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'''McCarthyism''' is named for U.S. [[Senator Joseph McCarthy]] and refers to Sen. McCarthy's campaign to investigate problems associated with [[Communist Party of the United States|Communists]] working in sensitive US government jobs. His campaign infuriated the American [[Left]], and they often use the term to mean aggressive questioning of someone's background or personal beliefs, or making accusations of disloyalty. It is a derogatory term. It is often used to refer to [[House Un-American Activities Committee]] (HUAC) or the Hollywood Blacklist, even though those weren't really part of McCarthy's campaign. <ref>[http://www.newmediajournal.us/staff/bates/05252007.htm  Joe McCarthy: Gone But Certainly Not Forgotten], Michael M. Bates, ''New Media Journal'', May 25, 2007. </ref>  

'''McCarthyism''' is named for U.S. [[Senator Joseph McCarthy]] and refers to Sen. McCarthy's campaign to investigate [[Communist Party of the United States|Communists]] members working in sensitive US government jobs in violation of the [[Hatch Act]]. The Hatch Act forbad federal employment of workers who had membership in "any political organization which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government."  By 1950, it was widely known the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]] had stolen atomic weapons know-how with the assistance of American citizens, many of them government employees. The United States spent $4 billion to develop the technology, roughly equivalent to $80 billion in today’s money.  International problems were extremely tense at the time, and the knowledge that the U.S. [[Cold War]] enemy obtained atomic weapons capabilities with the help of American citizens, coupled with the perception that the [[Truman administration]] did nothing about it, was very worrisome to many.

 

McCarthy's efforts to remove security risks from government infuriated the American [[Left]], and they often use the term to mean aggressive questioning of someone's background or personal beliefs, or making accusations of disloyalty. It is a derogatory term. It is often used to refer to [[House Un-American Activities Committee]] (HUAC) or the Hollywood Blacklist, even though those weren't really part of McCarthy's campaign. <ref>[http://www.newmediajournal.us/staff/bates/05252007.htm  Joe McCarthy: Gone But Certainly Not Forgotten], Michael M. Bates, ''New Media Journal'', May 25, 2007. </ref>  

==Amerasia cover up==

==Amerasia cover up==

In 1947 <ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages."

In 1947 <ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages."

</ref>, it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks. There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages". </ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations of espionage regarding high government officials, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margareet Chase Smith, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Recoird, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democtaric administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges"; "..there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

</ref>, it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks. There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages". </ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations of espionage regarding high government officials, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margaret Chase Smith, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democtaric administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges"; "..there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

==Hoover==

==Hoover==

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associated of real espionage. Hoover told a House Committee in February 1950 that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associated of real espionage. Hoover told a House Committee in February 1950 that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

[[Image:Semenov.JPG|right|thumb|285px|Iulii Khariton with a copy of the first Soviet atomic bomb, detonated on August 29, 1949.]]

[[Image:Semenov.JPG|right|thumb|285px|Iulii Khariton with a copy of the first Soviet atomic bomb, detonated on August 29, 1949.]]

The Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the loop in intelligence sharing after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] had become more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have had considerable counter espionage information which would have been helpful to them in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic energy program, but they had not been aware of it until after Fuchs arrest They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value.The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,]9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>

The Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the loop in intelligence sharing after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] had become more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have had considerable counter espionage information which would have been helpful to them in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic energy program, but they had not been aware of it until after Fuchs arrest They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,]9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>

In summary memorandums to Director Hoover of [[Venona project]] information begun in 1950 entitled, ''Operations of the [[MGB]] Residency at New York, 1944-45'', Special Agent [[Alan Belmont]] reported the FBI had identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activity who had been active in United States. Of this number the FBI had information from defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] and other sources regarding espionage activity on 87 of these persons. However, espionage activity on the paert of 119 persons from Venona information were not previously known to the FBI prior to 1946 but were mostly identified through investigation by 1950. <ref>[http://foia.fbi.gov/venona/venona.pdf FBI Venona file]</ref>

In summary memorandums to Director Hoover of [[Venona project]] information begun in 1950 entitled, ''Operations of the [[MGB]] Residency at New York, 1944-45'', Special Agent [[Alan Belmont]] reported the FBI had identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activity who had been active in United States. Of this number the FBI had information from defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] and other sources regarding espionage activity on 87 of these persons. However, espionage activity on the part of 119 persons from Venona information were not previously known to the FBI prior to 1946 but were mostly identified through investigation by 1950. <ref>[http://foia.fbi.gov/venona/venona.pdf FBI Venona file]</ref>

==Extrajudicial means==

==Extrajudicial means==

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] stated publicly he could identify 400 members of the Communist conspiracy which had delivered the know-how to build the [[atomic bomb]] to the Soviet Union.  This number of 400 was closely corroborated by the 349 codenames the cryptographers in the Venona project had discovered and FBI field investigators were working to identify.  Defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] also identified 81 persons involved in espionage, and Soviet cypher clerk [[Igor Gouzenko]] yielded up names too when he defected in Canada.

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] stated publicly he could identify 400 members of the Communist conspiracy which had delivered the know-how to build the [[atomic bomb]] to the Soviet Union.  This number of 400 was closely corroborated by the 349 codenames the cryptographers in the Venona project had discovered and FBI field investigators were working to identify.  Defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] also identified 81 persons involved in espionage, and Soviet cipher clerk [[Igor Gouzenko]] yielded up names too when he defected in Canada.

In sum, some 205 total true identities of persons involved in espionage during World War II were known to the FBI by 1950, some being corroborated by multiple sources.  Given the secret nature of Venona, and the unwillingness to let the Soviet Union know the US was reading its codes, the known spies were eased out of government positions, and where prosecution could occur using sources other than Venona, a few cases were attempted.  But the priority was always to maintain the secrecy regarding the breaking of Soviet codes, remove security risks, and forego law enforcement while cryptographers and field investigators continued working to identify others.

In sum, some 205 total true identities of persons involved in espionage during World War II were known to the FBI by 1950, some being corroborated by multiple sources.  Given the secret nature of Venona, and the unwillingness to let the Soviet Union know the US was reading its codes, the known spies were eased out of government positions, and where prosecution could occur using sources other than Venona, a few cases were attempted.  But the priority was always to maintain the secrecy regarding the breaking of Soviet codes, remove security risks, and forego law enforcement while cryptographers and field investigators continued working to identify others.

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the [[White House]], the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision.  General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowldege of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise. <ref>[http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/830wsuop.asp?pg=2 The Origins of McCarthyism], What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it? by Robert D. Novak, ''The Weekly Standard'', 06/30/2003, Volume 008, Issue 41.</ref>  

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the [[White House]], the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision.  General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowledge of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise. <ref>[http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/830wsuop.asp?pg=2 The Origins of McCarthyism], What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it? by Robert D. Novak, ''The Weekly Standard'', 06/30/2003, Volume 008, Issue 41.</ref>  

After the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear test, and it became apparent to the public that the Soviet Union obtained the know how from American citizens employed by the federal government during the [[New Deal]], with the growing tensions of the times over the [[Berlin Airlift]], the loss of the U.S.'s wartime ally in China to the Chinese [[Comintern]] forces, and later the [[Korean War]], those with knowledge of Venona had as an immediate priority to remove Soviet operatives from sensitive positions.  President Truman had instituted a system of Loyalty checks through review boards, but Truman himself was unaware of the extent of the real danger. Hoover approached McCarthy with a plan to (a) ease more security risks out of government positions, (b) put pressure on friends and relatives to reveal what they knew about Soviet operatives based upon familial relations or association in various communist front organizations, and (c) gain more knowledge of spies contacts and operations.  It took a willingness on McCarthy's part to stretch the limits of Senate Rules, and there is no indication Hoover disclosed completely to McCarthy  the FBI's full knowledge of Soviet espionage activity in the Untited States for the prior two and half decades. The immediate crisis was so large and potentially catastrophic that McCarthy was willing to act with Hoover and the FBI to help remove the remaining security risks.

After the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear test, and it became apparent to the public that the Soviet Union obtained the know how from American citizens employed by the federal government during the [[New Deal]], with the growing tensions of the times over the [[Berlin Airlift]], the loss of the U.S.'s wartime ally in China to the Chinese [[Comintern]] forces, and later the [[Korean War]], those with knowledge of Venona had as an immediate priority to remove Soviet operatives from sensitive positions.  President Truman had instituted a system of Loyalty checks through review boards, but Truman himself was unaware of the extent of the real danger. Hoover approached McCarthy with a plan to (a) ease more security risks out of government positions, (b) put pressure on friends and relatives to reveal what they knew about Soviet operatives based upon familial relations or association in various communist front organizations, and (c) gain more knowledge of spies contacts and operations.  It took a willingness on McCarthy's part to stretch the limits of Senate Rules, and there is no indication Hoover disclosed completely to McCarthy  the FBI's full knowledge of Soviet espionage activity in the United States for the prior two and half decades. The immediate crisis was so large and potentially catastrophic that McCarthy was willing to act with Hoover and the FBI to help remove the remaining security risks.

Most but not all of [[Senator McCarthy]]’s numbered cases were drawn from the “Lee List” or “108 list” of unresolved [[Department of State]] security cases compiled by the investigators for the House Appropriates Committee in 1947.  Robert E. Lee was the committee’s lead investigator and supervised preparation of the list.  The Tydings subcommittee also obtained this list.  The Lee list, also using numbers rather than names, was published in the proceeding of the subcommittee. <ref>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950).</ref>  

Most but not all of [[Senator McCarthy]]’s numbered cases were drawn from the “Lee List” or “108 list” of unresolved [[Department of State]] security cases compiled by the investigators for the House Appropriates Committee in 1947.  Robert E. Lee was the committee’s lead investigator and supervised preparation of the list.  The Tydings subcommittee also obtained this list.  The Lee list, also using numbers rather than names, was published in the proceeding of the subcommittee. <ref>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950).</ref>  

*On 31 July [[Elizabeth Bentley]] testifies before the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]] (HUAC), publicly accusing [[Harry Dexter White]] and [[White House]] adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] of being [[Soviet agents]].

*On 31 July [[Elizabeth Bentley]] testifies before the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]] (HUAC), publicly accusing [[Harry Dexter White]] and [[White House]] adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] of being [[Soviet agents]].

*3 August [[Whittaker Chambers]] names [[Harry Dexter White]] and the first General Secretary of the [[United Nations]] Charter meeting,, former State Depatment employee and confident of [[President Roosevelt]] at the [[Yalta Conference]], [[Alger Hiss]] as Communists in testimony before the HUAC.

*3 August [[Whittaker Chambers]] names [[Harry Dexter White]] and the first General Secretary of the [[United Nations]] Charter meeting,, former State Department employee and confident of [[President Roosevelt]] at the [[Yalta Conference]], [[Alger Hiss]] as Communists in testimony before the HUAC.

*13 August Harry Dexter White, the first head of the [[International Monetary Fund]], a keystone post war institution, denies charges he is a Soviet agent before HUAC.

*13 August Harry Dexter White, the first head of the [[International Monetary Fund]], a keystone post war institution, denies charges he is a Soviet agent before HUAC.

*On 23 September 1949 Truman announces that the Soviets have exploded an atomic bomb.

*On 23 September 1949 Truman announces that the Soviets have exploded an atomic bomb.

*19 October [[Meredith Gardner]] and [[Robert Lamphere]] secretely meet at [[Arlington Hall]] and formally inaugurate full-time FBI/Army [[Signals Intelligence Service]] liaison on coded Soviet messages.

*19 October [[Meredith Gardner]] and [[Robert Lamphere]] secretly meet at [[Arlington Hall]] and formally inaugurate full-time FBI/Army [[Signals Intelligence Service]] liaison on coded Soviet messages.

*On 1 October [[Maoist]] forces were victorious after the effective [[subversion (political)|subversion]] of [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]]’s support for the [[Chinese Nationalist]] government during World War II.

*On 1 October [[Maoist]] forces were victorious after the effective [[subversion (political)|subversion]] of [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]]’s support for the [[Chinese Nationalist]] government during World War II.