| Line 61: |
Line 61: |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| − | ==Why the Atomic Bomb?==
| |
| − | Why did the US drop the atomic bomb? Historians have puzzled over the problem for years. On the one hand, Japan was clearly defeated and wanted to surrender. After sifting through the records and cross-examining Japanese leaders, the experts of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded in 1946 that Japan would have surrendered by the end of 1945 because of the devastation wrought by the sea/air blockade and the incessant B-29 and carrier raids. The Survey lends weight to the retrospective conclusion that the atomic bomb did not have to be used to gain victory. Some "revisionists" have suggested Hiroshima was supposed to be an unmistakable signal to Stalin to play along diplomatically with the Americans who planned to rule the postwar world. Many have asked whether some sort of demonstration explosion should have been made, in order to frighten Tokyo without killing so many people. The option was considered, but with only two bombs available Truman decided instead to drop millions of leaflets upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki warning people to leave immediately, and at the Potsdam Conference he explicitly warned Japan it must surrender immediately or be hit with terrible force.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The civilian government in Tokyo wanted peace on conditional terms, but that was impossible because of Roosevelt's policy of "unconditional" surrender, and because the civilians did not control Japan's decisions--the Army did (in the name of the Emperor.) It is often assumed that Hiroshima caused Japan to surrender. Perhaps; but simultaneously the Soviet Union declared war, invaded Manchuria, and crushed the Japanese army there. This ended Japan's feeble hopes for a negotiated peace and proved conclusively that the Army could no longer defend the nation. Even after Hiroshima and the invasion of Manchuria the Army and Navy wanted to fight on, while the civilians wanted to give up. The decisive move was the unprecedented intervention of Emperor Hirohito, who opened negotiations. With Roosevelt gone, the Americans redefined "unconditional" to allow continuance of the Emperor. Hirohito then broadcast an order to the nation and its armed forces to surrender, which was immediately obeyed.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | ===Military Opposition to A-Bomb===
| |
| − | No military ethic will support the use of atomic bombs on the civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki--the military value of those targets was simply too small. (Both had once been major military ports, but by midsummer no ships were moving.) However, it would be incorrect to conclude that the American generals were the "guilty" party: they considered use of the atomic bomb on cities to be immoral, and opposed its use.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The U.S. Navy had very little to do with the atomic bomb decision. Having temporarily lost 5 of its 11 big carriers at Okinawa, it did not want to face the Kamikazes again during an invasion of Japan. It argued that the blockade was working well, cutting off nearly all oil, food and troop movements to and from Japan. It expected that the blockade would eventually lead to surrender. Not for several years were the admirals able to integrate atomic weapons into their Mahanian doctrine. Civilians overruled them.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In July 1945 the AAF saw its doctrine of strategic bombing working as intended. The original plan was to have used [[B-29]] bombers, from high altitude, with greater precision than the [[B-17]] and [[B-24]] bombers used in Europe. Unexpected high-altitude winds proved this was impossible, and Gen. [[Curtis LeMay]], newly commanding the strategic bombers, on his own authority changed to low-altitude incendiary bombing.He shed the machine guns and gunners, and the gasoline no longer needed to lift the planes to 30,000 feet. The result was a doubling of the bomb load, and very scared fliers who were greatly relieved to discover their losses were less using the new tactics.<ref>Craven and Cate, 5: 608-14; Thomas R. Searle "'It made a lot of sense to kill skilled workers': The firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945," ''Journal of Military History 103-134 66, no. 1 (Jan 2002): p. 103-134 </ref> From the first raid on March 9, the new tactic was devastating. working to perfection. The B-29 dropping conventional high explosives and incendiaries was the perfect instrument to destroy the infrastructure of Japan's larger cities. The great bombing campaign had just started; it was planned to peak a year later. The atomic bomb was not part of AAF doctrine; the AAF generals had not been consulted, knew very little about the bomb and even demanded a direct order from President Truman before they agreed to explode
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The Army agreed that the combination of blockade and strategic bombing would eventually destroy every Japanese city, but felt it could not destroy the Japanese Army, which was widely dispersed and dug in.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | General Marshall worried that the American people might grow weary of more years of warfare, and might even demand some sort of compromise peace in order to bring the soldiers home. (Marshall underestimated the intense determination of nearly all Americans to destroy Japan.) Furthermore he objected to dropping the bombs on cities on moral and political grounds (Japan might become an enemy forever). Most of all, he had a tactical rather than strategic use in mind. Only a handful of bombs were being built, (two to four per month) and MacArthur's invasion forces ought to have all of them. Marshall and his planners concluded that Japan would surrender only after ground troops captured Tokyo. The invasion of Kyushu was scheduled November 1; all bombs available then (probably seven) should be used there. They would give invading infantry forces enough firepower to destroy defensive ground installations, communications facilities, kill exposed enemy soldiers, and also block the arrival of reinforcements. To waste the precious bombs on irrelevant civilians would cause more American casualties, and like all the high American officials Marshall was committed to minimizing American--not Japanese-- losses.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In mid-1945 the Japanese troops on the home islands of Kyushu and Honshu were very poorly trained, equipped and officered. Furthermore, total US air supremacy would have rendered them immobile. Unlike Iwo Jima and Okinawa, Kyushu and Honshu were big enough to permit extensive use of tanks and large-scale maneuvering. The Kamikazes were a potential threat: Japan had 10,000 planes left and 19,000 pilots, plus enough gasoline for the purpose. However, but with its new close-in air bases on Okinawa, the AAF was prepared to close down every Japanese airfield. In sum, Japanese resistance might have been suicidal, with very heavy losses, but American losses would probably have been small, just as MacArthur predicted. Stimson and Truman, however, overruled Marshall and decided that the first two bombs would be used on cities in order to demonstrate the awesome power of the Allied forces.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | ===Manhattan Project===
| |
| − | President [[Harry S. Truman]], who had been completely frozen out of decision making and secret information before he suddenly became President in April, did not know what he wanted to do. He lurched this way then that, depending on who talked to him last.<ref> J. Samuel Walker, ''Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan'' (1997) [http://www.questia.com/read/35245486?title=Prompt%20and%20Utter%20Destruction%3a%20Truman%20and%20the%20Use%20of%20Atomic%20Bombs%20against%20Japan online edition]</ref> The man who talked to him last about the bomb was Henry Stimson. Stimson rarely participated in strategic planning, but he had one card up his sleeve--the atomic bomb. To build it, Roosevelt, set up the Manhattan Project.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The Manhattan Project was managed by Major General [[Leslie Groves]] (Corps of Engineers) with a staff of reservists and many thousands of civilian scientists and engineers. Nominally Groves reported directly to Marshall, but in fact Stimson was in charge. Stimson secured the necessary money and approval from Roosevelt and from Congress, and made sure Manhattan had the highest priorities. He controlled all planning for the use of the bomb, overruling the high command of the Army, Navy and AAF in the process. He wanted "Little Boy" (the Hiroshima bomb) dropped within hours of its earliest possible availability. And it was. Stimson wanted Japan to surrender, and thought the Hiroshima bomb on August 6 would provide the final push Tokyo needed. When nothing seemed to happen he had Truman drop "Fat Man" on Nagasaki on August 9. The Japanese offered to surrender on August 10.<ref> See Richard Rhodes, ''The Making of the Atomic Bomb'' (1995)
| |
| − | </ref>
| |
| − |
| |
| − | ===Stimson's vision===
| |
| − | In retrospect it seems possible that the impact of continued blockade, relentless conventional bombing, and the Russian invasion of Manchuria would have somehow forced the Japanese Army to surrender sometime in late 1945 or early 1946 even without the atomic bombs. Millions of Japanese would have died. <ref> for "revisionists" who reject use of the bomb, see Gar Alperovitz, ''The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb'' (1996) and Barton J. Bernstein, "Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History: Stimson, Conant, and Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Diplomatic History 17 (Winter 1993): 35-72</ref> But Stimson saw well beyond the immediate end of the war. He was the only top government official who tried to predict the meaning of the atomic age--he envisioned a new era in human affairs. For a half century he had worked to inject order, science, and moralism into matters of law, of state, and of diplomacy. His views had seemed outdated in the age of total warfare, but now he held what he called "the royal straight flush." The impact of the atom, he foresaw, would go far beyond military concerns to encompass diplomacy and world affairs, as well as business, economics and science. Above all, said Stimson, this "most terrible weapon ever known in human history" opened up "the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved." That is, the very destructiveness of the new weaponry would shatter the ages-old belief that wars could be advantageous. It might now be possible to call a halt to the use of destruction as a ready solution to human conflicts. Indeed, society's new control over the most elemental forces of nature finally "caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control--his moral power."
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria Stimson, then Secretary of State, proclaimed the famous "Stimson Doctrine." It said no fruits of illegal aggression would ever be recognized by the United States. Japan just laughed. Now the wheels of justice had turned and the "peace-loving" nations (as Stimson called them) had the chance to punish Japan's misdeeds in a manner that would warn aggressor nations never again to invade their neighbors. To validate the new moral order, the atomic bomb had to be used against civilians. Indeed, the Japanese people since 1945 have been intensely anti-militaristic, pointing with anguish to their experience at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Was Stimson then guilty of a crime (as many Japanese now believe)? Perhaps, but it has to be recognized that he moved the issue to a higher plane than one of military ethics. The question was not one of whether soldiers should use this weapon or not. Involved was the simple issue of ending a horrible war, and the more subtle and more important question of the possibility of genuine peace among nations. Stimson's decision involved the fate of mankind, and he posed the problem to the world in such clear and articulate fashion that there was near unanimous agreement mankind had to find a way so that atomic weapons would never be used again. Thanks in great part to Stimson's vision, they never have been used since August of 1945.<ref>See Sean L. Malloy, ''Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan'' (2008); John Bonnett, "Jekyll and Hyde: Henry L. Stimson, Mentalite, and the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb on Japan." ''War in History'' 1997 4(2): 174-212. Issn: 0968-3445 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]; McGeorge Bundy, ''Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years'' (1988);
| |
| − | Elting E. Morison, ''Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson'' (1960); Robert P. Newman, "Hiroshima and the Trashing of Henry Stimson" ''The New England Quarterly,'' Vol. 71, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 5-32 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/366722 in JSTOR]</ref>
| |
| | | | |
| | | | |