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| | The Democratic party was highly competitive in most states, but won the presidency only in 1856, 1884 and 1892. In 1892, the [[Populist Party]] made a remarkable showing, winning 22 electoral votes and one million popular votes. | | The Democratic party was highly competitive in most states, but won the presidency only in 1856, 1884 and 1892. In 1892, the [[Populist Party]] made a remarkable showing, winning 22 electoral votes and one million popular votes. |
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| − | In terms of elections, the GOP was dominant 1860-1872, and most elections from 1874 through 1892 were close. However the main opposition party, [[U.S. Democratic Party, History|the Democrats]] won only the 1856, 1884 and 1892 presidential elections; however, from 1874 to 1892 it usually controlled the House of Representatives. The northern and western states were largely Republican, save for closely balanced New York and Indiana. After 1874 the Democrats took control of the "[[Solid South]]." <ref> Foner (1988)</ref> | + | In terms of elections, the GOP was dominant 1860-1872, and most elections from 1874 through 1892 were close. However the main opposition party, [[U.S. Democratic Party, History|the Democrats]] won only the 1856, 1884 and 1892 presidential elections; however, from 1874 to 1892 it usually controlled the House of Representatives. The northern and western states were largely Republican, save for closely balanced New York and Indiana. After 1874 the Democrats took control of the "[[Solid South]]." <ref>Foner (1988)</ref> |
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| | [[Image:1856DEM.JPG|thumb|1856 Democratic winning ticket]] | | [[Image:1856DEM.JPG|thumb|1856 Democratic winning ticket]] |
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| | ===Voter behavior=== | | ===Voter behavior=== |
| − | As with the preceding [[Second Party System]] era, the Third was characterized by intense voter interest, routine high turnout, unflinching party loyalty, dependence on nominating conventions, hierarchical party organizations, and the systematic use of government jobs as patronage for party workers. Cities of 50,000 or more developed ward and citywide "[[Political_boss|bosses]]," who could depend on the votes of clients, especially recent immigrants. Newspapers continued to be the primary communication system, with the great majority closely linked to one party or the other. <ref> Kleppner (1979) gives detailed reports on voter behavior in every region.</ref> | + | As with the preceding [[Second Party System]] era, the Third was characterized by intense voter interest, routine high turnout, unflinching party loyalty, dependence on nominating conventions, hierarchical party organizations, and the systematic use of government jobs as patronage for party workers. Cities of 50,000 or more developed ward and citywide "[[Political boss|bosses]]," who could depend on the votes of clients, especially recent immigrants. Newspapers continued to be the primary communication system, with the great majority closely linked to one party or the other.<ref>Kleppner (1979) gives detailed reports on voter behavior in every region.</ref> |
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| | ===Broad coalitions form each party=== | | ===Broad coalitions form each party=== |
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| | Religious lines were sharply drawn [Kleppner 1979]. Methodists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Scandinavian Lutherans and other [[pietists]] in the North were tightly linked to the GOP, as typified by presidents [[James Garfield]] and [[Benjamin Harrison]] In sharp contrast, [[liturgical]] groups, especially the Catholics, Episcopalians, and German Lutherans, looked to the Democratic Party for protection from pietistic moralism, especially prohibition. Both parties cut across the class structure, with the Democrats more bottom-heavy. | | Religious lines were sharply drawn [Kleppner 1979]. Methodists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Scandinavian Lutherans and other [[pietists]] in the North were tightly linked to the GOP, as typified by presidents [[James Garfield]] and [[Benjamin Harrison]] In sharp contrast, [[liturgical]] groups, especially the Catholics, Episcopalians, and German Lutherans, looked to the Democratic Party for protection from pietistic moralism, especially prohibition. Both parties cut across the class structure, with the Democrats more bottom-heavy. |
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| − | Cultural issues, especially prohibition and foreign language schools, became important because of the sharp religious divisions in the electorate. In the North, about 50% of the voters were pietistic Protestants who believed the government should be used to reduce social sins, such as drinking. Liturgical churches comprised over a quarter of the vote and wanted the government to stay out of the morality business. Prohibition debates and referenda heated up politics in most states over a period of decades, as national prohibition was finally passed in 1918 (and repealed in 1932), serving as a major issue between the wet Democrats and the dry GOP. <ref>Kleppner (1979)</ref> | + | Cultural issues, especially prohibition and foreign language schools, became important because of the sharp religious divisions in the electorate. In the North, about 50% of the voters were pietistic Protestants who believed the government should be used to reduce social sins, such as drinking. Liturgical churches comprised over a quarter of the vote and wanted the government to stay out of the morality business. Prohibition debates and referenda heated up politics in most states over a period of decades, as national prohibition was finally passed in 1918 (and repealed in 1932), serving as a major issue between the wet Democrats and the dry GOP.<ref>Kleppner (1979)</ref> |
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| | {| class="wikitable" style="text-align: right" | | {| class="wikitable" style="text-align: right" |
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| | ===Civil War=== | | ===Civil War=== |
| − | It was the measure of genius of President Lincoln not only that he won his war but that he did so by drawing upon and synthesizing the strengths of anti-slavery, free soil, democracy, and nationalism. The [[Confederate States of America|Confederacy]] abandoned all party activity, and thereby forfeited the advantages of a nationwide organization committed to support of the administration. In the Union the Republican Party unanimously supported the war effort, finding officers, enlisted men, enlistment bonuses, aid to wives and widows, war supplies, bond purchases, and the enthusiasm that was critical to victory. The Democrats at first supported a war for Union, and in 1861 many Democratic politicians became colonels and generals. Announced by Lincoln in September 1862, emancipation was designed primarily to destroy the economic base of the Slave Power. It initially alienated many northern Democrats and even moderate Republicans. They were reluctant to support a war for the benefit of what they considered an inferior race. In the 1862 midterm elections, the Democrats made significant gains, but the Republicans remained in control with the support of the Unionist Party. Success on the battlefield (especially the fall of Atlanta) significantly bolstered the Republicans in the election of 1864. The Democrats attempted to capitalize on negative reactions to the Emancipation, but by 1864, these had faded somewhat due its success in undermining the South. Additionally, the Republicans made “[[Copperheads (politics)|Copperhead]]” treason a successful campaign issue. Increasingly the Union Army became the more and more Republican; probably a majority of Democrats who enlisted marched home Republican, including such key leaders as [[John A. Logan|John Logan]] and [[Benjamin Franklin Butler (politician)|Ben Butler]].<ref>Silbey (1991); Hansen (1980) </ref> | + | It was the measure of genius of President Lincoln not only that he won his war but that he did so by drawing upon and synthesizing the strengths of anti-slavery, free soil, democracy, and nationalism. The [[Confederate States of America|Confederacy]] abandoned all party activity, and thereby forfeited the advantages of a nationwide organization committed to support of the administration. In the Union the Republican Party unanimously supported the war effort, finding officers, enlisted men, enlistment bonuses, aid to wives and widows, war supplies, bond purchases, and the enthusiasm that was critical to victory. The Democrats at first supported a war for Union, and in 1861 many Democratic politicians became colonels and generals. Announced by Lincoln in September 1862, emancipation was designed primarily to destroy the economic base of the Slave Power. It initially alienated many northern Democrats and even moderate Republicans. They were reluctant to support a war for the benefit of what they considered an inferior race. In the 1862 midterm elections, the Democrats made significant gains, but the Republicans remained in control with the support of the Unionist Party. Success on the battlefield (especially the fall of Atlanta) significantly bolstered the Republicans in the election of 1864. The Democrats attempted to capitalize on negative reactions to the Emancipation, but by 1864, these had faded somewhat due its success in undermining the South. Additionally, the Republicans made “[[Copperheads (politics)|Copperhead]]” treason a successful campaign issue. Increasingly the Union Army became the more and more Republican; probably a majority of Democrats who enlisted marched home Republican, including such key leaders as [[John A. Logan|John Logan]] and [[Benjamin Franklin Butler (politician)|Ben Butler]].<ref>Silbey (1991); Hansen (1980)</ref> |
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| | ===Postwar=== | | ===Postwar=== |
| − | Civil war and [[Reconstruction]] issues polarized the parties until the [[Compromise of 1877]] finally ended the political warfare. War issues resonated for a quarter century, as Republicans waved the "bloody shirt" (of dead union soldiers), and Democrats warned against Black supremacy in the South and plutocracy in the North. The modernizing Republicans who had founded the party in 1854 looked askance at the undisguised corruption of [[Ulysses S. Grant]] and his war veterans, bolstered by the solid vote of freedmen. The dissenters formed a "[[Liberal Republican]]" Party in 1872, only to have it smashed by Grant's reelection. By the mid 1870s it was clear that Confederate nationalism was dead; all but the most ardent Republican “Stalwarts” agreed that the southern Republican coalition of African American [[Freedmen]], [[scalawags]] and [[carpetbaggers]] was helpless and hopeless. In 1874 the Democrats won big majorities in Congress, with economic depression a major issue. People asked how much longer could the Republicans use the Army to impose unnecessary control in the South. <ref>Foner (1988)</ref> | + | Civil war and [[Reconstruction]] issues polarized the parties until the [[Compromise of 1877]] finally ended the political warfare. War issues resonated for a quarter century, as Republicans waved the "bloody shirt" (of dead union soldiers), and Democrats warned against Black supremacy in the South and plutocracy in the North. The modernizing Republicans who had founded the party in 1854 looked askance at the undisguised corruption of [[Ulysses S. Grant]] and his war veterans, bolstered by the solid vote of freedmen. The dissenters formed a "[[Liberal Republican]]" Party in 1872, only to have it smashed by Grant's reelection. By the mid 1870s it was clear that Confederate nationalism was dead; all but the most ardent Republican “Stalwarts” agreed that the southern Republican coalition of African American [[Freedmen]], [[scalawags]] and [[carpetbaggers]] was helpless and hopeless. In 1874 the Democrats won big majorities in Congress, with economic depression a major issue. People asked how much longer could the Republicans use the Army to impose unnecessary control in the South.<ref>Foner (1988)</ref> |
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| | [[Image:Grant68a.jpg|thumb|300px|1868 campaign poster]] | | [[Image:Grant68a.jpg|thumb|300px|1868 campaign poster]] |
| − | [[Rutherford Hayes]] became President after a highly controversial electoral count, demonstrating that the corruption of Southern politics threatened the legitimacy of the presidency itself. After Hayes removed the last federal troops in 1877, the Republican Party in the South sank into oblivion, kept alive only by the crumbs of federal patronage.<ref> Vincent P. De Santis, ''Republicans Face the Southern Question'' (1969) </ref> | + | [[Rutherford Hayes]] became President after a highly controversial electoral count, demonstrating that the corruption of Southern politics threatened the legitimacy of the presidency itself. After Hayes removed the last federal troops in 1877, the Republican Party in the South sank into oblivion, kept alive only by the crumbs of federal patronage.<ref>Vincent P. De Santis, ''Republicans Face the Southern Question'' (1969)</ref> |
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| | ===Climax and Collapse, 1890-1896=== | | ===Climax and Collapse, 1890-1896=== |
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| | [[Frederick Jackson Turner]] and a succession of western historians depicted the Populist as responding to the closure of the frontier. Turner explained: | | [[Frederick Jackson Turner]] and a succession of western historians depicted the Populist as responding to the closure of the frontier. Turner explained: |
| − | :The Farmers' Alliance and the Populist demand for government ownership of the railroad is a phase of the same effort of the pioneer farmer, on his latest frontier. The proposals have taken increasing proportions in each region of Western Advance. Taken as a whole, Populism is a manifestation of the old pioneer ideals of the native American, with the added element of increasing readiness to utilize the national government to effect its ends.<ref> Frederick Jackson Turner, ''The Frontier in American History,'' (1920) p. 148; [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/22994/22994-h/22994-h.htm online edition]</ref> | + | :The Farmers' Alliance and the Populist demand for government ownership of the railroad is a phase of the same effort of the pioneer farmer, on his latest frontier. The proposals have taken increasing proportions in each region of Western Advance. Taken as a whole, Populism is a manifestation of the old pioneer ideals of the native American, with the added element of increasing readiness to utilize the national government to effect its ends.<ref>Frederick Jackson Turner, ''The Frontier in American History,'' (1920) p. 148; [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/22994/22994-h/22994-h.htm online edition]</ref> |
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| − | In the 1930s [[C. Vann Woodward]] stressed the southern base, seeing the possibility of a black-and-white coalition of poor against the overbearing rich. Georgia politician Tom Watson served as Woodward's hero.<ref> C. Vann Woodward, '' Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel'' (1938); Woodward, "Tom Watson and the Negro in Agrarian Politics," ''The Journal of Southern History,'' Vol. 4, No. 1 (Feb., 1938), pp. 14-33 </ref> In the 1950s, however, scholars such as [[Richard Hofstadter]] portrayed the Populist movement as an irrational response of backward-looking farmers to the challenges of modernity. The antithesis of anti-modern Populism was modernizing Progressivism in this model, with such leading progressives as [[Theodore Roosevelt]], [[Robert LaFollette]] and [[Woodrow Wilson]] had been vehement enemies of Populism, though [[William Jennings Bryan]] did cooperate with them and accepted the Populist nomination in 1896.<ref>Richard Hofstadter, '' The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.'' (1955</ref> | + | In the 1930s [[C. Vann Woodward]] stressed the southern base, seeing the possibility of a black-and-white coalition of poor against the overbearing rich. Georgia politician Tom Watson served as Woodward's hero.<ref>C. Vann Woodward, '' Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel'' (1938); Woodward, "Tom Watson and the Negro in Agrarian Politics," ''The Journal of Southern History,'' Vol. 4, No. 1 (Feb., 1938), pp. 14-33</ref> In the 1950s, however, scholars such as [[Richard Hofstadter]] portrayed the Populist movement as an irrational response of backward-looking farmers to the challenges of modernity. The antithesis of anti-modern Populism was modernizing Progressivism in this model, with such leading progressives as [[Theodore Roosevelt]], [[Robert LaFollette]] and [[Woodrow Wilson]] had been vehement enemies of Populism, though [[William Jennings Bryan]] did cooperate with them and accepted the Populist nomination in 1896.<ref>Richard Hofstadter, '' The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.'' (1955</ref> |
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| − | In 2007 Charles Postel rejected the notion that the Populists were traditionalistic and anti-modern. Quite the reverse, he argued, the Populists aggressively sought self-consciously progressive goals. They sought diffusion of scientific and technical knowledge, formed highly centralized organizations, launched large-scale incorporated businesses, and pressed for an array of state-centered reforms. Hundreds of thousands of women committed to Populism seeking a more modern life, education, and employment in schools and offices. A large section of the labor movement looked to Populism for answers, forging a political coalition with farmers that gave impetus to the regulatory state. Progress, however, was also menacing and inhumane, Postel notes. White Populists, embraced social-Darwinist notions of racial improvement, Chinese exclusion and the humiliation and brutality of separate-but-equal.<ref> Charles Postel, ''The Populist Vision'' (2007) </ref> | + | In 2007 Charles Postel rejected the notion that the Populists were traditionalistic and anti-modern. Quite the reverse, he argued, the Populists aggressively sought self-consciously progressive goals. They sought diffusion of scientific and technical knowledge, formed highly centralized organizations, launched large-scale incorporated businesses, and pressed for an array of state-centered reforms. Hundreds of thousands of women committed to Populism seeking a more modern life, education, and employment in schools and offices. A large section of the labor movement looked to Populism for answers, forging a political coalition with farmers that gave impetus to the regulatory state. Progress, however, was also menacing and inhumane, Postel notes. White Populists, embraced social-Darwinist notions of racial improvement, Chinese exclusion and the humiliation and brutality of separate-but-equal.<ref>Charles Postel, ''The Populist Vision'' (2007)</ref> |
| | | | |
| | ===Rules changes=== | | ===Rules changes=== |
| − | The [[United States presidential election, 1896|1896 election]] changed the rules of the game. By campaigning tirelessly with over 500 speeches in 100 days, [[William Jennings Bryan]] seized control of the headlines. It no longer mattered as much what the editorial page said—most newspapers opposed him—as long as his speeches made the front page. Financing likewise changed radically. Under the Second and Third Party Systems, parties financed their campaigns through patronage; now [[Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act|civil service reform]] was undercutting that revenue, and entirely new, outside sources of funding became critical. [[Mark Hanna]] systematically told nervous businessmen and financiers that he had a business plan to win the election, and then billed them for their share of the cost. Hanna spent $3.5 million in three months for speakers, pamphlets posters and rallies that all warned of doom and anarchy if Bryan should win, and offered prosperity and pluralism under [[William McKinley]]. Party loyalty itself weakened as voters were switching between parties much more often. It became respectable to declare oneself an “independent.”<ref> Jensen (1971) ch 10; Keller (1977)</ref> | + | The [[United States presidential election, 1896|1896 election]] changed the rules of the game. By campaigning tirelessly with over 500 speeches in 100 days, [[William Jennings Bryan]] seized control of the headlines. It no longer mattered as much what the editorial page said—most newspapers opposed him—as long as his speeches made the front page. Financing likewise changed radically. Under the Second and Third Party Systems, parties financed their campaigns through patronage; now [[Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act|civil service reform]] was undercutting that revenue, and entirely new, outside sources of funding became critical. [[Mark Hanna]] systematically told nervous businessmen and financiers that he had a business plan to win the election, and then billed them for their share of the cost. Hanna spent $3.5 million in three months for speakers, pamphlets posters and rallies that all warned of doom and anarchy if Bryan should win, and offered prosperity and pluralism under [[William McKinley]]. Party loyalty itself weakened as voters were switching between parties much more often. It became respectable to declare oneself an “independent.”<ref>Jensen (1971) ch 10; Keller (1977)</ref> |
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| | ===Third Parties=== | | ===Third Parties=== |
| − | Throughout the nineteenth century, third parties such as the [[Prohibition Party]], [[Greenback Party]] and the [[Populist Party (United States)|Populist Party]] evolved from widespread antiparty sentiment and a belief that governance should attend to the public good rather than partisan agendas. Because this position was based more on social experiences than any political ideology, nonpartisan activity was generally most effective on the local level. As third-party candidates tried to assert themselves in mainstream politics, however, they were forced to betray the antiparty foundations of the movement by allying with major partisan leaders. These alliances and the factionalism they engendered discouraged nonpartisan supporters and undermined the third-party movement by the end of the nineteenth century. Many reformers and nonpartisans subsequently lent support to the Republican Party, which promised to attend to issues important to them, such as anti-slavery or prohibition.<ref> See Voss-Hubbard (1999); Keller (1977) </ref> | + | Throughout the nineteenth century, third parties such as the [[Prohibition Party]], [[Greenback Party]] and the [[Populist Party (United States)|Populist Party]] evolved from widespread antiparty sentiment and a belief that governance should attend to the public good rather than partisan agendas. Because this position was based more on social experiences than any political ideology, nonpartisan activity was generally most effective on the local level. As third-party candidates tried to assert themselves in mainstream politics, however, they were forced to betray the antiparty foundations of the movement by allying with major partisan leaders. These alliances and the factionalism they engendered discouraged nonpartisan supporters and undermined the third-party movement by the end of the nineteenth century. Many reformers and nonpartisans subsequently lent support to the Republican Party, which promised to attend to issues important to them, such as anti-slavery or prohibition.<ref>See Voss-Hubbard (1999); Keller (1977)</ref> |
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| | ===Fourth Party System, 1896-1932=== | | ===Fourth Party System, 1896-1932=== |
| | {{main|Fourth Party System}} | | {{main|Fourth Party System}} |
| − | The overwhelming Republican victory, repeated in 1900, restored business confidence, inaugurated a long epoch of prosperity, and swept away the issues and personalities of the Third Party System. The period 1896-1932 can be called the Fourth Party System. Most voting blocs continued unchanged, but others realigned themselves, giving a strong Republican dominance in the industrial Northeast, though the way was clear for the Progressive Era to impose a new way of thinking and a new agenda for politics. <ref>Keller (1977); McGerr (2003)</ref> | + | The overwhelming Republican victory, repeated in 1900, restored business confidence, inaugurated a long epoch of prosperity, and swept away the issues and personalities of the Third Party System. The period 1896-1932 can be called the Fourth Party System. Most voting blocs continued unchanged, but others realigned themselves, giving a strong Republican dominance in the industrial Northeast, though the way was clear for the Progressive Era to impose a new way of thinking and a new agenda for politics.<ref>Keller (1977); McGerr (2003)</ref> |
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| | Alarmed at the new rules of the game for campaign funding, the Progressives launched investigations and exposures (by the "[[muckraker]]" journalists) into corrupt links between party bosses and business. New laws and constitutional amendments weakened the party bosses by installing primaries and directly electing senators. [[Theodore Roosevelt]] shared the growing concern with business influence on government. When [[William Howard Taft]] appeared to be too cozy with pro-business conservatives in terms of tariff and conservation issues, Roosevelt broke with his old friend and his old party. After losing the 1912 Republican nomination to Taft, he founded a new "[[Progressive Party (United States, 1912)|Bull Moose]]" Progressive Party and ran as a third candidate. Although he outpolled Taft (who won only two states) in both the popular vote and the electoral college, the Republican split elected Woodrow Wilson and made pro-business conservatives the dominant force in the GOP.<ref>McGerr (2003)</ref> | | Alarmed at the new rules of the game for campaign funding, the Progressives launched investigations and exposures (by the "[[muckraker]]" journalists) into corrupt links between party bosses and business. New laws and constitutional amendments weakened the party bosses by installing primaries and directly electing senators. [[Theodore Roosevelt]] shared the growing concern with business influence on government. When [[William Howard Taft]] appeared to be too cozy with pro-business conservatives in terms of tariff and conservation issues, Roosevelt broke with his old friend and his old party. After losing the 1912 Republican nomination to Taft, he founded a new "[[Progressive Party (United States, 1912)|Bull Moose]]" Progressive Party and ran as a third candidate. Although he outpolled Taft (who won only two states) in both the popular vote and the electoral college, the Republican split elected Woodrow Wilson and made pro-business conservatives the dominant force in the GOP.<ref>McGerr (2003)</ref> |
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| | * Campbell, Tracy. ''Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, an American Political Tradition-1742-2004'' (2005) [http://www.amazon.com/Deliver-Vote-Election-Political-Tradition-1742-2004/dp/078671591X/ref=si3_rdr_bb_product excerpt and text search] | | * Campbell, Tracy. ''Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, an American Political Tradition-1742-2004'' (2005) [http://www.amazon.com/Deliver-Vote-Election-Political-Tradition-1742-2004/dp/078671591X/ref=si3_rdr_bb_product excerpt and text search] |
| | * DeCanio, Samuel. "Religion and Nineteenth-Century Voting Behavior: A New Look at Some Old Data" ''Journal of Politics'', 2007 69: 339-350 | | * DeCanio, Samuel. "Religion and Nineteenth-Century Voting Behavior: A New Look at Some Old Data" ''Journal of Politics'', 2007 69: 339-350 |
| − | * De Santis, Vincent P. "The Republican Party and the Southern Negro, 1877-1897." ''The Journal of Negro History'', Vol. 45, No. 2, (1960) pp 71-87 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2992(196004)45%3A2%3C71%3ATRPATS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N in JSTOR] | + | * De Santis, Vincent P. "The Republican Party and the Southern Negro, 1877-1897." ''The Journal of Negro History'', Vol. 45, No. 2, (1960) pp 71–87 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2992(196004)45%3A2%3C71%3ATRPATS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N in JSTOR] |
| − | * De Santis, Vincent P. "The Political Life of the Gilded Age: A Review of the Recent Literature" ''The History Teacher,'' Vol. 9, No. 1 (Nov., 1975), pp. 73-106 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2745(197511)9%3A1%3C73%3ATPLOTG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W in JSTOR] | + | * De Santis, Vincent P. "The Political Life of the Gilded Age: A Review of the Recent Literature" ''The History Teacher,'' Vol. 9, No. 1 (Nov., 1975), pp. 73–106 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2745(197511)9%3A1%3C73%3ATPLOTG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W in JSTOR] |
| | * Dinkin, Robert J. ''Campaigning in America: A History of Election Practices.'' (1989) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=14291969 online edition] | | * Dinkin, Robert J. ''Campaigning in America: A History of Election Practices.'' (1989) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=14291969 online edition] |
| | * Dozer, D. M. "Benjamin Harrison and the Presidential Campaign of 1892," in ''American Historical Review'' 54, no. 1 (1948) [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762(194810)54%3A1%3C49%3ABHATPC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L in JSTOR] | | * Dozer, D. M. "Benjamin Harrison and the Presidential Campaign of 1892," in ''American Historical Review'' 54, no. 1 (1948) [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762(194810)54%3A1%3C49%3ABHATPC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L in JSTOR] |
| − | * Earle, Jonathan H. ''Jacksonian Antislavery and the Politics of Free Soil, 1824–1854'' (2004). Pp. 282. [http://www.amazon.com/Jacksonian-Antislavery-Politics-Free-1824-1854/dp/0807855553/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194245720&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] | + | * Earle, Jonathan H. ''Jacksonian Antislavery and the Politics of Free Soil, 1824–1854'' (2004). Pp. 282. [http://www.amazon.com/Jacksonian-Antislavery-Politics-Free-1824-1854/dp/0807855553/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194245720&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] |
| | * Faulkner, Harold U.; ''Politics, Reform, and Expansion, 1890-1900'' (1959), scholarly survey, strong on economic and political history [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=8541336 online edition] | | * Faulkner, Harold U.; ''Politics, Reform, and Expansion, 1890-1900'' (1959), scholarly survey, strong on economic and political history [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=8541336 online edition] |
| | * Fine, Sidney. ''Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought'', 1865–1901. University of Michigan Press, 1956. History of ideas | | * Fine, Sidney. ''Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought'', 1865–1901. University of Michigan Press, 1956. History of ideas |
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| | * Holt, Michael F. "The Primacy of Party Reasserted." ''Journal of American History'' 1999 86(1): 151-157. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2567410 in JSTOR] | | * Holt, Michael F. "The Primacy of Party Reasserted." ''Journal of American History'' 1999 86(1): 151-157. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2567410 in JSTOR] |
| | * James, Scott C. ''Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884-1936.'' (2000). 307 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Presidents-Parties-State-Perspective-Democratic/dp/0521030021/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194245875&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] | | * James, Scott C. ''Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884-1936.'' (2000). 307 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Presidents-Parties-State-Perspective-Democratic/dp/0521030021/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194245875&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] |
| − | * Jensen, Richard. "Democracy, Republicanism and Efficiency: The Values of American Politics, 1885-1930," in Byron Shafer and Anthony Badger, eds, ''Contesting Democracy: Substance and Structure in American Political History, 1775-2000'' (U of Kansas Press, 2001) pp 149-180; [http://www.uic.edu/~rjensen/rj0025.htm online version] | + | * Jensen, Richard. "Democracy, Republicanism and Efficiency: The Values of American Politics, 1885-1930," in Byron Shafer and Anthony Badger, eds, ''Contesting Democracy: Substance and Structure in American Political History, 1775-2000'' (U of Kansas Press, 2001) pp 149–180; [http://www.uic.edu/~rjensen/rj0025.htm online version] |
| | * Jensen, Richard. ''The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896'' (1971) | | * Jensen, Richard. ''The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896'' (1971) |
| | * Josephson, Matthew. ''The Politicos: 1865-1896'' 1938. entertaining narrative of national politics | | * Josephson, Matthew. ''The Politicos: 1865-1896'' 1938. entertaining narrative of national politics |
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| | <references/> | | <references/> |
| | {{reflist}} | | {{reflist}} |
| − | [[Category: United States History]] | + | [[Category:United States History]] |
| − | [[Category: United States Political Parties]] | + | [[Category:United States Political Parties]] |
| − | [[Category: American Civil War]] | + | [[Category:American Civil War]] |
| − | [[Category: Reconstruction]] | + | [[Category:Reconstruction]] |
| − | [[Category: Gilded Age]] | + | [[Category:Gilded Age]] |
| | [[Category:United States Political Terms]] | | [[Category:United States Political Terms]] |
| | [[Category:Republican Party]] | | [[Category:Republican Party]] |
| | [[Category:Democratic Party]] | | [[Category:Democratic Party]] |