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{{See also|World War II in the Air#Goals and Achievements of Strategic Bombing}}

{{See also|World War II in the Air#Goals and Achievements of Strategic Bombing}}

[[Michael Tracey]] writes:<ref>[https://mtracey.substack.com/p/a-fairy-tale-version-of-world-war A Fairy Tale Version of World War II is Being Used to Sell the Next World War], Michael Tracey, September 21, 2022. substack.</ref>

[[Michael Tracey]] writes:<ref>[https://mtracey.substack.com/p/a-fairy-tale-version-of-world-war A Fairy Tale Version of World War II is Being Used to Sell the Next World War], Michael Tracey, September 21, 2022. substack.</ref>

{{quotebox-float|"Those keen to maintain an ability to say that US entry to World War II was justified, even if certain methods or tactics were not justified, often point to a few high-profile examples of bombing raids which they think may have crossed a line. These commonly include the firebombing of [[Dresden]], the firebombing of [[Tokyo]], and the [[nuclear]] strikes on [[Hiroshima]] and [[Nagasaki]] — all of which deliberately targeted civilians for mass destruction. But less commonly understood is that these attacks were not aberrational. Deliberate targeting of civilians was always a foundational tenet of the Allied (and US) aerial warfare strategy.  

{{quotebox-float|"Those keen to maintain an ability to say that US entry to World War II was justified, even if certain methods or [[tactics]] were not justified, often point to a few high-profile examples of bombing raids which they think may have crossed a line. These commonly include the firebombing of [[Dresden]], the firebombing of [[Tokyo]], and the [[nuclear]] strikes on [[Hiroshima]] and [[Nagasaki]] — all of which deliberately targeted [[civilian]]s for mass destruction. But less commonly understood is that these attacks were not aberrational. Deliberate targeting of civilians was always a foundational tenet of the [[Allied]] (and US) aerial [[war]]fare [[strategy]].  

According to a review published in 2006 by Air University Press, and conveniently available on the Defense Department’s website, US perpetration of so-called “area raids” in the European theater was officially authorized and systematic.

According to a review published in 2006 by Air University Press, and conveniently available on the [[Defense Department]]’s website, US perpetration of so-called “area raids” in the European theater was officially authorized and systematic.

The first “city bombing attack” conducted by British forces was in Mannheim, Germany on December 16, 1940 — crews were ordered to “drop incendiaries on the center of town,” reports the Air Force review. “The attack had the clear intention of burning out the city center.” By September 27, 1943, the US officially institutionalized this tactic. In a raid on the German city of Emden, the command headquarters of the Eighth Air Force “ordered the attacking aircraft to aim for the center of the city, not specific industrial or transportation targets.” As the 2006 Air Force review specifies, “by definition an area raid on a city requires a large percentage of incendiaries.” From that point onward, the Eighth Air Force conducted at least one “area raid” per week until the end of the war. Previously raids which deliberately targeted civilian populations had occurred on a more ad hoc basis, such as on August 12, 1943, when 106 US bombers “visually attacked the city of [[Bonn]] as a target of opportunity with 243 tons of bombs.”

The first “city bombing attack” conducted by British forces was in Mannheim, Germany on December 16, 1940 — crews were ordered to “drop incendiaries on the center of town,” reports the Air Force review. “The attack had the clear intention of burning out the city center.” By September 27, 1943, the US officially institutionalized this tactic. In a raid on the German city of Emden, the command headquarters of the Eighth Air Force “ordered the attacking aircraft to aim for the center of the city, not specific industrial or transportation targets.” As the 2006 Air Force review specifies, “by definition an area raid on a city requires a large percentage of incendiaries.” From that point onward, the Eighth Air Force conducted at least one “area raid” per week until the end of the war. Previously raids which deliberately targeted civilian populations had occurred on a more ad hoc basis, such as on August 12, 1943, when 106 US bombers “visually attacked the city of [[Bonn]] as a target of opportunity with 243 tons of bombs.”

In January 1945, General George McDonald pointed out that in its large-scale adoption of this tactic, the US Air Force was “unequivocally into the business of area bombardment of congested civil populations,” causing “indiscriminate homicide and destruction.” In certain Air Force records, deliberate bombings of cities were concealed and falsely classified as attacks on “military targets.” But this was not some rogue activity; in a joint directive issued on January 24, 1943, [[Franklin Roosevelt]] and [[Winston Churchill]] ordered their respective air forces to “undermine the morale of the German people.” The prevailing theory was that this could be accomplished by deliberately fire-bombing civilian population centers to instill “generalized fear,” as Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, explained. In early 1942, the British forces had adopted “an almost exclusive focus on city centers.” As early as July 9, 1941, months before formal US entry to the war, Roosevelt had directed his military chiefs to develop operational principles for the forthcoming aerial bombardment campaign. The chiefs concluded that a central aim should be the “undermining of German morale by air attack of civil concentrations… heavy and sustained bombing of cities may crash that morale entirely.”

In January 1945, General George McDonald pointed out that in its large-scale adoption of this tactic, the US Air Force was “unequivocally into the business of area bombardment of congested civil [[population]]s,” causing “indiscriminate homicide and destruction.” In certain Air Force records, deliberate bombings of cities were concealed and [[false]]ly classified as attacks on “[[military]] targets.” But this was not some rogue activity; in a joint directive issued on January 24, 1943, [[Franklin Roosevelt]] and [[Winston Churchill]] ordered their respective air forces to “undermine the morale of the German people.” The prevailing theory was that this could be accomplished by deliberately fire-bombing [[civilian]] [[population]] centers to instill “generalized fear,” as Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, explained. In early 1942, the British forces had adopted “an almost exclusive focus on city centers.” As early as July 9, 1941, months before formal US entry to the war, Roosevelt had directed his military chiefs to develop operational principles for the forthcoming aerial bombardment campaign. The chiefs concluded that a central aim should be the “undermining of German morale by air attack of civil concentrations… heavy and sustained bombing of cities may crash that morale entirely.”

Even US aerial attacks in which civilians may not have been deliberately targeted are difficult to distinguish from US aerial attacks in which civilians were deliberately targeted. As Tami Davis Biddle, professor at the United States Army War College, wrote in 2005:

Even US aerial attacks in which civilians may not have been deliberately targeted are difficult to distinguish from US aerial attacks in which civilians were deliberately targeted. As Tami Davis Biddle, professor at the United States Army War College, wrote in 2005:

:In order to maintain a reasonable operating tempo, the Americans had taken to mounting frequent attacks on railway marshaling yards — large, visible targets either within or on the outskirts of major cities. Though such raids were designated and recorded as attacks on “communications” or “transportation” targets, they were often — in their effects — hard to distinguish from less discriminate “area” raids. The Americans typically included incendiary bombs, which were not particularly efficient against marshaling yards but could cause widespread collateral damage.  

:In order to maintain a reasonable operating tempo, the Americans had taken to mounting frequent attacks on railway marshaling yards — large, visible targets either within or on the outskirts of major cities. Though such raids were designated and recorded as attacks on “communications” or “transportation” targets, they were often — in their effects — hard to distinguish from less discriminate “area” raids. The Americans typically included incendiary bombs, which were not particularly efficient against marshaling yards but could cause widespread [[collateral damage]].  

Years after the civilian-targeting policy had been systematically implemented, in February 1945, Secretary of War Stimson declared: “We will continue to bomb military targets and… there has been no change in the policy against conducting ‘terror bombings’ against civilian populations.” There had only been “no change” insofar as deliberate targeting of civilians had long been the policy. This official deception continued for some time, such as on July 23, 1945, when — repeating as fact the claims made by US Air Force General James Bevans — the ''[[New York Times]]'' reported: “During the entire European war, the American air forces concentrated on precision bombing.”

Years after the civilian-targeting policy had been systematically implemented, in February 1945, [[Secretary of War Stimson]] declared: “We will continue to bomb military targets and… there has been no change in the policy against conducting ‘[[terror]] bombings’ against [[civilian]] [[population]]s.” There had only been “no change” insofar as deliberate targeting of civilians had long been the policy. This official deception continued for some time, such as on July 23, 1945, when — repeating as fact the claims made by US Air Force General James Bevans — the ''[[New York Times]]'' reported: “During the entire European war, the American air forces concentrated on precision bombing.”

“The leaders of the USAAF knew exactly what they were doing, and civilian casualties were one of the explicit objectives of area incendiary bombing approved by both the USAAF and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” concluded Thomas Searle in the Journal of Military History (2002).

“The leaders of the USAAF knew exactly what they were doing, and civilian casualties were one of the explicit objectives of area incendiary bombing approved by both the USAAF and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” concluded Thomas Searle in the Journal of Military History (2002).