in China through the medium of a government fully and fairly representative of all important Chinese political elements, including the Chinese Communists," said Acheson. (Freda Utley, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=JmAcAAAAMAAJ The China story]'' [H. Regnery Co., 1951], p. 15) This was the pretext for the U.S. embargo on arms to China in July 1946. Even after the embargo ended in May 1947, Acheson was able to delay shipments another six months. In 1949, he would explicitly instruct his subordinates that "it is desirable that shipments be delayed where possible to do so without formal action." (David S. McLellan, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=SfJ2AAAAMAAJ Dean Acheson: the State Department years]'' [New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1976] ISBN 0396073131, p. 188) After the fall of China, Senator John F. Kennedy would comment: "Mr. Speaker, over this weekend we have learned the extent of the disaster that has befallen China and the United States. The responsibility for the failure of our foreign policy in the Far East rests squarely with the [Truman] White House and the [Acheson] Department of State. The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed, was a crippling blow to the National Government. So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the [[Owen Lattimore|Lattimore]]s and the Fairbanks, with the imperfection of the democratic system in China after twenty years of war, and the tales of corruption in high places, that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China." John F. Kennedy, ''A Compendium of Speeches, Statements, and Remarks Delivered During His Service in the Congress of the United States'' (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 41-42. Cf. [[#refEvans07|Evans 2007]]: 419</ref>&mdash;a move that would prove [http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/RummelDemocide.php catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://chineseculture.about.com/od/mediainchina/p/Writer-Jung-Chang.htm member of Mao's Red Guards]. [[#refChang05|Chang 2005]]: 3, 560, 651. Cf. Stephane Courtois et al., ''[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674076082 The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression]'' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) ISBN 9780674076082, p. 4.</ref>

Hiss had input even on China. During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, regarding the war with Japan, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to the formerly [https://archive.is/HTiIW Top Secret minutes], "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 229. The official State Department record resorts to the passive voice, obscuring Hiss's role in this incident: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 502] Press reports relying on this [https://books.google.com/books?id=kotPYEqx7kMC&q=memory+hole#v=snippet&q=memory%20hole&f=false bowdlerized] official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]." FDR apologists such as liberal "[https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/weekinreview/04tanenhaus.html court historian]" Arthur Schlesinger parroted this official version as dogma: "As for Yalta, Alger Hiss had nothing to do with the Far Eastern discussions, and knew nothing of their existence," etc. Arthur Meier Schlesinger, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=MegmQB1MxqkC The Politics of Hope: And, The Bitter Heritage: American Liberalism in the 1960s]'' (Princeton University Press, 2008) ISBN 0691134758, p. 237</ref> The British, due to their interests in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present (because they were [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/smenu.asp not at war with Japan]). The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that Acheson would subsequently use as a pretext to obstruct aid to China<ref>"Too much stress cannot be laid on the hope that our economic assistance be carried out in China through the medium of a government fully and fairly representative of all important Chinese political elements, including the Chinese Communists," said Acheson. (Freda Utley, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=JmAcAAAAMAAJ The China story]'' [H. Regnery Co., 1951], p. 15) This was the pretext for the U.S. embargo on arms to China in July 1946. Even after the embargo ended in May 1947, Acheson was able to delay shipments another six months. In 1949, he would explicitly instruct his subordinates that "it is desirable that shipments be delayed where possible to do so without formal action." (David S. McLellan, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=SfJ2AAAAMAAJ Dean Acheson: the State Department years]'' [New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1976] ISBN 0396073131, p. 188) After the fall of China, Senator John F. Kennedy would comment: "Mr. Speaker, over this weekend we have learned the extent of the disaster that has befallen China and the United States. The responsibility for the failure of our foreign policy in the Far East rests squarely with the [Truman] White House and the [Acheson] Department of State. The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed, was a crippling blow to the National Government. So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the [[Owen Lattimore|Lattimore]]s and the Fairbanks, with the imperfection of the democratic system in China after twenty years of war, and the tales of corruption in high places, that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China." John F. Kennedy, ''A Compendium of Speeches, Statements, and Remarks Delivered During His Service in the Congress of the United States'' (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 41-42. Cf. [[#refEvans07|Evans 2007]]: 419</ref>&mdash;a move that would prove [http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/RummelDemocide.php catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://chineseculture.about.com/od/mediainchina/p/Writer-Jung-Chang.htm member of Mao's Red Guards]. [[#refChang05|Chang 2005]]: 3, 560, 651. Cf. Stephane Courtois et al., ''[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674076082 The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression]'' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) ISBN 9780674076082, p. 4.</ref>

Among the "memoranda for the President" Stettinius directed be placed "in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss," according to retired U.S. intelligence analyst Christina Shelton, was a position paper registering the State Department's strong opposition to turning over to the USSR the southern Kurile and Sakhalin islands. This State Department memo never made it into the Yalta briefing books, but did make it to Moscow, where it would be [http://frontpagemag.com/2012/05/03/alger-hiss-why-he-chose-treason/ found in the Russian archives] after the fall of the Soviet Union.<ref>[[#refPlokhy2010|Plokhy 2010]], cited in [[#refShelton2012|Shelton 2012]]: 151</ref>

Among the "memoranda for the President" Stettinius directed be placed "in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss," according to retired U.S. intelligence analyst Christina Shelton, was a position paper registering the State Department's strong opposition to turning over to the USSR the southern Kurile and [[Sakhalin]] islands. This State Department memo never made it into the Yalta briefing books, but did make it to Moscow, where it would be [http://frontpagemag.com/2012/05/03/alger-hiss-why-he-chose-treason/ found in the Russian archives] after the fall of the Soviet Union.<ref>[[#refPlokhy2010|Plokhy 2010]], cited in [[#refShelton2012|Shelton 2012]]: 151</ref>

Apparently unaware of this memo, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] ultimately made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [https://web.archive.org/web/20131113064720/https://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), conceding these territorial demands, as well as giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest,<ref>Laura Tyson Li, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=tnbMSIL077wC Madame Chiang Kai-Shek: China's Eternal First Lady]'' (Open City Books, 2006) ISBN 0871139332, p. 267</ref> alleging the existence of a "Communist conspiracy within the State Department."<ref>Don Lohbeck, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=eJ44AAAAIAAJ Patrick J. Hurley]'' (H. Regnery Co., 1956), p. 447</ref>  

Apparently unaware of this memo, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] ultimately made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [https://web.archive.org/web/20131113064720/https://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), conceding these territorial demands, as well as giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest,<ref>Laura Tyson Li, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=tnbMSIL077wC Madame Chiang Kai-Shek: China's Eternal First Lady]'' (Open City Books, 2006) ISBN 0871139332, p. 267</ref> alleging the existence of a "Communist conspiracy within the State Department."<ref>Don Lohbeck, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=eJ44AAAAIAAJ Patrick J. Hurley]'' (H. Regnery Co., 1956), p. 447</ref>