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|casualties2=Killed: 1,481<br/>Wounded: 7,627<br/>Missing: 89

|casualties2=Killed: 1,481<br/>Wounded: 7,627<br/>Missing: 89

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The '''Second Battle of Bull Run''' or '''Second Manassas''', was fought August 28-30, 1862 during the [[American Civil War]] near Manassas, [[Virginia]], involving the Army of Northern Virginia under Confederate General [[Robert E. Lee]], and the Union's Army of Virginia under Major General [[John Pope]].  Lee's overwhelming victory did much to enhance his reputation as a battlefield commander.

The '''Second Battle of Bull Run''' or '''Second Manassas''', was fought August 28–30, 1862 during the [[American Civil War]] near Manassas, [[Virginia]], involving the Army of Northern Virginia under Confederate General [[Robert E. Lee]], and the Union's Army of Virginia under Major General [[John Pope]].  Lee's overwhelming victory did much to enhance his reputation as a battlefield commander.

==Prelude==

==Prelude==

General Pope was a man of little tact, often discourteous and overbearing, arrogant and boastful. A pompous assumption of command address to his overworked troops compared them unfavorably to the men he had led in the West, alienating his Easterners permanently. Soon after taking command, Pope had issued orders that stirred up the civil populace and embittered many Southerners against him. The orders authorized foraging, directing Union troops to subsist off the country. The intent of the orders apparently was to restrict guerrilla activity but seemed more to encourage violence against civilians. His actions led General Lee to declare that Pope had to be "suppressed."  

General Pope was a man of little tact, often discourteous and overbearing, arrogant and boastful. A pompous assumption of command address to his overworked troops compared them unfavorably to the men he had led in the West, alienating his Easterners permanently. Soon after taking command, Pope had issued orders that stirred up the civil populace and embittered many Southerners against him. The orders authorized foraging, directing Union troops to subsist off the country. The intent of the orders apparently was to restrict guerrilla activity but seemed more to encourage violence against civilians. His actions led General Lee to declare that Pope had to be "suppressed."  

Pope's threat to Gordonsville led Lee to send Stonewall Jackson 13-16 July with his and Richard Ewell's Divisions to protect that place. By 27 July, Pope's growing strength caused Lee to add [[A. P. Hill]]'s Division, raising Jackson's force to about 24,000 men. Lee was able to risk reducing the Richmond defenses because of McClellan's inactivity and indications that the Army of the Potomac was preparing to leave. These signs included such things as the retrograde of wounded and the diversion of reinforcements from the Hampton area to Aquia and Alexandria on the Potomac.  

Pope's threat to Gordonsville led Lee to send Stonewall Jackson 13–16 July with his and Richard Ewell's Divisions to protect that place. By 27 July, Pope's growing strength caused Lee to add [[A. P. Hill]]'s Division, raising Jackson's force to about 24,000 men. Lee was able to risk reducing the Richmond defenses because of McClellan's inactivity and indications that the Army of the Potomac was preparing to leave. These signs included such things as the retrograde of wounded and the diversion of reinforcements from the Hampton area to Aquia and Alexandria on the Potomac.  

On 3 August, General Halleck directed General McClellan to begin his final withdrawal from the Peninsula and to return to Northern Virginia to support Pope. McClellan protested and did not begin his redeployment until 14 August. The situation created an opportunity for General Lee. The removal of the Army of the Potomac as a threat meant that there would be a short period when he could turn on Pope's force and actually outnumber it before the merger of the two Federal armies. Under these circumstances Pope should have assumed a defensive role from the time Halleck had decided to move McClellan, but his flexibility was impeded by Halleck's insistence that Pope remain forward along the lines of the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers. Pope was required at first to keep Brig. Gen. Rufus King's Division at Aquia and Fredericksburg to secure the docks there and also to use other parts of his force to keep open the Orange and Alexandria rail line from Culpeper to Washington. This extended Pope to the maximum. Even when King was released to him on 8 August, Pope still had to hold the river line. Halleck's insistence on this reduced Pope's planning options and exposed his force unnecessarily.  

On 3 August, General Halleck directed General McClellan to begin his final withdrawal from the Peninsula and to return to Northern Virginia to support Pope. McClellan protested and did not begin his redeployment until 14 August. The situation created an opportunity for General Lee. The removal of the Army of the Potomac as a threat meant that there would be a short period when he could turn on Pope's force and actually outnumber it before the merger of the two Federal armies. Under these circumstances Pope should have assumed a defensive role from the time Halleck had decided to move McClellan, but his flexibility was impeded by Halleck's insistence that Pope remain forward along the lines of the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers. Pope was required at first to keep Brig. Gen. Rufus King's Division at Aquia and Fredericksburg to secure the docks there and also to use other parts of his force to keep open the Orange and Alexandria rail line from Culpeper to Washington. This extended Pope to the maximum. Even when King was released to him on 8 August, Pope still had to hold the river line. Halleck's insistence on this reduced Pope's planning options and exposed his force unnecessarily.  

Stonewall Jackson noted this and attempted a move against Pope's forward units; however, poor staff work delayed his movements and he collided with Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks' II Corps of the Army of Virginia. The two men's units fought a fierce battle at Cedar Mountain south of Culpeper on 9 August. Pope's aggressive rhetoric and cautious directives had made his intentions unclear to Banks who, in doubt, chose to attack. The battle was a virtual draw, but Jackson withdrew as the rest of Pope's force advanced to support the battered Banks. Lee joined Jackson at Gordonsville on 15 August, bringing with him by rail the corps of Pope's West Point classmate [[James Longstreet]]. A skeleton Confederate force remained in Richmond to watch McClellan depart.  

Stonewall Jackson noted this and attempted a move against Pope's forward units; however, poor staff work delayed his movements and he collided with Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks' II Corps of the Army of Virginia. The two men's units fought a fierce battle at Cedar Mountain south of Culpeper on 9 August. Pope's aggressive rhetoric and cautious directives had made his intentions unclear to Banks who, in doubt, chose to attack. The battle was a virtual draw, but Jackson withdrew as the rest of Pope's force advanced to support the battered Banks. Lee joined Jackson at Gordonsville on 15 August, bringing with him by rail the corps of Pope's West Point classmate [[James Longstreet]]. A skeleton Confederate force remained in Richmond to watch McClellan depart.  

Lee felt the best way for him to assure the full relief of Richmond was to unite his forces and move on Pope. "The disparity of force between the contending forces rendered the risks unavoidable." At this point, Lee's united force of about 55,000 men slightly outnumbered Pope's. He hoped to trap Pope in the triangle formed between the convergence of the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers. Again, staff planning was poor and the Southern forces were slow to take up their attack positions. While this was taking place, on 18 August a patrol from the 1st Michigan Cavalry encountered Maj. Gen. [[J. E. B. Stuart]]'s headquarters group at Verdiersville and made off with a copy of Lee's plan. Pope made use of the information to withdraw skillfully north of the Rappahannock on the night of 18-19 August, basing himself in Warrenton. Lee unsuccessfully probed Pope's flanks along the river for the next several days.  

Lee felt the best way for him to assure the full relief of Richmond was to unite his forces and move on Pope. "The disparity of force between the contending forces rendered the risks unavoidable." At this point, Lee's united force of about 55,000 men slightly outnumbered Pope's. He hoped to trap Pope in the triangle formed between the convergence of the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers. Again, staff planning was poor and the Southern forces were slow to take up their attack positions. While this was taking place, on 18 August a patrol from the 1st Michigan Cavalry encountered Maj. Gen. [[J. E. B. Stuart]]'s headquarters group at Verdiersville and made off with a copy of Lee's plan. Pope made use of the information to withdraw skillfully north of the Rappahannock on the night of 18–19 August, basing himself in Warrenton. Lee unsuccessfully probed Pope's flanks along the river for the next several days.  

J. E. B. Stuart led a retaliatory raid against Pope's headquarters then at Catlett's Station during the night of 22-23 August. The Confederate cavalry made off with, among other things, Pope's dispatch book. From it Lee learned of the Army of Virginia's dispositions as well as the expected rate of reinforcement from the Army of the Potomac. Pope's letters also revealed his plan to remain on the defensive until his strength grew.  

J. E. B. Stuart led a retaliatory raid against Pope's headquarters then at Catlett's Station during the night of 22–23 August. The Confederate cavalry made off with, among other things, Pope's dispatch book. From it Lee learned of the Army of Virginia's dispositions as well as the expected rate of reinforcement from the Army of the Potomac. Pope's letters also revealed his plan to remain on the defensive until his strength grew.  

Lee decided he had to break the stalemate along the Rappahannock quickly before he was overwhelmingly outnumbered. All the major fords along the swollen river were well covered, with most of Pope's army concentrated between Sulphur Springs and Warrenton. The Federal fight was at Waterloo, six miles northwest of Warrenton. Lee saw only one chance to change the situation, "If one runs great risks, it is for the purpose of gaining great advantages." He thus split his forces and sent Jackson's force completely around Pope's northern flank. His objective was to bring about a decisive battle in which the advantages of position would be his, forcing Pope to fight on his terms. He knew from the captured papers that Pope was being controlled from Washington, which control required him to keep links to Aquia and along the river line, thus impairing his initiative and freedom of action. Lee also was aware of the internal command problems and lack of cohesiveness in Pope's army and wanted to take advantage of them while he had the chance. Jackson's move would compel Pope to give up the river line to safeguard his rear, thus spreading confusion and creating the opportunity for an engagement on terms favorable to the Confederates.  

Lee decided he had to break the stalemate along the Rappahannock quickly before he was overwhelmingly outnumbered. All the major fords along the swollen river were well covered, with most of Pope's army concentrated between Sulphur Springs and Warrenton. The Federal fight was at Waterloo, six miles northwest of Warrenton. Lee saw only one chance to change the situation, "If one runs great risks, it is for the purpose of gaining great advantages." He thus split his forces and sent Jackson's force completely around Pope's northern flank. His objective was to bring about a decisive battle in which the advantages of position would be his, forcing Pope to fight on his terms. He knew from the captured papers that Pope was being controlled from Washington, which control required him to keep links to Aquia and along the river line, thus impairing his initiative and freedom of action. Lee also was aware of the internal command problems and lack of cohesiveness in Pope's army and wanted to take advantage of them while he had the chance. Jackson's move would compel Pope to give up the river line to safeguard his rear, thus spreading confusion and creating the opportunity for an engagement on terms favorable to the Confederates.  

*Foote, Shelby, ''The Civil War, A Narrative, Vol. 1, Fort Sumter to Perryville'', Random House, New York (1958)

*Foote, Shelby, ''The Civil War, A Narrative, Vol. 1, Fort Sumter to Perryville'', Random House, New York (1958)

==See Also==

==See also==

* [[American Civil War: 1862]]

* [[American Civil War: 1862]]

{{Template:Campaignbox Northern Virginia}}

{{Campaignbox Northern Virginia}}

{{Template:ACW Battles of 1861}}

{{ACW Battles of 1861}}

[[Category: American Civil War Battles]]

[[Category:American Civil War Battles]]