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The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 significantly damaged the already tenuous relationship between Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]] and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Vance felt that Brzezinski's linkage of SALT II ratification to other Soviet activities, together with the growing domestic criticisms in the United States of the accord, convinced Brezhnev to decide on military intervention in Afghanistan. Brzezinski, however, later recounted that he repeatedly advanced proposals on how to  maintain Afghanistan's "independence" and deter a Soviet invasion but was frustrated by the Department of State's opposition.  

The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 significantly damaged the already tenuous relationship between Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]] and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Vance felt that Brzezinski's linkage of SALT II ratification to other Soviet activities, together with the growing domestic criticisms in the United States of the accord, convinced Brezhnev to decide on military intervention in Afghanistan. Brzezinski, however, later recounted that he repeatedly advanced proposals on how to  maintain Afghanistan's "independence" and deter a Soviet invasion but was frustrated by the Department of State's opposition.  

According to Brzezinski, a National Security Council working group on Afghanistan wrote several reports on the deteriorating situation in 1979, but President Carter ignored them until the Soviet intervention destroyed his illusions.  Brzezinski has stated that the US provided communications equipment and limited financial aid to the mujahideen prior to the "formal" invasion, but only in response to the Soviet deployment of forces to Afghanistan and the 1978 coup, and with the intention of preventing further Soviet encroachment in the region.<ref>{{cite web|author=&ldquo;&rdquo; |url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGjAsQJh7OM&feature=channel |title=Brzezinski and the Afghan War Pt2 |publisher=YouTube |date= |accessdate=2010-07-10}}</ref> Two declassified documents signed by Carter shortly before the invasion do authorize the provision "unilaterally or through third countries as appropriate support to the Afghan insurgents either in the form of cash or non-military supplies" and the "worldwide" distribution of "non-attributable propaganda" to "expose" the leftist Afghan government as "despotic and subservient to the Soviet Union" and to "publicize the efforts of the Afghan insurgents to regain their country's sovereignty," but the records also show that the provision of arms to the rebels did not begin until 1980.<ref>http://www.activistmagazine.com/images/stories/government/carter_79-1581.jpg</ref><ref>http://www.activistmagazine.com/images/stories/government/carter_79-1579.jpg</ref>  Vance's close aide Marshall Shulman  "insists that the State Department worked hard to dissuade the Soviets from invading."<ref>''The Nation'', November 12, 2001</ref>  

According to Brzezinski, a National Security Council working group on Afghanistan wrote several reports on the deteriorating situation in 1979, but President Carter ignored them until the Soviet intervention destroyed his illusions.  Brzezinski has stated that the US provided communications equipment and limited financial aid to the mujahideen prior to the "formal" invasion, but only in response to the Soviet deployment of forces to Afghanistan and the 1978 coup, and with the intention of preventing further Soviet encroachment in the region.<ref>{{cite web|author=&ldquo;&rdquo; |url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGjAsQJh7OM&feature=channel |title=Brzezinski and the Afghan War Pt2 |publisher=YouTube |date= |accessdate=2010-07-10}}</ref> Two declassified documents signed by Carter shortly before the invasion do authorize the provision "unilaterally or through third countries as appropriate support to the Afghan insurgents either in the form of cash or non-military supplies" and the "worldwide" distribution of "non-attributable propaganda" to "expose" the leftist Afghan government as "despotic and subservient to the Soviet Union" and to "publicize the efforts of the Afghan insurgents to regain their country's sovereignty," but the records also show that the provision of arms to the rebels did not begin until 1980.<ref>http://www.activistmagazine.com/images/stories/government/carter_79-1581.jpg</ref><ref>http://www.activistmagazine.com/images/stories/government/carter_79-1579.jpg</ref>  Vance's close aide Marshall Shulman  "insists that the State Department worked hard to dissuade the Soviets from invading."<ref>''The Nation'', November 12, 2001</ref> The aid in 1979 was purely humanitarian in nature.

The Soviet invasion and occupation killed up to 2 million Afghans.<ref>http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm#Afghanistan</ref>  Brzezinski defended the arming of the rebels in response, saying that it "was quite important in hastening the end of the conflict," thereby saving the lives of thousands of Afghans, but "not in deciding the conflict, because actually the fact is that even though we helped the mujaheddin, they would have continued fighting without our help, because they were also getting a lot of money from the Persian Gulf and the Arab states, and they weren't going to quit. They didn't decide to fight because we urged them to. They're fighters, and they prefer to be independent. They just happen to have a curious complex: they don't like foreigners with guns in their country. And they were going to fight the Soviets.  Giving them weapons was a very important forward step in defeating the Soviets, and that's all to the good as far as I'm concerned."  When he was asked if he thought it was the right decision in retrospect (given the Taliban's subsequent rise to power), he said: "Which decision? For the Soviets to go in? The decision was the Soviets', and they went in. The Afghans would have resisted anyway, and they were resisting. I just told you: in my view, the Afghans would have prevailed in the end anyway, 'cause they had access to money, they had access to weapons, and they had the will to fight."<ref>http://www.activistmagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1110&Itemid=143</ref>

The Soviet invasion and occupation killed up to 2 million Afghans.<ref>http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm#Afghanistan</ref>  Brzezinski defended the arming of the rebels in response, saying that it "was quite important in hastening the end of the conflict," thereby saving the lives of thousands of Afghans, but "not in deciding the conflict, because actually the fact is that even though we helped the mujaheddin, they would have continued fighting without our help, because they were also getting a lot of money from the Persian Gulf and the Arab states, and they weren't going to quit. They didn't decide to fight because we urged them to. They're fighters, and they prefer to be independent. They just happen to have a curious complex: they don't like foreigners with guns in their country. And they were going to fight the Soviets.  Giving them weapons was a very important forward step in defeating the Soviets, and that's all to the good as far as I'm concerned."  When he was asked if he thought it was the right decision in retrospect (given the Taliban's subsequent rise to power), he said: "Which decision? For the Soviets to go in? The decision was the Soviets', and they went in. The Afghans would have resisted anyway, and they were resisting. I just told you: in my view, the Afghans would have prevailed in the end anyway, 'cause they had access to money, they had access to weapons, and they had the will to fight."<ref>http://www.activistmagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1110&Itemid=143</ref>