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| | '''SALT II''' was another treaty between the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] following [[SALT I]]. It was signed by [[Jimmy Carter]] in 1979. In a victory for conservatives, on December 20, 1979 the Democratic-controlled [[Senate Armed Services Committee]] voted 10-0 against ratifying the treaty. This lopsided vote (with seven abstentions) declared that SALT II was "not in the national security interests of the United States." The U.S. Senate thereby failed to ratify the treaty, and it never went into effect. | | '''SALT II''' was another treaty between the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] following [[SALT I]]. It was signed by [[Jimmy Carter]] in 1979. In a victory for conservatives, on December 20, 1979 the Democratic-controlled [[Senate Armed Services Committee]] voted 10-0 against ratifying the treaty. This lopsided vote (with seven abstentions) declared that SALT II was "not in the national security interests of the United States." The U.S. Senate thereby failed to ratify the treaty, and it never went into effect. |
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| − | [[category:diplomacy]] | + | [[Category:Diplomacy]] |
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| | The SALT II negotiations began in November 1972. | | The SALT II negotiations began in November 1972. |
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| | The SALT II Treaty would have provided for: | | The SALT II Treaty would have provided for: |
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| − | *an equal aggregate limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles -- ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). Initially, this ceiling would have been 2,400 as agreed at Vladivostok. The ceiling would have been lowered to 2,250 at the end of 1981; | + | *an equal aggregate limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). Initially, this ceiling would have been 2,400 as agreed at Vladivostok. The ceiling would have been lowered to 2,250 at the end of 1981; |
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| | *an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles; | | *an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles; |
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| | The Joint Statement of Principles, the third element of the SALT II agreement, would have established a basic framework for the next stage of SALT negotiations, SALT III. The sides agreed on the following general goals to be achieved in the next round of talks: | | The Joint Statement of Principles, the third element of the SALT II agreement, would have established a basic framework for the next stage of SALT negotiations, SALT III. The sides agreed on the following general goals to be achieved in the next round of talks: |
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| − | -- significant and substantial reductions in the number of strategic offensive arms; -- further qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms; and -- resolution of the issues included in the protocol. | + | -- significant and substantial reductions in the number of strategic offensive arms; -- further qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms; and—resolution of the issues included in the protocol. |
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| | The sides would also have considered other steps to enhance strategic stability, and either side could have brought up any other topic relevant to the limitation of strategic arms. | | The sides would also have considered other steps to enhance strategic stability, and either side could have brought up any other topic relevant to the limitation of strategic arms. |
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| | The Joint Statement of Principles also established the principle that cooperative measures might be used to ensure adequate verification of a SALT III agreement, raising the possibility of thus going beyond reliance on national technical means of verification alone. | | The Joint Statement of Principles also established the principle that cooperative measures might be used to ensure adequate verification of a SALT III agreement, raising the possibility of thus going beyond reliance on national technical means of verification alone. |