Changes

In 1939 the U. S. supplied Japan with 59% of all war materials. The havoc wrought upon China by Japan using American made bombs dropped from American made airplanes was publicized as Japanese atrocities. (cf Porter Sargent, Bulletin #1 ''War Propaganda'', May 30, 1939).<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Getting_Us_Into_War-Porter_Sargent-1941-640pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=218&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pgs. 525 - 544 pdf], pdf</ref>

In 1939 the U. S. supplied Japan with 59% of all war materials. The havoc wrought upon China by Japan using American made bombs dropped from American made airplanes was publicized as Japanese atrocities. (cf Porter Sargent, Bulletin #1 ''War Propaganda'', May 30, 1939).<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Getting_Us_Into_War-Porter_Sargent-1941-640pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=218&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pgs. 525 - 544 pdf], pdf</ref>

''Time'' magazine referred to Thomas Lamont in its November 25, 1940 issue as a specialist on Japan. Years earlier Lamont visited Japan with [[Walter Lippmann]]. At the Academy of Political Science, Lamont responded to the question, "Should the U.S. tighten trade embargoes against Japan?" ''Time'' said "he pointed out inconsistencies and omissions in U.S. embargoes  that still permitted Japan to get war supplies."  The outcry against supplying Japan with the essentials for her aggressive war against China was met by an announcement from the [[Roosevelt Administration]] of 'embargoes' on the export of scrap and oil. Porter Sargent observed, "Subtle influences through the organizations of fund raising, public relations and communication by radio or print, make it possible to soft pedal the profit from arming Japan while promoting the use of armed force against her."<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, quoted in ''Getting Us into War'', Porter Sargent Publisher: P. Sargent, Boston, 1941, pg. 530.</ref> "Watertight as a fish-net" is how [[Comintern]] operative and editor of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] publication ''Pacific Affairs'', [[Owen Lattimore]] characterized the embargo on November 9, 1940.  "The Royal Dutch-Shell group and a subsidiary of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company will supply 7,000,000 barrels of oil to Japan over six months," a ''New York Times'' dispatch of October 17 reported. "Arrangements have been virtually concluded for Japan to get 40 per cent of her oil requirements for the next six months in the Dutch Indies." [[KGB]] source [[I. F. Stone]] reported on the State Department's handling of the embargo in the October 5, 1940 issue of ''[[The Nation]]'',

''Time'' magazine referred to Thomas Lamont in its November 25, 1940 issue as a specialist on Japan. Years earlier Lamont visited Japan with [[Walter Lippmann]]. At the Academy of Political Science, Lamont responded to the question, "Should the U.S. tighten trade embargoes against Japan?" ''Time'' said "he pointed out inconsistencies and omissions in U.S. embargoes  that still permitted Japan to get war supplies."  The outcry against supplying Japan with the essentials for her aggressive war against China was met by an announcement from the [[Roosevelt Administration]] of 'embargoes' on the export of scrap and oil. Porter Sargent observed, "Subtle influences through the organizations of fund raising, public relations and communication by radio or print, make it possible to soft pedal the profit from arming Japan while promoting the use of armed force against her."<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, quoted in ''Getting Us into War'', Porter Sargent Publisher: P. Sargent, Boston, 1941, pg. 530.</ref> "Watertight as a fish-net" is how [[Comintern]] operative and editor of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] publication ''Pacific Affairs'', [[Owen Lattimore]] characterized the embargo on November 9, 1940.  "The Royal Dutch-Shell group and a subsidiary of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company will supply 7,000,000 barrels of oil to Japan over six months," a ''New York Times'' dispatch of October 17 reported. "Arrangements have been virtually concluded for Japan to get 40 per cent of her oil requirements for the next six months in the Dutch Indies." [[KGB]] source [[I. F. Stone]] wrote on the State Department's handling of the embargo in the October 5, 1940 issue of ''[[The Nation]]'',

:"Within the department, over the objections of a more farsighted minority, the experts made a joke of the discourses by protecting the profits accruing to American business from the aggressions we were so nobly denouncing."  The trade "treaty expired in January of [1940], but it was not until July that an 'embargo' on oil and scrap was announced . . . . The details were left to the State Department experts. When the regulations were promulgated it was found that the only scrap 'embargoed'" was one little used of the 75 varieties of iron and steel scrap, and "the only petroleum 'embargoed' was aviation gas". Stone continued, "the 'embargo' itself was only a system of licensing. It is now revealed that few if any licenses were denied under these regulations . . . . The Japanese, with about a year's supply on hand, do not need our scrap as much as they did, and the scrap industry, with a defense boom in the offing, does not need Japanese orders . The big steel companies cannot oppose an embargo on scrap by claiming that we have an over-supply of steel and at the same time ask for a higher price for steel on the ground of a shortage . . . . Both big steel and the scrap industry have accepted the embargo with a curious equanimity. This may be the result of a new sense of patriotism or it may be something else." <ref>I.F. Stone, ''The Nation'', October 5, 1940.</ref>

:"Within the department, over the objections of a more farsighted minority, the experts made a joke of the discourses by protecting the profits accruing to American business from the aggressions we were so nobly denouncing."  The trade "treaty expired in January of [1940], but it was not until July that an 'embargo' on oil and scrap was announced . . . . The details were left to the State Department experts. When the regulations were promulgated it was found that the only scrap 'embargoed'" was one little used of the 75 varieties of iron and steel scrap, and "the only petroleum 'embargoed' was aviation gas". Stone continued, "the 'embargo' itself was only a system of licensing. It is now revealed that few if any licenses were denied under these regulations . . . . The Japanese, with about a year's supply on hand, do not need our scrap as much as they did, and the scrap industry, with a defense boom in the offing, does not need Japanese orders . The big steel companies cannot oppose an embargo on scrap by claiming that we have an over-supply of steel and at the same time ask for a higher price for steel on the ground of a shortage . . . . Both big steel and the scrap industry have accepted the embargo with a curious equanimity. This may be the result of a new sense of patriotism or it may be something else." <ref>I.F. Stone, ''The Nation'', October 5, 1940.</ref>