| | The term "textualism" was originally coined by Justice [[Robert Jackson]] in his famous concurrence in ''[[Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer]]'', 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which became more influential than the Court opinion. Later, this term was used by a [[liberal]] commentator in an unsuccessful attempt to embarrass it.<ref>William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 623 (1990) (under the doctrine of textualism, "once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant").</ref> An older form of textualism was the "plain meaning" doctrine. | | The term "textualism" was originally coined by Justice [[Robert Jackson]] in his famous concurrence in ''[[Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer]]'', 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which became more influential than the Court opinion. Later, this term was used by a [[liberal]] commentator in an unsuccessful attempt to embarrass it.<ref>William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 623 (1990) (under the doctrine of textualism, "once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant").</ref> An older form of textualism was the "plain meaning" doctrine. |
| | + | A classic description of textualism, without using the term itself, is Justice Scalia's concurrence in ''Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com.'', 777 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 1985). |