Talk:Free will

It is a logical inconsistancy to claim that foreknowledge of an individual's actions allows that individual to possess free will. If the will is known, it is not free. If the will is free, it cannot be known.

Thus, if a deity has foreknowledge of an individual's actions, then that deity has denied the individual's free will.

If an individual's will is genuinely free, then any claim that a deity can have prior knowledge of an individual's actions is false.

Free will and an omniscient deity are mutually exclusive. If either is encompassed by a theologically honest position, the other must be denied. --OmnusErudito 14:24, 14 March 2007 (EDT)

This argument assumes that the future is capable of being the subject of knowledge (a fairly widely held assumption, but one I, and many other philosophers, reject). That is, it assumes that a statement about the future is true or false, rather than indeterminate. If the future is indeterminate then an omniscient deity would be able to know all that is knowable and still not know what I am going to do in the future. Of course, this position raises problems with respect to prophesy and that may be a problem for some theists (but not necessarily for all theists if they reject prophesy or if they view prophesy as a promise of what God intends to do in the future). So, while you are right, free will and the common understanding of an omniscient deity are at odds, free will and an omniscient deity are not necessarily at odds.--Reginod 15:34, 14 March 2007 (EDT)

Knowing all possible outcomes does not make a being omniscient - I know all possible outcomes of a dice-roll, but I am not omniscient. Given time and inclination, I could work out all possible results to a general election, but I will still not be omniscient. No matter how complex a system, no matter how many possible outcomes exist in potentia, knowing all the possibilities does not make a being omniscient, merely clever. Omniscience would require that the being know which of the possible outcomes will occur, bringing us right back to my original point. (I like your rewrite of the article, by the way)--OmnusErudito 14:28, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. My point was simply that it could be the case that the future is not something that is knowable--at all--so even an all knowing entity (one that knows everything that is knowable) would not know the future. Such an entity would know all the posable outcomes (just as we know what results a dice-roll may have), but it would not know the future. this assumes a non-static future (which is an understanding of the nature of the future that is more compatible with free will than a static, even if unknown, future). This would mean an all knowing God would still not know the future--so God's foreknowledge would not be in conflict with free will. I'm not saying it is the right answer, I'm not sure what the right answer is, but it is one way to make free will and the existence of an all knowing being compatible.

Thank you for the compliment on the edit, I'm of the opinion that it is better to note where the debate is than pretend knowledge of the truth.--Reginod 14:50, 15 March 2007 (EDT)--Reginod 14:50, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

That is much clearer, and a response needs much more thought on my part, not something I will have time to do for at least a week or two.--OmnusErudito 14:56, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

No hurry, I have this page on my watchlist so when you get a chance to respond I will see it.--Reginod 14:59, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

Angels and animals

Removed:

• Within a totally naturalistic system, freewill does not exist.
• In the Christian faith it is believed that humans were created with freewill so that they would chose to worship God, unlike angels who were created without the choice to worship God.

1. I don't understand the reference to naturalism. Are you saying that your actions are all determined by physical law, L.T.?
2. Which denomination says that angels are incapable of making choices? Haven't you read Jude 1:6-7? (It mentions angels who sinned, and sin is a choice.) --Ed Poor ^Talk 14:33, 27 July 2007 (EDT)

Section on morality

This article on free will seems quite brief so I've added a section here. It's not fantastically well written and it's a bit waffly but hopefully it'll do until it can be expanded, either by my or another person.Sam99foster 10:51, 14 September 2008 (EDT)

I like the first sentence, bu I find the rest confusing. It seems to be starting with the assumption that determinism is the opposite of free will, then redefines free will to be determinism! This means that it's not actually the opposite after all, but simply another name for the same thing. Philip J. Rayment 11:03, 14 September 2008 (EDT)

Yeah sorry, I should've made that clearer but I hoped I could leave it a little implicit. Essentially Hume draws a distinction between two kinds of freedom - freedom of action and freedom of will. The former is the freedom to do as you choose (i.e. it would be compromised if you were in jail or tied up or something), and the latter is the freedom to determine your own will. Hume says that confusion between these two terms is at the root of many discussions of free will, since often people use free will to mean the latter thing when in reality it doesn't make much sense - either things are determined or they are random (because of cause and effect). Is that at all clear? --Sam99foster 11:58, 14 September 2008 (EDT)