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Success required the use of Secretary of State [[George Marshall]]’s enormous prestige, evident in his speech<ref>For text see [http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/mars1.html "Marshall Announces His Plan"] </ref> at Harvard University in June 1947 and of course in the informal name of the whole program. Even more essential was close collaboration with the Republicans who controlled Congress, especially their foreign policy leader, Senator [[Arthur Vandenberg]].  Vandenberg, who had shepherded the Truman Plan through Congress in 1947, was a critical supporter and  won Congressional approval for the much more expensive Marshall Plan. All of Europe was invited to join, along with much of Latin America.<ref> Switzerland did not officially join, in order to preserve its neutrality. However it was at least partly incorporated into the ERP economic system through the 1949 off-shore trade agreement.</ref>
 
Success required the use of Secretary of State [[George Marshall]]’s enormous prestige, evident in his speech<ref>For text see [http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/mars1.html "Marshall Announces His Plan"] </ref> at Harvard University in June 1947 and of course in the informal name of the whole program. Even more essential was close collaboration with the Republicans who controlled Congress, especially their foreign policy leader, Senator [[Arthur Vandenberg]].  Vandenberg, who had shepherded the Truman Plan through Congress in 1947, was a critical supporter and  won Congressional approval for the much more expensive Marshall Plan. All of Europe was invited to join, along with much of Latin America.<ref> Switzerland did not officially join, in order to preserve its neutrality. However it was at least partly incorporated into the ERP economic system through the 1949 off-shore trade agreement.</ref>
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American and European newspapers, political parties, businesses, labor unions, and intellectuals supported a massive promotional campaign that warned that the isolationist mistakes following World War I must not be repeated. In the United States some critics complained about a "global WPA" (wee [[WPA]]) but little organized opposition emerged, apart from far-left elements in some labor unions.  Most Americans were exhausted from war and wanted to return to domestic concerns, and reduce heavy wartime taxes; vast new spending programs threatened these goals. ERP supporters answered that America’s national security was at stake, and rebuilding Europe now would be far cheaper than fighting a third world war.  The isolationism  among conservative Republicans crumbled when the Stalinist seizure of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 showed time was running out.   
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American and European newspapers, political parties, businesses, labor unions, and intellectuals supported a massive promotional campaign that warned that the isolationist mistakes following World War I must not be repeated. In the United States some critics complained about a "global WPA" (see [[WPA]]) but little organized opposition emerged, apart from far-left elements in some labor unions.  Most Americans were exhausted from war and wanted to return to domestic concerns, and reduce heavy wartime taxes; vast new spending programs threatened these goals. ERP supporters answered that America’s national security was at stake, and rebuilding Europe now would be far cheaper than fighting a third world war.  The isolationism  among conservative Republicans crumbled when the Stalinist seizure of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 showed time was running out.   
 
===Building support in Europe===
 
===Building support in Europe===
 
At first most European leaders embraced the plan, but the Communists swung into opposition once Stalin signaled his opposition. However the socialist movements endorsed and supported the ERP as did business and liberal elements.  A European organization was formed, the ''' Organization for European Economic Cooperation''' ('''OEEC''') to coordinate policies, and at all times the details and operations of the program was negotiated between the U.S. and European nations.
 
At first most European leaders embraced the plan, but the Communists swung into opposition once Stalin signaled his opposition. However the socialist movements endorsed and supported the ERP as did business and liberal elements.  A European organization was formed, the ''' Organization for European Economic Cooperation''' ('''OEEC''') to coordinate policies, and at all times the details and operations of the program was negotiated between the U.S. and European nations.
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The US State Department used household exhibitions in West Berlin as a propaganda tool to promote the benefits of the ERP, democratic freedom, and individual consumption. Prominent designers and architects designed the exhibitions, which often opened on socialist holidays, thereby ensuring that large numbers of visitors would come from East Berlin. The exhibitions presented a stark contrast between the broad-based consumerism of the West and the tight restrictions and scarcity of Communist Eastern Europe. In addition, the products on display served to undermine the widespread European belief that there was an inherent contradiction between high culture and American mass consumption. The effectiveness of this campaign led the Soviet Union to launch its own program of "consumer socialism," or citizen enfranchisement through consumer rewards, which was modeled on the West.<ref> Greg Castillo, "Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption as Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 2005 40(2): 261-288. Issn: 0022-0094 in [[Ebsco]]</ref>
 
The US State Department used household exhibitions in West Berlin as a propaganda tool to promote the benefits of the ERP, democratic freedom, and individual consumption. Prominent designers and architects designed the exhibitions, which often opened on socialist holidays, thereby ensuring that large numbers of visitors would come from East Berlin. The exhibitions presented a stark contrast between the broad-based consumerism of the West and the tight restrictions and scarcity of Communist Eastern Europe. In addition, the products on display served to undermine the widespread European belief that there was an inherent contradiction between high culture and American mass consumption. The effectiveness of this campaign led the Soviet Union to launch its own program of "consumer socialism," or citizen enfranchisement through consumer rewards, which was modeled on the West.<ref> Greg Castillo, "Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption as Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 2005 40(2): 261-288. Issn: 0022-0094 in [[Ebsco]]</ref>
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An opinion poll sponsored by ECA in mid-1950 interviewed 2,000 people in France, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Austria and Italy. In all, 80% knew of the ERP and 75% Between 25% and 40% had an understanding of how it worked. The hardest audience to reach were the workers and the peasants. It was they who doubted most profoundly the motives behind American action, just as Communist propaganda prompted them to do.<ref>David Ellwood, "'You Too Can Be like Us': Selling the Marshall Plan.'' ''History Today'' 1998 48(10): 33-39. Issn: 0018-2753 in [[Ebsco]] </ref>  
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An opinion poll sponsored by ECA in mid-1950 interviewed 2,000 people in France, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Austria and Italy. In all, 80% knew of the ERP and 75% Between 25% and 40% had an understanding of how it worked. The hardest audience to reach were the workers and the peasants. It was they who doubted most profoundly the motives behind American action, just as Communist propaganda prompted them to do.<ref>David Ellwood, "'You Too Can Be like Us': Selling the Marshall Plan.'' ''History Today'' 1998 48(10): 33-39. Issn: 0018-2753 in [[Ebsco]] </ref>
    
==Soviet opposition==
 
==Soviet opposition==
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