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'''Luftwaffe''' is [[German]] for air force (the Geman words ''Luft - air'' and ''Waffe - weapon'').  The Luftwaffe is the current German air force. However its most famous period by far was during [[World War II]].The '''Luftwaffe''' The pride of [[Nazi Germany]] under its bombastic leader Hermann Goering, it learned new combat techniques in the Spanish Civil War and appealed to Hitler as the decisive strategic weapon he needed. Its high technology and rapid growth led to exaggerated fears in the 1930s that cowed the British and French into appeasement. In the World War II the Luftwaffe performed well in 1939-41, but was poorly coordinated with overall German strategy, and never ramped up to the size and scope needed in a total war.  It never built large bombers, was deficient in radar, and could not deal with the faster, more agile [[P-51]] Mustang pursuit planes after 1943. The Luftwaffe was narrowly defeated in the Battle of Britain (1940), and reached maximum size of 1.9 million airmen in 1942. Grueling operations wasted it away on the eastern front after 1942.  It lost most of its fighter planes to Mustangs in 1944 while trying to defend against massive American and British air raids. When its gasoline supply ran dry in 1944, it was reduced to anti-aircraft flak roles, and many of its men were sent to infantry units.

'''Luftwaffe''' is [[German]] for air force (the Geman words ''Luft - air'' and ''Waffe - weapon'').  The Luftwaffe is the current German air force. However its most famous period by far was during [[World War II]].The '''Luftwaffe''' The pride of [[Nazi Germany]] under its bombastic leader Hermann Goering, it learned new combat techniques in the Spanish Civil War and appealed to Hitler as the decisive strategic weapon he needed. Its high technology and rapid growth led to exaggerated fears in the 1930s that cowed the British and French into appeasement. In the World War II the Luftwaffe performed well in 1939-41, but was poorly coordinated with overall German strategy, and never ramped up to the size and scope needed in a total war.  It never built large bombers, was deficient in radar, and could not deal with the faster, more agile [[P-51]] Mustang pursuit planes after 1943. The Luftwaffe was narrowly defeated in the Battle of Britain (1940), and reached maximum size of 1.9 million airmen in 1942. Grueling operations wasted it away on the eastern front after 1942.  It lost most of its remaining fighter planes to Mustangs in 1944 while trying to defend against massive American and British air raids. When its gasoline supply ran dry in 1944, it was reduced to anti-aircraft flak roles, and many of its men were sent to infantry units.

==Beginnings==

==Beginnings==

The [[Battle of Britain]], August to September. 1940, was fought for air supremacy over Britain. Hitler wanted to threaten an invasion, but with a weak navy he could not counter the Royal Navy unless the Luftwaffe defeated the RAF.<ref>An invasion was unlikely; over a third of the days were bad flying weather that grounded most flights. On those days the Royal Navy battleships could plow through the storms and sink the entire invasion fleet.</ref> The Luftwaffe used 1300 medium bombers guarded by 900 fighters; they made 1500 sorties a day from bases in France, Belgium and Norway.  The RAF had 650 fighters, with more coming out of the factories every day. Thanks to its new radar system, the British knew where the Germans were, and could concentrate their counterattacks.  The Germans used their strategic bombing doctrine to focus on RAF airfields and radar stations.  After the RAF bomber forces (quite separate from the fighter forces) attacked Berlin and other cities, Hitler swore revenge and diverted the Luftwaffe to attacks on London.  The success the Luftwaffe was having in rapidly wearing down the RAF was squandered, as the civilians being hit were far less critical than the airfields and radar stations that were now ignored.<ref> Civilian deaths were 300 to 600 a day, plus 1000 to 3000 injured.  London was not a factory city and aircraft production  went up.</ref> The last German daylight raid was September 30; the Luftwaffe was taking unacceptable losses and broke off the attack; occasional blitz raids hit London and other cities from time to time before May 1941, killing some 43,000 civilians. The Luftwaffe lost 1733 planes, the British, 915. The British showed more determination, better radar, and better ground control, while the Germans violated their own doctrine with wasted attacks on London.

The [[Battle of Britain]], August to September. 1940, was fought for air supremacy over Britain. Hitler wanted to threaten an invasion, but with a weak navy he could not counter the Royal Navy unless the Luftwaffe defeated the RAF.<ref>An invasion was unlikely; over a third of the days were bad flying weather that grounded most flights. On those days the Royal Navy battleships could plow through the storms and sink the entire invasion fleet.</ref> The Luftwaffe used 1300 medium bombers guarded by 900 fighters; they made 1500 sorties a day from bases in France, Belgium and Norway.  The RAF had 650 fighters, with more coming out of the factories every day. Thanks to its new radar system, the British knew where the Germans were, and could concentrate their counterattacks.  The Germans used their strategic bombing doctrine to focus on RAF airfields and radar stations.  After the RAF bomber forces (quite separate from the fighter forces) attacked Berlin and other cities, Hitler swore revenge and diverted the Luftwaffe to attacks on London.  The success the Luftwaffe was having in rapidly wearing down the RAF was squandered, as the civilians being hit were far less critical than the airfields and radar stations that were now ignored.<ref> Civilian deaths were 300 to 600 a day, plus 1000 to 3000 injured.  London was not a factory city and aircraft production  went up.</ref> The last German daylight raid was September 30; the Luftwaffe was taking unacceptable losses and broke off the attack; occasional blitz raids hit London and other cities from time to time before May 1941, killing some 43,000 civilians. The Luftwaffe lost 1733 planes, the British, 915. The British showed more determination, better radar, and better ground control, while the Germans violated their own doctrine with wasted attacks on London.

 

The British surprised the Germans with their high quality airplanes; flying close to home bases where they could refuel, and using [[radar]] as part of an integrated air defense system, they had a significant advantage over German planes operating at long range. The Hawker Hurricane fighter plane played a vital role for the Royal Air Force (RAF) in winning the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940. A fast, heavily armed monoplane that went into service in 1937, the Hurricane was effective against both German fighters and bombers and accounted for 70-75% of German losses during the battle.  The Germans immediately pulled out their Stukas, which were so slow they were child's play for the Hurricanes and Spitfires. The Battle of Britain showed the world that Hitler's vaunted war machine could be defeated.

The British surprised the Germans with their high quality airplanes; flying close to home bases where they could refuel, and using [[radar]] as part of an [[integrated air defense system]] (IADS), they had a significant advantage over German planes operating at long range. The Hawker Hurricane fighter plane played a vital role for the Royal Air Force (RAF) in winning the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940. A fast, heavily armed monoplane that went into service in 1937, the Hurricane was effective against both German fighters and bombers and accounted for 70-75% of German losses during the battle.  The Germans immediately pulled out their Stukas, which were so slow they were child's play for the Hurricanes and Spitfires. The Battle of Britain showed the world that Hitler's vaunted war machine could be defeated.

===Navigation===

===Navigation===

The first system of radio guidance used by the Luftwaffe was the Knickebein or System K, operational in 1938. With it, ground controllers could direct bombers to targets at night and in all kinds of weather. Thirteen [[Knickebein]] transmitters were eventually built in the west, six in France. System K was expanded by the addition of [[X-Gerät]], a system of automatic bombardment. This was followed by System [[Y-Gerät]] (Wotan II). British countermeasures forced the Germans to discontinue the offensive use of the system but they used the Y-Gerät until the invasion of Normandy.  

The first system of radio guidance used by the Luftwaffe was the Knickebein or System K, operational in 1938. With it, ground controllers could direct bombers to targets at night and in all kinds of weather. Thirteen [[Knickebein]] transmitters were eventually built in the west, six in France. System K was expanded by the addition of [[X-Gerät]], a system of automatic bombardment. This was followed by System [[Y-Gerät]] (Wotan II). British countermeasures forced the Germans to discontinue the offensive use of the system but they used the Y-Gerät until the invasion of Normandy.  

==Hitler's mistakes==

==Hitler's mistakes==

After the failure of the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe failed to mount a major strategic air campaign, not because of the lack of strategic air doctrine or theory but because of the failure to produce an effective heavy bomber, the failure to train enough pilots for a war of attrition, and the failure of the high command to utilize the Luftwaffe in the most effective manner.  Göring met Hitler often; they talked of Nazi party affairs. The Luftwaffe was unaware of Hitler's strategic plans and was unable to prepare accordingly. Hitler's interference sabotaged the jet planes the Germans had invented.  Hitler made strategy without realizing how progressively weaker his air power was becoming or how rapidly the Allies were building up theirs, and he put increasing faith in secret weapons (especially the V-1 and V-2) that were too inaccurate to be of much value.<ref>R. J. Overy, "Hitler and Air Strategy," ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 1980 15(3): 405-421.  </ref>

After the failure of the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe failed to mount a major strategic air campaign, not because of the lack of strategic air doctrine or theory but because of the failure to produce an effective heavy bomber, the failure to train enough pilots for a war of attrition, and the failure of the high command to utilize the Luftwaffe in the most effective manner.  Göring met Hitler often; they talked of Nazi party affairs. The Luftwaffe was unaware of Hitler's strategic plans and was unable to prepare accordingly. Hitler's interference sabotaged the jet planes the Germans had invented.  Hitler made strategy without realizing how progressively weaker his air power was becoming or how rapidly the Allies were building up theirs, and he put increasing faith in secret weapons (especially the V-1 and V-2) that were too inaccurate to be of much value.<ref>R. J. Overy, "Hitler and Air Strategy," ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 1980 15(3): 405-421.  </ref>

==Destruction of the Luftwaffe over Germany==

==Destruction of the Luftwaffe over Germany==

While the British IADS was operational in the critical days of 1940, the Germans were beginning to build their IADS, the [[Kammhuber Line]], in 1940.  

While the British air defense system was operational in the critical days of 1940, the Germans were only beginning to build their own version, the [[Kammhuber Line]], in 1940. They never caught up with the British.

In late 1943 the USAAF (U.S. Air Force) suddenly realized the need to revise its basic doctrine: strategic bombing against a technologically sophisticated enemy like Germany was impossible without air supremacy. General Hap Arnold replaced Ira Eaker with Carl Spaatz and Jimmy Doolittle, who fully appreciated the new reality. They provided fighter escorts all the way into Germany and back, and cleverly used B- 17s as bait for Luftwaffe planes, which the escorts then shot down. Doolittle's slogan was "The First Duty of 8th AF Fighters is to Destroy German Fighters.", one aspect of modern [[air warfare planning#offensive counter-air|Offensive Counter-Air (OCA)]].

In late 1943 the USAAF (U.S. Air Force) suddenly realized the need to revise its basic doctrine: strategic bombing against a technologically sophisticated enemy like Germany was impossible without air supremacy. General Hap Arnold replaced Ira Eaker with Carl Spaatz and Jimmy Doolittle, who fully appreciated the new reality. They provided fighter escorts all the way into Germany and back, and cleverly used B- 17s as bait for Luftwaffe planes, which the escorts then shot down. Doolittle's slogan was "The First Duty of 8th AF Fighters is to Destroy German Fighters."  

===Big Week, February 1944===

===Big Week, February 1944===

The Allied response was the "Big Week," (20-25 February 1944, code named ARGUMENT),  when 2400 bombers from the RAF [[Bomber Command]] and 3800 bombers from US [[Eighth Air Force]] and [[Ninth Air Force]] based in England, and the US [[Fifteenth Air Force]] based in Italy, launched a full-scale assault against the German aircraft industry.  They dropped 20,000 tons of bombs, the British at night, the Americans by day.  American losses amounted to 254 aircraft, including 28 fighters, while RAF lost 157.  Flak accounted for most of the losses; flak seldom downed a bomber but instead knocked it out of formation, allowing the Germans to pounce.  The purpose was to diminish the German air force by cutting into its fighter-plane production and by drawing the German fighters into the air for American fighters to destroy.  American bombers protected by hundreds of fighters, flew 3,800 sorties dropping 10,000 tons of high explosives on the main German aircraft and ball-bearing factories. The Luftwaffe made a powerful effort to sweep American day bombers from the skies. The battle raged for a week. It was fought over Regensburg, Merseburg, Schweinfurt, and other critical industrial centers. The German fighter force was severely crippled, as their fighter planes were designed to knock out big bombers but were slower and less agile than the American P-51 Mustangs.  The US suffered 2,600 casualties, with a loss of 137 bombers and 21 fighters. Ball bearing production was unaffected, as Nazi munitions boss [[Albert Speer]] repaired the damage in a few weeks; he even managed to double aircraft production. Sensing the danger, Speer began dispersing production into numerous small, hidden factories.<ref>Craven & Cate,  3:43-6</ref>

The Allied response was the "Big Week," (20-25 February 1944, code named ARGUMENT),  when 2400 bombers from the RAF [[Bomber Command]] and 3800 bombers from US [[Eighth Air Force]] and [[Ninth Air Force]] based in England, and the US [[Fifteenth Air Force]] based in Italy, launched a full-scale assault against the German aircraft industry.  They dropped 20,000 tons of bombs, the British at night, the Americans by day.  American losses amounted to 254 aircraft, including 28 fighters, while RAF lost 157.  Flak accounted for most of the losses; flak seldom downed a bomber but instead knocked it out of formation, allowing the Germans to pounce.  The purpose was to diminish the German air force by cutting into its fighter-plane production and by drawing the German fighters into the air for American fighters to destroy.  American bombers protected by hundreds of fighters, flew 3,800 sorties dropping 10,000 tons of high explosives on the main German aircraft and ball-bearing factories. The Luftwaffe made a powerful effort to sweep American day bombers from the skies. The battle raged for a week. It was fought over Regensburg, Merseburg, Schweinfurt, and other critical industrial centers. The German fighter force was severely crippled, as their fighter planes were designed to knock out big bombers but were slower and less agile than the American P-51 Mustangs.  The US suffered 2,600 casualties, with a loss of 137 bombers and 21 fighters. Ball bearing production was unaffected, as Nazi munitions boss [[Albert Speer]] repaired the damage in a few weeks; he even managed to double aircraft production. Sensing the danger, Speer began dispersing production into numerous small, hidden factories.<ref>Craven & Cate,  3:43-6</ref>

Though victorious in Poland in September, 1939, the Luftwaffe did not perform as well as the Nazi propaganda machine led the world to believe, both because of its own internal weaknesses and the creditable resistance put up by the Polish air force.<ref>  John F. Kreis, "Blitzkrieg in Poland." ''Air Power History'' 1989 36(3): 31-35. Issn: 1044-016x </ref>

Though victorious in Poland in September, 1939, the Luftwaffe did not perform as well as the Nazi propaganda machine led the world to believe, both because of its own internal weaknesses and the creditable resistance put up by the Polish air force.<ref>  John F. Kreis, "Blitzkrieg in Poland." ''Air Power History'' 1989 36(3): 31-35. Issn: 1044-016x </ref>

On the first day of the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviet air force (VVS) lost 336 aircraft in aerial combat to only 40 German losses.  Much more threatening was the loss, within a few days of 800 Soviet aircraft destroyed on the ground in the course of Luftwaffe bombing raids on airfields. This was the first ever instance of one air force achieving a significant victory over another by pre-emptive strikes against its air bases. The Luftwaffe had attempted this in Poland in 1939 and in France in 1940 without much luck. The successful attacks on Soviet air bases, the superiority of the Luftwaffe pilots in air-to-air combat, and the loss of hundreds of damaged but repairable aircraft that had to be abandoned on airfields about to be over-run by advancing German ground troops together meant that, by the end of the first week of the German invasion, the VVS was nearly defunct as a combat organization.

On the first day of the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviet air force (VVS) lost 336 aircraft in aerial combat to only 40 German losses.  Much more threatening was the loss, within a few days of 800 Soviet aircraft destroyed on the ground in the course of Luftwaffe bombing raids on airfields. This was the first ever instance of one air force achieving a significant victory over another by pre-emptive strikes against its air bases. The Luftwaffe had attempted this in Poland in 1939 and in France in 1940 with less success. The successful attacks on Soviet air bases, the superiority of the Luftwaffe pilots in air-to-air combat, and the loss of hundreds of damaged but repairable aircraft that had to be abandoned on airfields about to be over-run by advancing German ground troops together meant that, by the end of the first week of the German invasion, the Soviet air force VVS was nearly defunct as a combat organization.

In May 1942, the Luftwaffe, by providing a high level of tactical air support, played a key role in smashing a major Soviet offensive around Kharkov. Performing well in all operations, including tactical reconnaissance, air-drop and supply, direct battlefield support, interdiction, and protection of German logistics, it initially engaged in a series of nonstop defensive missions that countered the Soviet effort to encircle German forces and then greatly aided German ground forces as they threw back and crushed the Soviet forces.<ref> Joel S. A. Hayward, "The German Use of Air Power at Kharkov, May 1942." ''Air Power History'' 1997 44(2): 18-29. Issn: 1044-016x </ref>

In May 1942, the Luftwaffe, by providing a high level of tactical air support, played a key role in smashing a major Soviet offensive around Kharkov. Performing well in all operations, including tactical reconnaissance, air-drop and supply, direct battlefield support, interdiction, and protection of German logistics, it initially engaged in a series of nonstop defensive missions that countered the Soviet effort to encircle German forces and then greatly aided German ground forces as they threw back and crushed the Soviet forces.<ref> Joel S. A. Hayward, "The German Use of Air Power at Kharkov, May 1942." ''Air Power History'' 1997 44(2): 18-29. Issn: 1044-016x </ref>

In July 1942, north of Norway, an attack by the Luftwaffe sank two ships, and convoy PQ-17, sailing from Iceland to Archangel, Russia, was ordered to scatter by the British Admiralty. It mistakenly thought the German battleship ''Tirpitz'' was about to intercept the convoy. Twenty-two more ships were sunk by the well-coordinated attack of German air forces.<ref> Harold J. McCormick, "Convoy Catastrophe: the Destruction of PQ-17 to North Russia in July, 1942." ''Sea History'' 1992 (62): 14-16. Issn: 0146-9312 </ref>

In July 1942, north of Norway, an attack by the Luftwaffe sank two ships, and convoy PQ-17, sailing from Iceland to Archangel, Russia, was ordered to scatter by the British Admiralty. It mistakenly thought the German battleship ''Tirpitz'' was about to intercept the convoy. Twenty-two more ships were sunk by the well-coordinated attack of German air forces.<ref> Harold J. McCormick, "Convoy Catastrophe: the Destruction of PQ-17 to North Russia in July, 1942." ''Sea History'' 1992 (62): 14-16. Issn: 0146-9312 </ref>

After 1942 the Soviets completely restructured their air force around mobile air armies.  By 1942-3 Soviet air power challenged the Luftwaffe for air supremacy in the Stalingrad, Kuban, and Kursk campaigns. Frontal aviation's 17 air armies were complemented by a long-range air army in 1944, by which time the Soviets had air superiority, though it lacked long range bombers.

After 1942 the Soviets completely restructured their air force around mobile air armies.  By 1942-3 Soviet air power challenged the Luftwaffe for air supremacy in the Stalingrad, Kuban, and Kursk campaigns. Frontal aviation's 17 air armies were complemented by a long-range air army in 1944, by which time the Soviets had air superiority, though it lacked long range bombers.  As a result the Soviets had more planes and more gasoline. The Russian front became a meatgrinder for the Luftwaffe; it was systematically worn down.

===Failure of Cooperation===

===Failure of Cooperation===

Germany's Kriegsmarine (navy) and Luftwaffe failed to cooperate throughout most of the war because of interbranch jealousy, limited strategic vision, poor leadership in the Luftwaffe, and the personality defects of Göring. This failure, coupled with the strategic shift eastward after mid-1941 and the lack of an offensive oriented air branch of the Kriegsmarine, meant that Germany was never able to fulfill its potential effectiveness in naval operations designed to restrict Britain's operational and material resource base.<ref> Sönke Neitzel, "Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe Co-operation in the War Against Britain, 1939-1945." ''War in History'' 2003 10(4): 448-463. Issn: 0968-3445

Germany's Kriegsmarine (navy) and Luftwaffe failed to cooperate throughout most of the war because of interbranch jealousy, limited strategic vision, poor leadership in the Luftwaffe, and the personality defects of Göring. This failure, coupled with the strategic shift eastward after mid-1941 and the lack of an offensive oriented air branch of the Kriegsmarine, meant that Germany was never able to fulfill its potential effectiveness in naval operations designed to restrict Britain's operational and material resource base.<ref> Sönke Neitzel, "Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe Co-operation in the War Against Britain, 1939-1945." ''War in History'' 2003 10(4): 448-463. Issn: 0968-3445

Fulltext: [[Ebsco]] </ref>

Fulltext: [[Ebsco]] </ref>  

In sharp contrast to the smooth cooperation of the Allies, the Luftwaffe ignored opportunities for strategic and economic cooperation with the air forces of its allies Italy, Finland, Romania, and Hungary.  Instead of using factories in France, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia to build new air fleets, it removed the machinery and shut the factories.<ref> James S. Corum, "The Luftwaffe and its Allied Air Forces in World War Ii: Parallel War and the Failure of Strategic and Economic Cooperation." ''Air Power History'' 2004 51(2): 4-19. Issn: 1044-016x Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>   

In sharp contrast to the smooth cooperation of the Allies, the Luftwaffe ignored opportunities for strategic and economic cooperation with the air forces of its allies Italy, Finland, Romania, and Hungary.  Instead of using factories in France, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia to build new air fleets, it removed the machinery and shut the factories.<ref> James S. Corum, "The Luftwaffe and its Allied Air Forces in World War Ii: Parallel War and the Failure of Strategic and Economic Cooperation." ''Air Power History'' 2004 51(2): 4-19. Issn: 1044-016x Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>   

==Collapse==

==Collapse==

By 1942 everything started to go wrong.  Defeat after defeat in the air against increasingly superior enemy planes sapped morale, and killed off the best pilots.  Göring was easily outmaneuvered by rival Nazis after 1940 and the Luftwaffe experienced an erosion of authority after it failed to meet his grandiose promises.  Hitler was enthusiastic in support, believing air power was the supreme strategic weapon; but he never understood air affairs, even though he talked glibly about them. He did not coordinate the Luftwaffe with the other branches of service, and Göring systematically misled him about Luftwaffe progress.  Hotler did not plan in terms of continuous massive quantity and quality in the number of planes or in their offensive use. He thought in terms of defense or of secret, magic weapons for one massive, catastrophic blow.<ref> Overy, "Hitler and Air Strategy" </ref>   

By 1942 everything started to go wrong.  Defeat after defeat in the air against increasingly superior enemy planes sapped morale, and killed off the best pilots.  Göring was easily outmaneuvered by rival Nazis after 1940 and the Luftwaffe experienced an erosion of authority after it failed to meet his grandiose promises.  Hitler was enthusiastic in support, believing air power was the supreme strategic weapon; but he never understood air affairs, even though he talked glibly about them. He did not coordinate the Luftwaffe with the other branches of service, and Göring systematically misled him about Luftwaffe progress.  Hotler did not plan in terms of continuous massive quantity and quality in the number of planes or in their offensive use. He thought in terms of defense or of secret, magic weapons for one massive, catastrophic blow.<ref> Overy, "Hitler and Air Strategy" </ref>   

 

Luftwaffe technology was not well concentrated. The [[Me-262]] jet flew test runs in 1939--Germany needed 10,000 of these superior planes but only produced 1000 and most never flew in combat. Again, Hitler personally intervened in a manner providential &mdash; for the Allies. He insisted that the Me-262 not be deployed until it could carry out bombing missions, for which it was not designed. He only allowed it in a devastating air defense role when it was too late.  Likewise the brilliant engineering efforts that went into the highly innovative [[V-1]] jet-powered cruise missile and [[V-2]] rocket-powered ballistic missile were partly wasted from a narrow military point of view; their guidance was too inaccurate to threaten any target smaller than a metropolitan area.  On the other hand, the Allies diverted up to 25% of the air power to attacks on the V-weapons. (The Luftwaffe was responsible for the V-1, while the army was in charge of the V-2.)  

Luftwaffe technology was not well concentrated. The [[Me-262]] jet flew test runs in 1939--Germany needed 10,000 of these superior planes but only produced 1000 and most never flew in combat. Again, Hitler personally intervened in a manner providential &mdash; for the Allies. He insisted that the Me-262 not be deployed until it could carry out bombing missions, for which it was not designed. He only allowed it in a devastating air defense role when it was too late.  Likewise the brilliant engineering efforts that went into the highly innovative [[V-1]] jet-powered cruise missile and [[V-2]] rocket-powered ballistic missile were partly wasted from a narrow military point of view; their guidance was too inaccurate to threaten any target smaller than a metropolitan area.  On the other hand, the Allies diverted up to 25% of the air power to attacks on the V-weapons. (The Luftwaffe was responsible for the V-1, while the army was in charge of the V-2.)  

 

The success of early blitzkriegs blinded the Germans to the necessity of planning for a protracted air war, so they lacked the planes, fuel supplies, and trained airmen. By 1944 their pilots had far less flying experience than the Allies, and were more and more helpless in the sky. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe was unable to solve its growing logistics problems; when its fuel supply ran dry in 1944 it was doomed.  Increasingly the Luftwaffe concentrated on ground-based anti-aircraft operations, which involved hundreds of thousands of women soldiers. The major cities were ringed with high power guns; including 423 around Vienna. Often they were built on high flak towers that had unobstructed views.  The British bombers flew at night and the Germans used searchlights (staffed by women) to track their location, direction and speed so the guns, which shot ahead of the bombers, could throw up a barrage of shells that might hit the planes.  The Germans never had a proximity fuze so their shells seldom exploded at the right moment. <ref> Note that the searchlights were not there to blind pilots; when four searchlights converged on one plane, then  analog mechanical calculators were used to estimate exactly where the plane--two or three miles high-- would be when the shells reached that height. Edward B. Westermann, ''Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914-1945'' (2005); Horst Boog, "Luftwaffe and Logistics in the Second World War." ''Aerospace Historian'' 1988 35(2): 103-110. Issn: 0001-9364 </ref>

The success of early blitzkriegs blinded the Germans to the necessity of planning for a protracted air war, so they lacked the planes, fuel supplies, and trained airmen. By 1944 their pilots had far less flying experience than the Allies, and were more and more helpless in the sky. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe was unable to solve its growing logistics problems; when its fuel supply ran dry in 1944 it was doomed.  Increasingly the Luftwaffe concentrated on ground-based anti-aircraft operations, which involved hundreds of thousands of women soldiers. The major cities were ringed with high power guns; including 423 around Vienna. Often they were built on high flak towers that had unobstructed views.  The British bombers flew at night and the Germans used searchlights (staffed by women) to track their location, direction and speed so the guns, which shot ahead of the bombers, could throw up a barrage of shells that might hit the planes.  The Germans never had a proximity fuze so their shells seldom exploded at the right moment. <ref> Note that the searchlights were not there to blind pilots; when four searchlights converged on one plane, then  analog mechanical calculators were used to estimate exactly where the plane--two or three miles high-- would be when the shells reached that height. Edward B. Westermann, ''Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914-1945'' (2005); Horst Boog, "Luftwaffe and Logistics in the Second World War." ''Aerospace Historian'' 1988 35(2): 103-110. Issn: 0001-9364 </ref>

Surplus airmen and ground crews were reorganized into 21 Luftwaffe  field divisions; they came under army control in late 1943, as Göring was losing power.  They were generally of mediocre quality and were chewed up on the the Eastern Front; few men returned.

Surplus airmen and ground crews were reorganized into 21 Luftwaffe  field divisions; they came under army control in late 1943, as Göring was losing power.  They were generally of mediocre quality and were chewed up on the the Eastern Front; few men returned.

Despite intensified Allied bo,mbing, Germany achieved its highest plane production at the end of 1944 (a total of 12,329 aircraft), but their quality was inferior to Allied warplanes. The production of aviation gasoline (itself of much lower octane than Allied gasoline)  allowed for a daily consumption of 6,000 tons of flight fuel in 1944; the fuel production crisis in 1945 brought this to 76 tons. On 30 April 1945 the Luftwaffe flew its last 96 actions.

Despite intensified Allied bombing, Germany achieved its highest plane production at the end of 1944 (a total of 12,329 aircraft), but their quality was inferior to Allied warplanes. The production of aviation gasoline (itself of much lower octane than Allied gasoline)  allowed for a daily consumption of 6,000 tons of flight fuel in 1944; the fuel production crisis in 1945 brought this to 76 tons. On 30 April 1945 the Luftwaffe flew its last 96 actions.

==Luftwaffe today==

==Luftwaffe today==

*  Corum, James S. and Muller, Richard R. ''The Luftwaffe's Way of War: German Air Force Doctrine, 1911-1945.'' (1998). 295 pp.  

*  Corum, James S. and Muller, Richard R. ''The Luftwaffe's Way of War: German Air Force Doctrine, 1911-1945.'' (1998). 295 pp.  

* Corum, James S. ''The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940.'' (1997). 368 pp.  

* Corum, James S. ''The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940.'' (1997). 368 pp.  

* Craven, Wesley Frank and J. L. Cate. ''The Army Air Forces in World War II'' (5 vol 1949), detailed official U.S. history; see  vol 2 and 3  [http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/ online edition]

* Craven, Wesley Frank and J. L. Cate. ''The Army Air Forces in World War II'' (5 vol 1949), detailed official U.S. history; see  vol 2 and 3  [http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/ online edition]

* Harvey, A.D. "The Soviet Air Force versus the Luftwaffe: ''History Today.'' 52#1 (January 2002) pp 48+ in [[EBSCO]]  and [http://www.questia.com/read/5000684819?title=The%20Soviet%20Air%20Force%20versus%20the%20Luftwaffe%3a%20A.D.Harvey%20Assesses%20the%20Role%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Air%20Force%20in%20the%20Defeat%20of%20Nazism online edition]

* Harvey, A.D. "The Soviet Air Force versus the Luftwaffe: ''History Today.'' 52#1 (January 2002) pp 48+ in [[EBSCO]]  and [http://www.questia.com/read/5000684819?title=The%20Soviet%20Air%20Force%20versus%20the%20Luftwaffe%3a%20A.D.Harvey%20Assesses%20the%20Role%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Air%20Force%20in%20the%20Defeat%20of%20Nazism online edition]