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{{See also|Critical rationalism}}

{{See also|Critical rationalism}}

In ''The Open Society and its Enemies'' Popper put forward the concept of "critical rationalism" in opposition to what he called the "authoritarian rationalism" of previous philosophers.  Previous philosophers had assumed a central role of justification in knowledge, whilst Popper denied the very possibility of justification arguing that any attempt to establish a foundation for knowledge led to a regress ending in "faith" (in the sense of a belief held without conclusive reasons that is held to be uncriticisable).  Popper characterised rationality not as a methodology of formulating and verifying proposition but as a constant criticism of existing beliefs.   

In ''The Open Society and its Enemies'' Popper put forward the concept of "critical rationalism" in opposition to what he called the "authoritarian rationalism" of previous philosophers.  Previous philosophers had assumed a central role of justification in knowledge, whilst Popper denied the very possibility of justification arguing that any attempt to establish a foundation for knowledge led to a regress ending in "faith" (in the sense of a belief held without conclusive reasons that is held to be uncriticizable).  Popper characterized rationality not as a methodology of formulating and verifying proposition but as a constant criticism of existing beliefs.   

In ''The Open Society and its Enemies'' Popper declared his "faith" in reason (as characterised by criticism).  A faith that led him to reject any other epistemological authority.  His student, W. W. Bartley III went further ("The Retreat to Comittment") and rejected the need to have faith in reason.  For Bartley ''all'' propositions where criticisable, even the propositions of basic logic themselves, a position he termed "comprehensively critical rationalism".

In ''The Open Society and its Enemies'' Popper declared his "faith" in reason (as characterized by criticism), a faith that led him to reject any other epistemological authority.  His student, W. W. Bartley III went further ("The Retreat to Commitment") and rejected the need to have faith in reason.  For Bartley ''all'' propositions were criticizable, even the propositions of basic logic themselves, a position he termed "comprehensively critical rationalism".

Another pupil of Popper's, David W. Miller rejects not only dogma, which can be characterised as support for propositions that should not be questioned but the very concept of "support".

Another pupil of Popper's, David W. Miller rejects not only dogma, which can be characterized as support for propositions that should not be questioned but the very concept of "support".

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The view is criticised by those who hold that knowledge must have foundations, basic beliefs that are both true and justified, from which other propositions are derived.

The view is criticized by those who hold that knowledge must have foundations, basic beliefs that are both true and justified, from which other propositions are derived.  In ''The Open Society and its Enemies'', Popper refutes naive versions of this theory by pointing out that simply as a matter of logic such beliefs cannot be invoked to justify themselves; hence, the foundation stands in need of a foundation.  He proceeds to add weight to this argument using the example of mathematics, citing Godel's Incompleteness Theorum and extending the principle to every science (eg physics) that depends on even basic arithmetic.  Popper felt that he had refuted foundationalism decisively - but the urge to 'foundationalize' mathematics has not abated and, more generally, a number of significant thinkers (notably Quine, arguably Wittgenstein) have advanced various 'holisms' to provide epistemology with a foundation that isn't subject to Popper's apparently decisive refutation of naive foundationalism.

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