Changes

The philosopher of religion [[William L. Rowe]] states the evidential problem of evil as follows <ref>William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 16: 335-41 - [http://www.uta.edu/philosophy/faculty/burgess-jackson/Rowe]</ref>:

The philosopher of religion [[William L. Rowe]] states the evidential problem of evil as follows <ref>William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 16: 335-41 - [http://www.uta.edu/philosophy/faculty/burgess-jackson/Rowe]</ref>:

R1) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

R1) There exist instances of intense suffering which an [[omnipotence|omnipotent]], [[omniscience|omniscient]] being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

R2) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

R2) An omniscient, [[omnibenevolence|wholly good]] being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

C) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

C) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.