Changes

A major breakthrough occurred at the Vladivostok meeting in November 1974, between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev. At this meeting, the sides agreed to a basic framework for the SALT II agreement. Basic elements of the Aide-Memoire, which recorded this agreement, included:

A major breakthrough occurred at the Vladivostok meeting in November 1974, between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev. At this meeting, the sides agreed to a basic framework for the SALT II agreement. Basic elements of the Aide-Memoire, which recorded this agreement, included:

*2,400 equal aggregate limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) of the sides;

*2,400 equal aggregate limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles ([[ICBM]]s, [[SLBM]]s, and heavy bombers) of the sides;

*1,320 equal aggregate limit on MIRV systems;

*1,320 equal aggregate limit on MIRV systems;

The SALT II Treaty would have provided for:

The SALT II Treaty would have provided for:

      -- an equal aggregate limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles -- ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). Initially, this ceiling would have been 2,400 as agreed at Vladivostok. The ceiling would have been lowered to 2,250 at the end of 1981;

*an equal aggregate limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles -- ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). Initially, this ceiling would have been 2,400 as agreed at Vladivostok. The ceiling would have been lowered to 2,250 at the end of 1981;

      -- an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles;

*an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles;

      -- an equal aggregate limit of 1,200 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles; and

*an equal aggregate limit of 1,200 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles; and

      -- an equal aggregate limit of 820 on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs.

*an equal aggregate limit of 820 on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs.

In addition to these numerical limits, the agreement would have included:

In addition to these numerical limits, the agreement would have included:

      -- a ban on construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers, and on increases in the number of fixed heavy ICBM launchers;

*a ban on construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers, and on increases in the number of fixed heavy ICBM launchers;

      -- a ban on heavy mobile ICBM launchers, and on launchers of heavy submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs);

*a ban on heavy mobile [[ICBM launcher]]s, and on launchers of heavy submarine-launched [[ballistic missile]]s (SLBMs) and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs);

      -- a ban on flight-testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, with an exception of one new type of light ICBM for each side;

*a ban on flight-testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, with an exception of one new type of light ICBM for each side;

      -- a ban on increasing the numbers of warheads on existing types of ICBMs, and a limit of 10 warheads on the one new type of ICBM permitted to each Party, a limit of 14 warheads on SLBMs, and 10 warheads on ASBMs. The number of long-range cruise missiles per heavy bomber would have been limited to an average of 28; and the number of long-range cruise missiles per heavy bomber of existing types would have been limited to 20;

*a ban on increasing the numbers of [[warhead]]s on existing types of ICBMs, and a limit of 10 warheads on the one new type of ICBM permitted to each Party, a limit of 14 warheads on SLBMs, and 10 warheads on ASBMs. The number of long-range [[cruise missiles]] per [[heavy bomber]] would have been limited to an average of 28; and the number of long-range cruise missiles per heavy bomber of existing types would have been limited to 20;

      -- ceilings on the launch-weight and throw-weight of strategic ballistic missiles and a ban on the conversion of light ICBM launchers to launchers of heavy ICBMs;

*ceilings on the [[launch-weight]] and [[throw-weight]] of strategic ballistic missiles and a ban on the conversion of light ICBM launchers to launchers of heavy ICBMs;

      -- a ban on the Soviet SS-16 ICBM;

*a ban on the Soviet [[SS-16]] ICBM;

      -- a ban on rapid reload ICBM systems;

*a ban on rapid reload ICBM systems;

      -- a ban on certain new types of strategic offensive systems which were technologically feasible, but which had not yet been deployed. Such systems included long-range ballistic missiles on surface ships, and ballistic and cruise missile launchers on the seabeds;

*a ban on certain new types of strategic offensive systems which were technologically feasible, but which had not yet been deployed. Such systems included long-range ballistic missiles on surface ships, and ballistic and cruise missile launchers on the [[seabed]]s;

      -- advance notification of certain ICBM test launches; and

*advance notification of certain ICBM [[test launch]]es; and

      -- an agreed data base for systems included in various SALT-limited categories.

*an agreed [[data base]] for systems included in various SALT-limited categories.

The Treaty also included detailed definitions of limited systems, provisions to enhance verification, a ban on circumvention of the provisions of the agreement, and a provision outlining the duties of the SCC in connection with the SALT II Treaty. The duration of the Treaty was to have been through 1985.

The Treaty also included detailed definitions of limited systems, provisions to enhance [[verification]], a ban on circumvention of the provisions of the agreement, and a provision outlining the duties of the [[SCC]] in connection with the SALT II Treaty. The duration of the Treaty was to have been through 1985.

Verification of the SALT II Treaty would have been by national technical means (NTM) of verification, including photo-reconnaissance satellites. The sides had agreed not to interfere with each others national technical means of verification, and not to use deliberate concealment measures which would have impeded verification by NTM of compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Because specific characteristics of some SALT-limited systems become apparent during the testing phase, monitoring of testing programs was an important aspect of SALT verification. Such monitoring might have involved collection of electronic signals known as telemetry which are used during tests to transmit information about systems while they are being tested. Therefore, the sides had agreed not to engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information such as through the use of telemetry encryption whenever such denial would have impeded verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Verification of the SALT II Treaty would have been by national technical means (NTM) of verification, including [[photo-reconnaissance]] satellites. The sides had agreed not to interfere with each other's [[national technical means of verification]], and not to use deliberate concealment measures which would have impeded verification by NTM of compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Because specific characteristics of some SALT-limited systems become apparent during the testing phase, monitoring of testing programs was an important aspect of SALT verification. Such monitoring might have involved collection of electronic signals known as [[telemetry]] which are used during tests to transmit information about systems while they are being tested. Therefore, the sides had agreed not to engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information such as through the use of telemetry [[encryption]] whenever such denial would have impeded verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

In addition to these provisions of the Treaty which directly addressed the question of verification, counting and distinguishability rules, as well as some constraints on specific systems, were incorporated into the agreement specifically for verification purposes.

In addition to these provisions of the Treaty which directly addressed the question of verification, counting and distinguishability rules, as well as some constraints on specific systems, were incorporated into the agreement specifically for verification purposes.

To facilitate verification of the MIRV limits, the sides agreed that once a missile had been tested with MIRVs, then all missiles of that type were to be considered to have been equipped with MIRVs, even if that missile type had also been tested with a non-MIRV payload. Additionally, the sides agreed that once a launcher contained or launched a MIRVed missile, then all launchers of that type would be considered to be launchers of MIRVed missiles and included in the 1,320 limit. Similar counting rules were adopted for cruise missiles and for heavy bombers.

To facilitate verification of the MIRV limits, the sides agreed that once a missile had been tested with MIRVs, then all missiles of that type were to be considered to have been equipped with MIRVs, even if that missile type had also been tested with a non-MIRV payload. Additionally, the sides agreed that once a launcher contained or launched a MIRVed missile, then all launchers of that type would be considered to be launchers of MIRVed missiles and included in the 1,320 limit. Similar counting rules were adopted for cruise missiles and for heavy bombers.

A constraint included for verification purposes was a ban on production, testing, and deployment of the Soviet SS-16 ICBM. The missile appeared to share a number of components with the Soviet SS-20, an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). As the Parties had agreed that land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs should not be converted into launchers of ICBMs, the United States sought this ban on the SS-16 in order to prevent verification problems which might have arisen if the SS-16 program had gone forward, since in that case distinguishing between SS-16 and SS-20 deployments would have been very difficult.

A constraint included for verification purposes was a ban on production, testing, and deployment of the Soviet SS-16 ICBM. The missile appeared to share a number of components with the Soviet [[SS-20]], an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). As the Parties had agreed that land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs should not be converted into launchers of ICBMs, the United States sought this ban on the SS-16 in order to prevent verification problems which might have arisen if the SS-16 program had gone forward, since in that case distinguishing between SS-16 and SS-20 deployments would have been very difficult.

Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding, the sides exchanged data on the numbers of weapons in SALT-limited categories, and agreed to maintain this agreed data base through regular updates at each session of the Standing Consultative Commission. Although the United States did not require (and did not rely upon) this data for verification purposes, maintenance of the agreed data base would have insured that both parties applied the provisions of the Treaty in a consistent manner.

Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding, the sides exchanged data on the numbers of weapons in SALT-limited categories, and agreed to maintain this agreed data base through regular updates at each session of the Standing Consultative Commission. Although the United States did not require (and did not rely upon) this data for verification purposes, maintenance of the agreed data base would have insured that both parties applied the provisions of the Treaty in a consistent manner.