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| | In July 2003, U.S. Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Robert MacLean tried to blow the whistle within the TSA on a plan to reduce air marshal coverage of nonstop, long distance flights amidst heightened warnings <ref>[http://youtube.com/watch?v=Wi36t4B2OV4 Federal Air Marshal Fired for Exposing Dangerous Policy], ''CNN Lou Dobbs'', November 20, 2006</ref> based on a July 26, 2006 [[Department of Homeland Security]] (DHS) Advisory describing intelligence of an [[al-Qaeda]] suicide hijack plan. <ref>[http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2003/07/30-hijackings.htm U.S. warns of 9/11-style plane attacks], Mimi Hall and Kevin Johnson, ''USA Today'', August 1, 2003</ref> | | In July 2003, U.S. Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Robert MacLean tried to blow the whistle within the TSA on a plan to reduce air marshal coverage of nonstop, long distance flights amidst heightened warnings <ref>[http://youtube.com/watch?v=Wi36t4B2OV4 Federal Air Marshal Fired for Exposing Dangerous Policy], ''CNN Lou Dobbs'', November 20, 2006</ref> based on a July 26, 2006 [[Department of Homeland Security]] (DHS) Advisory describing intelligence of an [[al-Qaeda]] suicide hijack plan. <ref>[http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2003/07/30-hijackings.htm U.S. warns of 9/11-style plane attacks], Mimi Hall and Kevin Johnson, ''USA Today'', August 1, 2003</ref> |
| − | The plan would exploit a U.S. immigration loophole enabling a terrorist, without a U.S. visa, to take a flight from a country with less-stringent security to a U.S. airport and roam that U.S. airport during a layover before taking a second connecting flight to the destination country. Once inside a U.S. airport, terrorists would smuggle weapons onto aircraft by hiding weapons inside camera equipment and children's toys. During flight, the terrorists with the smuggled weapons would overpower the crew, take control, and fly the hijacked aircraft into U.S. east coast targets. <ref>[http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A64871-2003Jul29?language=printer Memo Warns Of New Plots To Hijack Jets], Sara Kehaulani Goo and Susan Schmidt, ''The Washington Post'', July 30, 2003</ref> The plan was in direct violation of the [[Aviation & Transportation Security Act]] (Public Law 107–71), Title 49 of the [[United States Code]] Section 44917: “Deployment of Federal Air Marshals... [on] nonstop, long distance flights, such as those targeted on [[September 11]], [[2001]], should be a priority.”<ref>[http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode49/usc_sec_49_00044917----000-.html 2001 Aviation & Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107–71)], ''Title 49 of the United States Code § 44917 "Deployment of Federal Air Marshals"'', November 19, 2001</ref> | + | The plan would exploit a U.S. immigration loophole enabling a terrorist, without a U.S. visa, to take a flight from a country with less-stringent security to a U.S. airport and roam that U.S. airport during a layover before taking a second connecting flight to the destination country. Once inside a U.S. airport, terrorists would smuggle weapons onto aircraft by hiding weapons inside camera equipment and children's toys. During flight, the terrorists with the smuggled weapons would overpower the crew, take control, and fly the hijacked aircraft into U.S. east coast targets. <ref>[http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A64871-2003Jul29?language=printer Memo Warns Of New Plots To Hijack Jets], Sara Kehaulani Goo and Susan Schmidt, ''The Washington Post'', July 30, 2003</ref> The plan was in direct violation of the [[Aviation & Transportation Security Act]] (Public Law 107–71), Title 49 of the [[United States Code]] Section 44917: '''“Deployment of Federal Air Marshals... [on] nonstop, long distance flights, such as those targeted on [[September 11]], [[2001]], should be a priority.”'''''Italic text''<ref>[http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode49/usc_sec_49_00044917----000-.html 2001 Aviation & Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107–71)], ''Title 49 of the United States Code § 44917 "Deployment of Federal Air Marshals"'', November 19, 2001</ref> |
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| | MacLean was rebuffed by his FAMS managers and the [[Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General]] (DHS/OIG), so he warned the public by going to the press. <ref>[http://onoekeh.blogspot.com/2003_07_01_archive.html Air Marshals Pulled from 'Key Flights'], Brock Meeks, ''NBC News (MSNBC)'', August 29, 2003</ref> The message he disclosed was not labeled as [["Sensitive Security Information"]] (SSI), the often abused information control label within DHS' [[Transportation Security Administration]] (TSA) used to protect information--unaware of any obligation to protect the information. For employees dealing with traditional classified information, which is typically much more sensitive that SSI, they must be made aware of its status so as to protect it accordingly. | | MacLean was rebuffed by his FAMS managers and the [[Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General]] (DHS/OIG), so he warned the public by going to the press. <ref>[http://onoekeh.blogspot.com/2003_07_01_archive.html Air Marshals Pulled from 'Key Flights'], Brock Meeks, ''NBC News (MSNBC)'', August 29, 2003</ref> The message he disclosed was not labeled as [["Sensitive Security Information"]] (SSI), the often abused information control label within DHS' [[Transportation Security Administration]] (TSA) used to protect information--unaware of any obligation to protect the information. For employees dealing with traditional classified information, which is typically much more sensitive that SSI, they must be made aware of its status so as to protect it accordingly. |
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| | ==Termination for Disclosure== | | ==Termination for Disclosure== |
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| − | On August 31, 2006, a year after proposing to terminate MacLean, the TSA asserted that the July 2003 information he disclosed was SSI. <ref>[http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/10/ap/government/main2787504.shtml U.S. Labels 2003 Leaked Memo 'Sensitive'], Larry Margasak, ''Associated Press'', May 10, 2007</ref> TSA labeled MacLean's disclosure as SSI over three years after it was made public. <ref>[http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/MacLeanFinalOrderSSI.pdf TSA's August 31, 2006 Final Order on Sensitive Security Information], Andrew Colsky, ''Transportation Security Administration'', August 31, 2006</ref> The [[Government Accountability Office]] (GAO) has criticized the DHS for failing to have clear policies and oversight of its SSI designations, and using vague standards for its use. <ref>[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05677.pdf Clear Policies and Oversight Needed for Designation of Sensitive Security Information], Steven J. Pecinovsky, ''Government Accountability Office'', June 1, 2005</ref> If DHS and the [[Department of Justice]] (DOJ) succeed with their removal of MacLean, these pseudo-classification markings will be abused to retroactively mark information as "sensitive" to then retaliate against whistleblowers, possibly decreasing the flow of critical information to the public. <ref>[http://pogo.org/p/government/rmaclean-dhs.html Retroactive Labeling in Robert MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security], Nick Schwellenbach, ''Project On Government Oversight'', May 5, 2007</ref> | + | On August 31, 2006, a year after proposing to terminate MacLean, the TSA retroactively labeled the July 2003 information he disclosed as SSI. <ref>[http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/10/ap/government/main2787504.shtml U.S. Labels 2003 Leaked Memo 'Sensitive'], Larry Margasak, ''Associated Press'', May 10, 2007</ref> TSA labeled MacLean's disclosure as SSI over three years after it was made public. <ref>[http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/MacLeanFinalOrderSSI.pdf TSA's August 31, 2006 Final Order on Sensitive Security Information], Andrew Colsky, ''Transportation Security Administration'', August 31, 2006</ref> The [[Government Accountability Office]] (GAO) has criticized the DHS for failing to have clear policies and oversight of its SSI designations, and using vague standards for its use. <ref>[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05677.pdf Clear Policies and Oversight Needed for Designation of Sensitive Security Information], Steven J. Pecinovsky, ''Government Accountability Office'', June 1, 2005</ref> If DHS and the [[Department of Justice]] (DOJ) succeed with their removal of MacLean, these pseudo-classification markings will be abused to retroactively mark information as "sensitive" to then retaliate against whistleblowers, possibly decreasing the flow of critical information to the public. <ref>[http://pogo.org/p/government/rmaclean-dhs.html Retroactive Labeling in Robert MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security], Nick Schwellenbach, ''Project On Government Oversight'', May 5, 2007</ref> |
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| | ==Transporation Security Administration and Department of Justice's Arguments== | | ==Transporation Security Administration and Department of Justice's Arguments== |