SkipCaptcha, nsSupply_SidersR, nsSupply_Siders_
8,436
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Line 1:
Line 1: − + + + + + + + +
improved - details on how the court vastly expanded the clause, then more details on the Lopez case
The '''Commerce Clause''' is the provision in the [[U.S. Constitution]] that establishes the power of [[Congress]] to regulate commerce among the states and with foreign entities. It is set forth in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.
The '''Commerce Clause''' is the provision in the [[U.S. Constitution]] that establishes the power of [[Congress]] to regulate commerce among the states and with foreign entities. It is set forth in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.
This is one of the most important, and most-often litigated, clauses in the [[U.S. Constitution]]. It is the single most important source of power for [[Congress]], and has been bused by it to pass laws governing business, civil rights, [[abortion]] and other social areas. Only beginning in 1995, in ''[[Lopez v. United States]]'', did the [[Rehnquist Court]] begin to limit the scope of what [[Congress]] might do based on this clause.
This is one of the most important, and most-often litigated, clauses in the [[U.S. Constitution]]. It is the single most important source of power for [[Congress]], and has been bused by it to pass laws governing business, civil rights, [[abortion]] and other social areas.
The [[Supreme Court of the United States]] greatly expanded the reach of the clause in [[Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States]]. The majority opinion cited Caminetti v. United States, which deemed that the interstate travel of passengers could be regulated as interstate commerce, and [[McCulloch v. Maryland]], amongst others, to conclude that "[T]he power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=379&page=241|work=Supreme Court of the United States|publisher=FindLaw|author=Justice [[Tom Clark]]|format=HTML|language=English|accessdate=May 2 2009|date=Dec 14 1964|title=ATLANTA MOTEL V. UNITED STATES, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)}}</ref>
Only beginning in 1995, in ''[[Lopez v. United States]]'', did the [[Rehnquist Court]] begin to limit the scope of what [[Congress]] might do based on this clause; in this case striking down the overarching Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 which was being used against a twelfth grader.
==References==
<references/>
==See Also==
==See Also==