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[[File:New York Stock Exchange 1939.jpg|thumb|New York Stock Exchange, 1939.]]

The '''Great Depression''' was a severe, worldwide economic downturn lasting from 1929 to the early 1940s. The primary cause was the failure of the [[Fed]] to carry out its given role of preventing [[bank run]]s. Nearly half the nation's banks failed, as panicked depositors withdrew their life savings, reducing the [[money supply]] and retarding [[investment]].

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Then, things were made still worse by [[government intervention]], i.e., the largest-ever peacetime [[tax increase]], an increase in [[tariff]]s, massive [[public works]] projects, [[wage and price controls]], and "increased bank-reserve requirements".<ref> [http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/the-great-depression-according-to-milton-friedman/# The Great Depression According to Milton Friedman]</ref>

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Then, things were made still worse by [[government intervention]], i.e., the largest-ever peacetime [[tax increase]], an increase in [[tariff]]s, massive [[public works]] projects, [[wage and price controls]], and "increased bank-reserve requirements".<ref>[http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/the-great-depression-according-to-milton-friedman/# The Great Depression According to Milton Friedman]</ref>

*{{Friedman-roosevelt-depression}}

*"[[Herbert Hoover|Hoover]]-nomics and FDR’s [[New Deal]] created the longest and deepest economic downturn in U.S. history." [http://www.thefreemanonline.org/book-reviews/the-politically-incorrect-guide-to-the-great-depression-and-the-new-deal/ Raymond Keating]

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* GDP fell drastically, with declines of 30-50% in most countries.

* Prices for commodities like crops, petroleum, raw materials and coal fell very sharply. This was '''deflation''' and it made the burden of debt higher and sabotaged long-term planning.

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* Unemployment soared, with the highest rates in heavy manufacturing. It reached 20-30% in major countries.<ref> "...government efforts -- first under Hoover and then under FDR -- to prop up wages despite falling prices led to a full decade of double-digit unemployment" [http://www.conservativebookclub.com/products/BookPage.asp?prod_cd=c7348 The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal] </ref>

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* Unemployment soared, with the highest rates in heavy manufacturing. It reached 20-30% in major countries.<ref>"...government efforts -- first under Hoover and then under FDR -- to prop up wages despite falling prices led to a full decade of double-digit unemployment" [http://www.conservativebookclub.com/products/BookPage.asp?prod_cd=c7348 The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal]</ref>

* Wage rates did NOT fall sharply, but hours per week of full-time workers fell. Workers were very reluctant to quit their jobs to look for a better one.

* Older workers without jobs were rarely hired; if they had jobs they delayed retirement.

* Teenagers had a very difficult time finding a first job; many stayed longer in school.

* Many men who were the breadwinner lost that role; many deserted their families and went on the road.

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* Thousands of small banks in the U.S. ~~closed--but~~ none in Canada or Britain.

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* Thousands of small banks in the U.S. closed—but none in Canada or Britain.

** When a bank closed its assets were sold off, and (in the U.S.) depositors after a few months received on average 85% of their deposits.

* Banks refused to lend money, and put their assets in safe government bonds.

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* Mortgages were foreclosed at record rates.

* Apartment owners often could not collect on rents; many went bankrupt.

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* Private ~~construction --both~~ housing and ~~commercial--plummeted~~, but public construction went up.

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* Private construction—both housing and commercial—plummeted, but public construction went up.

* Politically there was a widespread loss of faith in democracy; many countries turned to authoritarian regimes or dictatorships.

* The political results were negative for governments in power. In Britain this hurt the Labour party; in the U.S. it hurt the Republicans; in Canada it hurt the Liberal party.

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*As documented so well by free-market economists Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Murray Rothbard, during the 1920s, the Federal Reserve Board, exercising its power to expand the money supply, caused an inflationary binge — an action which created a false aura of prosperity. When the political authorities — faced with this inflationary threat and restrained by the gold standard — finally ceased the monetary expansion near the end of the decade, the inevitable economic hangover was reflected in the 1929 stock market crash and in generally depressed economic conditions. In other words, contrary to the indoctrination which the American people have received from their political authorities, the Great Depression was not the failure of America's free-enterprise system — it was the failure of political manipulation of money and credit.

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*Faced with the Great Depression — a depression which had been caused by government itself — Roosevelt's "solution" was to implement [[economic planning]]. Economist Jacob G. Hornberger has stated, "Under the banner of 'saving America's free-enterprise system,' FDR was directly responsible for the abandonment of America's 150-year history of free enterprise. <ref>http://www.fff.org/freedom/0891a.asp</ref>

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*Faced with the Great Depression — a depression which had been caused by government itself — Roosevelt's "solution" was to implement [[economic planning]]. Economist Jacob G. Hornberger has stated, "Under the banner of 'saving America's free-enterprise system,' FDR was directly responsible for the abandonment of America's 150-year history of free enterprise.<ref>http://www.fff.org/freedom/0891a.asp</ref>

== Prelude to the Depression ==

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[[Al Smith]]'s campaign manager, [[General Motors]] executive John J. Raskob, agreed. In an article entitled "Everybody Ought to be Rich" Raskob declared, "Prosperity is in the nature of an endless chain and we can break it only by refusing to see what it is." President-elect [[Herbert Hoover]] disagreed. Even before his inauguration he urged the [[Federal Reserve]] to halt "crazy and dangerous" gambling on [[Wall Street]] by increasing the discount rate the Fed charged banks for speculative loans. He asked magazines and newspapers to run stories warning of the dangers of rampant speculation.

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Once in the office, the new president ordered a reluctant [[Andrew Mellon]], his holdover secretary of the treasury, to promote the purchase of bonds instead of stocks. He sent his friend Henry Robinson, a Los Angeles banker, to convey a cautionary message to the financiers of Wall ~~Street--and~~ received in return a long, scoffing memorandum from Thomas W. Lamont of [[J.P. Morgan]] and Company. When the [[Federal Reserve Board]] that August did take steps to check the flow of speculative credit, New York bankers defied Washington, the National City Bank alone promising $100 million in fresh loans. An angry Hoover let the president of the [[New York Stock Exchange]] know that he was thinking of regulatory steps to curb stock manipulation and other excesses. Yet he undercut his own threat by placing ultimate responsibility for such measures on New York State's new governor, [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], who was already contemplating running against Hoover.

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Once in the office, the new president ordered a reluctant [[Andrew Mellon]], his holdover secretary of the treasury, to promote the purchase of bonds instead of stocks. He sent his friend Henry Robinson, a Los Angeles banker, to convey a cautionary message to the financiers of Wall Street—and received in return a long, scoffing memorandum from Thomas W. Lamont of [[J.P. Morgan]] and Company. When the [[Federal Reserve Board]] that August did take steps to check the flow of speculative credit, New York bankers defied Washington, the National City Bank alone promising $100 million in fresh loans. An angry Hoover let the president of the [[New York Stock Exchange]] know that he was thinking of regulatory steps to curb stock manipulation and other excesses. Yet he undercut his own threat by placing ultimate responsibility for such measures on New York State's new governor, [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], who was already contemplating running against Hoover.

Presidents in 1929 were not supposed to regulate Wall Street, or even talk about the gyrating market for fear of inadvertently setting off a panic. Hoover had his own reasons for keeping quiet. His conscience was pained after a friend took his advice to buy an issue that later nosedived. "To clear myself," the president told intimates, "I just bought it back and I have never advised anybody since."

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On [[Black Tuesday]], the twenty-ninth, the market collapsed. In the words of a gray haired Stock Exchange guard, "They roared like a lot of lions and tigers. They hollered and screamed, they clawed at one another collars. It was like a bunch of crazy men. Every once in a while, when Radio or Steel or Auburn would take another tumble, you'd see some poor devil collapse and fall to the floor."

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In a single day, sixteen million shares were ~~traded--a record--and~~ thirty billion dollars vanished into thin air. [[Westinghouse]] lost two thirds of its September value. DuPont dropped seventy points. The "Era of Get Rich Quick" was over. Jack Dempsey, America's first millionaire athlete, lost $3 million. Cynical New York hotel clerks asked incoming guests, "You want a room for sleeping or jumping?"

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In a single day, sixteen million shares were traded—a record—and thirty billion dollars vanished into thin air. [[Westinghouse]] lost two thirds of its September value. DuPont dropped seventy points. The "Era of Get Rich Quick" was over. Jack Dempsey, America's first millionaire athlete, lost $3 million. Cynical New York hotel clerks asked incoming guests, "You want a room for sleeping or jumping?"

== Discussion of remedial measures==

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The first instinct of governments and central banks faced with this gathering Depression began was to do nothing. Businessmen, economists, and politicians (memorably Secretary of the Treasury Mellon) expected the recession of 1929-1930 to be self-limiting. Earlier recessions had come to an end when the gap between actual and trend production was as large as in 1930. They expected workers with idle hands and capitalists with idle machines to try to undersell their still at-work peers. Prices would fall. When prices fell enough, entrepreneurs would gamble that even with slack demand production would be profitable at the new, lower wages. Production would then resume.

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Throughout the ~~decline--which~~ carried production per worker down to a level 40 percent below that which it had attained in 1929, and which saw the unemployment rise to take in more than a quarter of the labor ~~force--the~~ government did not try to prop up [[aggregate demand]]. The Federal Reserve did not use open market operations to keep the money supply from falling. Instead the only significant systematic use of open market operations was in the other direction: to raise interest rates and discourage gold outflows after the United Kingdom abandoned the gold standard in the fall of 1931. The Federal Reserve thought it knew what it was doing: it was letting the private sector handle the Depression in its own fashion. It saw the private sector's task as the "liquidation" of the American economy. And it feared that expansionary monetary policy would impede the necessary private-sector process of readjustment.

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Throughout the decline—which carried production per worker down to a level 40 percent below that which it had attained in 1929, and which saw the unemployment rise to take in more than a quarter of the labor force—the government did not try to prop up [[aggregate demand]]. The Federal Reserve did not use open market operations to keep the money supply from falling. Instead the only significant systematic use of open market operations was in the other direction: to raise interest rates and discourage gold outflows after the United Kingdom abandoned the gold standard in the fall of 1931. The Federal Reserve thought it knew what it was doing: it was letting the private sector handle the Depression in its own fashion. It saw the private sector's task as the "liquidation" of the American economy. And it feared that expansionary monetary policy would impede the necessary private-sector process of readjustment.

Contemplating the wreck of his country's economy and his own political career, Herbert Hoover wrote bitterly in retrospect about those in his administration who had advised inaction during the downslide:

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As Schumpeter put it, policy does not allow a choice between depression and no depression, but between depression now and a worse depression later: "inflation pushed far enough [would] undoubtedly turn depression into the sham prosperity so familiar from European postwar experience, [and]... would, in the end, lead to a collapse worse than the one it was called in to remedy." For "recovery is sound only if it does come of itself. For any revival which is merely due to artificial stimulus leaves part of the work of depressions undone and adds, to an undigested remnant of maladjustment, new maladjustment of its own which has to be liquidated in turn, thus threatening business with another [worse] crisis ahead"

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This ~~doctrine--that~~ in the long run the Great Depression would turn out to have been "good medicine" for the economy, and that proponents of stimulative policies were shortsighted enemies of the public ~~welfare--drew~~ anguished cries of dissent. British economist Ralph Hawtrey scorned those who, like Robbins and Hayek, wrote at the nadir of the Great Depression that the greatest danger the economy faced was inflation. It was, Hawtrey said, the equivalent of "Crying, 'Fire! Fire!' in Noah's flood."

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This doctrine—that in the long run the Great Depression would turn out to have been "good medicine" for the economy, and that proponents of stimulative policies were shortsighted enemies of the public welfare—drew anguished cries of dissent. British economist Ralph Hawtrey scorned those who, like Robbins and Hayek, wrote at the nadir of the Great Depression that the greatest danger the economy faced was inflation. It was, Hawtrey said, the equivalent of "Crying, 'Fire! Fire!' in Noah's flood."

[[John Maynard Keynes]] also tried to bury the liquidationists in ridicule. [[Milton Friedman]] in the 1930s and early 1940s was an avid Keynesian and indeed became a top advisor to the Treasury Department. In the 1950s he changed positions.

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However, the "liquidationist" view carried the day. Even governments that had unrestricted international freedom of ~~action--like~~ France and the United States with their massive gold ~~reserves--tended~~ not to pursue expansionary monetary and fiscal policies on the grounds that such would reduce investor "confidence" and hinder the process of liquidation, reallocation, and the resumption of private investment.

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However, the "liquidationist" view carried the day. Even governments that had unrestricted international freedom of action—like France and the United States with their massive gold reserves—tended not to pursue expansionary monetary and fiscal policies on the grounds that such would reduce investor "confidence" and hinder the process of liquidation, reallocation, and the resumption of private investment.

==Attempts to stimulate the economy==

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Refusing to accept the "natural" economic cycle in which a market crash was followed by cuts in business investment, production and wages, Hoover summoned industrialists to the White House on November 21, part of a round robin of conferences with business, labor, and farm leaders, and secured a promise to hold the line on wages. [[Henry Ford]] even agreed to increase workers' daily pay from six to seven dollars. From the nation's utilities, Hoover won commitments of $1.8 billion in new construction and repairs for 1930. Railroad executives made a similar pledge. Organized labor agreed to withdraw its latest wage demands.

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The President ordered federal departments to speed up construction projects. He contacted all forty-eight state governors to make a similar appeal for expanded public works. He went to Congress with a $160 million tax cut, coupled with a doubling of resources for public buildings and dams, highways and harbors. In December of 1929, Hoover's friend Julius Barnes of the [[U.S. Chamber of Commerce]] presided over the first meeting of the National Business Survey Conference, a task force of four hundred leading businessmen designated to enforce the voluntary agreements. Looking back at the year, the "[[New York Times]]" judged Commander Richard Byrd's expedition to the South ~~Pole-- not~~ the Wall Street ~~crash-- the~~ biggest news story of 1929.

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The President ordered federal departments to speed up construction projects. He contacted all forty-eight state governors to make a similar appeal for expanded public works. He went to Congress with a $160 million tax cut, coupled with a doubling of resources for public buildings and dams, highways and harbors. In December 1929, Hoover's friend Julius Barnes of the [[U.S. Chamber of Commerce]] presided over the first meeting of the National Business Survey Conference, a task force of four hundred leading businessmen designated to enforce the voluntary agreements. Looking back at the year, the "[[New York Times]]" judged Commander Richard Byrd's expedition to the South Pole—not the Wall Street crash—the biggest news story of 1929.

Praise for Hoover's intervention was widespread. "No one in his place could have done more," concluded the ''"New York Times"'' in the spring of 1930, by which time the Little Bull Market had restored a measure of confidence on Wall Street. "Very few of his predecessors could have done as much." concluded the Times. On February 18 Hoover announced that the preliminary shock had passed, and that employment was again on the mend. In June, a delegation of bishops and bankers called at the White House to warn of spreading joblessness. Hoover reminded them of his successful conferences with business and labor, and the explosion of government activity and public works designed to alleviate suffering. "Gentlemen," he concluded, "you have come six weeks too late".

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For most of our history Americans have been resigned to the "boom and bust" school of economics. When the economy got overheated and speculation ran rampant, a crash was unavoidable. Under such circumstances the best government could do was to do nothing that might make a bad thing worse. "Panics" had occurred in the 1830's under President [[Martin Van Buren]], in the 1850s under [[James Buchanan]], during [[Ulysses S. Grant]]'s term in the 1870s and, most notably, under [[Grover Cleveland]] in the 1890s.

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None of these presidents did much to stem the deflation in prices, contraction of investment, and loss of jobs that ~~resulted--for~~ the simple reason that standard economic theory held there was little if anything they could do. Then, in 1921, a post war slump led President [[Warren Harding]] to name Hoover as chairman of a special conference to deal with unemployment. "There is no economic failure so terrible in its import," Hoover declared at the time, "as that of a country possessing a surplus of every necessity of life in which numbers...willing and anxious to work are deprived of dire necessities. It simply cannot be if our moral and economic system is to survive.

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None of these presidents did much to stem the deflation in prices, contraction of investment, and loss of jobs that resulted—for the simple reason that standard economic theory held there was little if anything they could do. Then, in 1921, a post war slump led President [[Warren Harding]] to name Hoover as chairman of a special conference to deal with unemployment. "There is no economic failure so terrible in its import," Hoover declared at the time, "as that of a country possessing a surplus of every necessity of life in which numbers...willing and anxious to work are deprived of dire necessities. It simply cannot be if our moral and economic system is to survive.

This view explains President Hoover's vigorous counterattack in the wake of Wall Street's initial tumble. Not all of his advisers were so willing to abandon Boom and Bust theories. As late as 1930, Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon held that a panic might not be such a bad thing. "It will purge the rottenness out of the system," he added. "High costs of living...will come down. People will work harder, live a moral life. Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less competent people." Mellon lost out, however, and was packed off by President Hoover to the [[Court of Saint James]].

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==World Trade==

[[File:Spiral-1933.jpg|thumb|340px|total imports for 75 countries, 1929-33]]

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Every country began cutting imports, with the result that world trade spiraled downward, as the "Kindleberger spiral" demonstrates. The total imports of 75 countries declined from $3.0 billion in early 1929, shrinking every quarter to a low of $944 million in spring 1933.<ref> Charles Kindleberger, ''The World in Depression 1929-1939'' (1986), p 170</ref> The U.S. made matters worse with the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1933, which restricted imports into the US. Canada, Britain, France and other countries retaliated by reducing their imports from the US.

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Every country began cutting imports, with the result that world trade spiraled downward, as the "Kindleberger spiral" demonstrates. The total imports of 75 countries declined from $3.0 billion in early 1929, shrinking every quarter to a low of $944 million in spring 1933.<ref>Charles Kindleberger, ''The World in Depression 1929-1939'' (1986), p 170</ref> The U.S. made matters worse with the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1933, which restricted imports into the US. Canada, Britain, France and other countries retaliated by reducing their imports from the US.

== Why the "Great" Depression? ==

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Twice on the night of March 3, Hoover telephoned the president-elect trying to persuade him to join in concerted action. FDR replied that governors were free to do what they wished on a state by state basis. A little after one in the morning, the Governors of New York and Illinois unilaterally suspended banking operations in their states. "We are at the end of our string," President Hoover remarked to his secretary that morning, "there is nothing more we can do."

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Economist Milton Friedman points out the Federal Reserve Board did not do what it was created to ~~do -- act~~ as lender of last resort to keep the money supply from ~~shrinking -- which~~ caused the banking crisis.

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Economist Milton Friedman points out the Federal Reserve Board did not do what it was created to do—act as lender of last resort to keep the money supply from shrinking—which caused the banking crisis.

== The Drought ==

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* Bremer William W. "Along the American Way: The New Deal's Work Relief Programs for the Unemployed." ''Journal of American History'' 62 (December 1975): 636-652 online in JSTOR

* Chandler, Lester. ''America's Greatest Depression'' (1970). overview by economic historian.

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* Fisher, Irving. "The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions," ''Econometrica,'' Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct., 1933), pp. ~~337-357~~ [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28193310%291%3A4%3C337%3ATDTOGD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6&origin=JSTOR-pdf in JSTOR]

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* Fisher, Irving. "The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions," ''Econometrica,'' Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct., 1933), pp. 337–357 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28193310%291%3A4%3C337%3ATDTOGD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6&origin=JSTOR-pdf in JSTOR]

* Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz, ''A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960'' (1963), classic monetarist explanation; highly statistical; partly reprinted as ''The Great Contraction''. [http://www.amazon.com/Monetary-History-United-States-1867-1960/dp/0691003548/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194983806&sr=8-3 excerpt and text search]

* Gallaway, Lowell, Richard Vedder, Martin Bronfenbrenner. ''Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in Twentieth-Century America'' 336 pp [http://www.questia.com/library/book/out-of-work-unemployment-and-government-in-twentieth-century-america-by-lowell-gallaway-richard-vedder-martin-bronfenbrenner.jsp online edition], by conservative economists

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* Mitchell, Broadus. ''Depression Decade: From New Era through New Deal, 1929-1941'' (1964), overview of economic history [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=98065455 online edition]

* Parker, Randall E. ''Reflections on the Great Depression'' (2002) interviews with 11 leading economists

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* Roose, Kenneth D. "The Recession of 1937-38" ''Journal of Political Economy'', Vol. 56, No. 3 (Jun., 1948) , pp. ~~239-248~~ online [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808(194806)56%3A3%3C239%3ATRO1%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0 in JSTOR]

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* Roose, Kenneth D. "The Recession of 1937-38" ''Journal of Political Economy'', Vol. 56, No. 3 (Jun., 1948) , pp. 239–248 online [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808(194806)56%3A3%3C239%3ATRO1%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0 in JSTOR]

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* Romasco Albert U. "Hoover-Roosevelt and the Great Depression: A Historiographic Inquiry into a Perennial Comparison." In John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner and David Brody, eds. ''The New Deal: The National Level'' (1973) v 1 pp ~~3-26~~.

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* Romasco Albert U. "Hoover-Roosevelt and the Great Depression: A Historiographic Inquiry into a Perennial Comparison." In John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner and David Brody, eds. ''The New Deal: The National Level'' (1973) v 1 pp 3–26.

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* Romer, Christina D. "The Nation in Depression," ''The Journal of Economic Perspectives,'' Vol. 7, No. 2. (Spring, 1993), pp. ~~19-39~~. major survey by leading economist, with comparisons to other nations [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199321%297%3A2%3C19%3ATNID%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7 in JSTOR]

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* Romer, Christina D. "The Nation in Depression," ''The Journal of Economic Perspectives,'' Vol. 7, No. 2. (Spring, 1993), pp. 19–39. major survey by leading economist, with comparisons to other nations [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199321%297%3A2%3C19%3ATNID%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7 in JSTOR]

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* Romer, Christina D. "What Ended the Great Depression?" ''The Journal of Economic History,'' Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. ~~757-784~~ [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28199212%2952%3A4%3C757%3AWETGD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K&origin=JSTOR-pdf in JSTOR]

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* Romer, Christina D. "What Ended the Great Depression?" ''The Journal of Economic History,'' Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 757–784 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28199212%2952%3A4%3C757%3AWETGD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K&origin=JSTOR-pdf in JSTOR]

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* Romer, Christina D. "The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression," ''The Quarterly Journal of Economics,'' Vol. 105, No. 3 (Aug., 1990), pp. ~~597-624~~ [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199008%29105%3A3%3C597%3ATGCATO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5&origin=JSTOR-pdf in JSTOR]

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* Romer, Christina D. "The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression," ''The Quarterly Journal of Economics,'' Vol. 105, No. 3 (Aug., 1990), pp. 597–624 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199008%29105%3A3%3C597%3ATGCATO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5&origin=JSTOR-pdf in JSTOR]

* Rosen, Elliot A. ''Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the Economics of Recovery'' (2005) argues productivity gains were more responsible for long-term recovery than New Deal

* Rothbard, Murray N. ''America's Great Depression'' (1963), by leading libertarian economist

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* Watkins, T. H. ''The Great Depression: America in the 1930s.'' (1993). [http://www.amazon.com/Great-Depression-America-1930s/dp/0316924547/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194984060&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

* [http://www.upjohninst.org/publications/ch1/wheelerch1.pdf Wheeler, Mark, ed. ''The Economics of the Great Depression'' (1998)]

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* White, Eugene N. "The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited," ''The Journal of Economic Perspectives'' Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), pp. ~~67-83~~, evaluates different theories [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1942891 in JSTOR]

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* White, Eugene N. "The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited," ''The Journal of Economic Perspectives'' Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), pp. 67–83, evaluates different theories [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1942891 in JSTOR]

* Wicker, Elmus. ''The Banking Panics of the Great Depression'' 1996 [http://www.eh.net/bookreviews/library/0028.shtml online review]

* Wecter, Dixon. ''The Age of the Great Depression, 1929-1941.'' (1948). social history

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===Bibliography: World===

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* Aldcroft, Derek H. ''Europe's Third World: The European Periphery in the Interwar Years'' (2006) 217pp; ISBN: 0-7546-0599-X. [http://www.amazon.com/Europes-Third-World-European-Periphery/dp/075460599X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194985841&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

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* Aldcroft, Derek H. ''Europe's Third World: The European Periphery in the Interwar Years'' (2006) 217pp; ISBN 0-7546-0599-X. [http://www.amazon.com/Europes-Third-World-European-Periphery/dp/075460599X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194985841&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

* Ambrosius, G. and W. Hubbard, ''A Social and Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe'' (1989)

* Bernanke, Ben S. "The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Approach," ''Journal of Money, Credit & Banking,'' Vol. 27, 1995 [http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5001644781 online edition]

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* Madsen, Jakob B. "Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade during the Great Depression"' ''Southern Economic Journal'', Vol. 67, 2001 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-4038(200104)67%3A4%3C848%3ATBATCO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q in JSTOR]

* Madsen, Jakob B. "The Length and the Depth of the Great Depression: an International Comparison." ''Research in Economic History'' 2004 22: 239-288. Issn: 0363-3268

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* Mundell, R. A. "A Reconsideration of the Twentieth Century' "The American Economic Review" Vol. 90, No. 3 (Jun., 2000), pp. ~~327-340~~ [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282(200006)90:3%3C327:AROTTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8 in JSTOR]

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* Mundell, R. A. "A Reconsideration of the Twentieth Century' "The American Economic Review" Vol. 90, No. 3 (Jun., 2000), pp. 327–340 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282(200006)90:3%3C327:AROTTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8 in JSTOR]

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* Romer, Christina D. "The Nation in Depression," ''The Journal of Economic Perspectives,'' Vol. 7, No. 2. (Spring, 1993), pp. ~~19-39~~. major survey by leading economist, with comparisons to other nations [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199321%297%3A2%3C19%3ATNID%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7 in JSTOR]

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* Romer, Christina D. "The Nation in Depression," ''The Journal of Economic Perspectives,'' Vol. 7, No. 2. (Spring, 1993), pp. 19–39. major survey by leading economist, with comparisons to other nations [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199321%297%3A2%3C19%3ATNID%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7 in JSTOR]

* Rothermund, Dietmar. ''The Global Impact of the Great Depression'' (1996)

* Shiroyama, Tomoko. ''China during the Great Depression: Market, State, and the World Economy, 1929-1937'' (2008)

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== External ~~Links~~ ==

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== External links ==

* [http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?issueID=26&articleID=320 "The Great Depression Revisited," by Roger Garrison]

* [http://www.onpower.org/history_greatdepression.html/ Great Depression]

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