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Using its leverage over Pinochet to curtail Chilean human rights abuses, the US simultaneously pressured Chile to introduce a series of free market economic reforms, a process that escalated sharply in the eighties.  This led to a period of rapid economic expansion and development without precedent in Latin America, in which growth averaged 7% annually, that came to be known as the "''miracle of Chile''" (it also included the region's greatest reductions in infant mortality<ref>Nick Eberstadt, The Poverty of Communism (Transaction Publishers, 1990), pp188,
 
Using its leverage over Pinochet to curtail Chilean human rights abuses, the US simultaneously pressured Chile to introduce a series of free market economic reforms, a process that escalated sharply in the eighties.  This led to a period of rapid economic expansion and development without precedent in Latin America, in which growth averaged 7% annually, that came to be known as the "''miracle of Chile''" (it also included the region's greatest reductions in infant mortality<ref>Nick Eberstadt, The Poverty of Communism (Transaction Publishers, 1990), pp188,
 
196-206, 240-6, in which he discusses living standards in Communist Cuba versus Pinochet's Chile.</ref>).  In turn, this allowed Chile to make a long-term transition to sustainable democratic rule that would likely have been otherwise inconceivable.<ref>http://www.lyd.com/noticias/violencia/what_really.html</ref>
 
196-206, 240-6, in which he discusses living standards in Communist Cuba versus Pinochet's Chile.</ref>).  In turn, this allowed Chile to make a long-term transition to sustainable democratic rule that would likely have been otherwise inconceivable.<ref>http://www.lyd.com/noticias/violencia/what_really.html</ref>
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Another aspect of the American role in Chile was an alleged attempt on the life of Chilean general Rene Schneider in 1970, due to his support for the appointment of Allende.  The Church hearings found that the CIA did in fact give weapons to a group of men who it knew had attacked him twice before, ostensibly as a test of loyalty so that the CIA would remain privy to their information, but that the weapons provided and the group thereby armed were not the ones who actually killed him.  The weapons were returned unused to the CIA and then discarded in the Pacific Ocean.<ref>http://www.history-matters.com/archive/church/reports/ir/html/ChurchIR_0120a.htm</ref>  On June 11, 1971, Kissinger and Nixon said the following in a private conversation: 
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: '''Kissinger''': —when they did try to assassinate somebody, it took three attempts— 
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: '''Nixon''': Yeah. 
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: '''Kissinger''': —and he lived for three weeks afterwards.<ref>http://blog.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/07/nixon_tape_reveals_oval_office.html</ref>
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There are two possible interpretations of these remarks:  a) Kissinger was telling the President that a military coup could not succeed in Chile because there were no officers both willing and ''able'' to carry one out; or b) the two men were mocking the CIA's squeamishness about killing Schneider.<ref>{{cite news| url=http://blog.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/07/nixon_tape_reveals_oval_office.html | work=The Washington Post | title=Nixon and Kissinger joked over Chile assassination}}</ref>
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The Senate Intelligence Committee, in its investigation of the matter, concluded that since the machine guns supplied to Valenzuela had not actually been employed in the killing, and since General Viaux had been officially discouraged by the CIA a few days before the murder, there was therefore "no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that United States officials specifically anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction."  This view has been disputed by writer [[Christopher Hitchens]].<ref>http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2001/feb/24/features.weekend</ref>
    
===Iraq 1958-63 and 1973-5===
 
===Iraq 1958-63 and 1973-5===
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