Changes

  | year = August 9, 1951

  | year = August 9, 1951

  | title = Page 9707

  | title = Page 9707

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>  

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref> <ref>FBI Silvmaster file 5c pg. 11 pdf. [http://foia.fbi.gov/silversm/silversm5c.pdf]</ref>

* [[Peveril Meigs]], U.S. State Department; Department of the Army; McCarthy's Case #3 and Lee list #2;<ref>

* [[Peveril Meigs]], U.S. State Department; Department of the Army; McCarthy's Case #3 and Lee list #2;<ref>

Meigs became employed with the State Department in September, 1945, and was allowed to resign from the State department in 1948 even though there were concerns regarding his security/loyalty. McCarthy related to the Senate the fact that Meigs was under investigation by the State Department's security/loyalty board yet was allowed to resign without noting his file as having been under investigation. Subsequently, Meigs went to work for the Department of the Army and after McCarthy communicated to the Army that Meigs should be investigated, the Army then looked into Meigs' background and found him to be a clear loyalty/security risk. In January 12, 1952 and again on May 26, 1952, McCarthy stated to the Senate that, "On February 20, I believe, I laid before the Senate the case of Perveril Meigs. The State Department held a hearing. They knew that they could not conceivably clear Perveril Meigs, even with the type of board which they have. What did they do? They notified him that he would not be cleared, so he then resigned, went over to the Army and got a job in the Army, with no notification to the Army that this man was an extremely bad security risk because of close association with espionage agents. It was only after we called the Army's attention to the case that the Army Loyalty Board took the case up, and of course, they promptly ordered him discharged." Meigs' case is a perfect example of the State Department covering up either its' incompetence in hiring individuals that are security/loyalty risks and/or in being able to properly filter out such individuals once they are employees of the State Department. The tactic of informing a suspected security/loyalty risk and allowing him or her to resign was a strategy implemented in order for the State Department to avoid appearing incompetent or as though they did not make any effort to avoid hiring loyalty/security risks.  

Meigs became employed with the State Department in September, 1945, and was allowed to resign from the State department in 1948 even though there were concerns regarding his security/loyalty. McCarthy related to the Senate the fact that Meigs was under investigation by the State Department's security/loyalty board yet was allowed to resign without noting his file as having been under investigation. Subsequently, Meigs went to work for the Department of the Army and after McCarthy communicated to the Army that Meigs should be investigated, the Army then looked into Meigs' background and found him to be a clear loyalty/security risk. In January 12, 1952 and again on May 26, 1952, McCarthy stated to the Senate that, "On February 20, I believe, I laid before the Senate the case of Perveril Meigs. The State Department held a hearing. They knew that they could not conceivably clear Perveril Meigs, even with the type of board which they have. What did they do? They notified him that he would not be cleared, so he then resigned, went over to the Army and got a job in the Army, with no notification to the Army that this man was an extremely bad security risk because of close association with espionage agents. It was only after we called the Army's attention to the case that the Army Loyalty Board took the case up, and of course, they promptly ordered him discharged." Meigs' case is a perfect example of the State Department covering up either its' incompetence in hiring individuals that are security/loyalty risks and/or in being able to properly filter out such individuals once they are employees of the State Department. The tactic of informing a suspected security/loyalty risk and allowing him or her to resign was a strategy implemented in order for the State Department to avoid appearing incompetent or as though they did not make any effort to avoid hiring loyalty/security risks.