Changes

see [[American entry into World War I]]

see [[American entry into World War I]]

The World War broke out in 1914--Americans wer astonished and were officially neutral. By 1915, Americans were paying much more attention to the war. The German atrocities against civilians in belgium and especially the illegal u-boat sinking of the British passenger liner ''[[Lusitania]]'' was the eye-opener for most people regarding German brutality.<ref> International law said that in wartime it was permissible to sink a merchant or passenger ship only after the creew and passengers were give time to get into life boats. The ''Lusitania'' sank in 15 minutes and most passengers drowned.</ref> In 1915, a strong "Preparedness" movement emerged. It argued that the United States needed to immediately build up strong naval and land forces for defensive purposes; an unspoken assumption was that America would fight sooner or later. General [[Leonard Wood]] (still on active duty after serving a term as Chief of Staff of the Army), ex-president [[Theodore Roosevelt]], and former secretaries of war [[Elihu Root]] and [[Henry Stimson]] were the driving forces behind Preparedness, along with many of the nation's most prominent bankers, industrialists, lawyers and scions of prominent families. Indeed there emerged an "Atlanticist" foreign policy establishment, a group of influential Americans drawn primarily from upper-class lawyers, bankers, academics, and politicians of the Northeast, committed to a strand of Anglophile internationalism.<ref> John P. Finnegan, ''Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914-1917'' (1975)</ref>   

The World War broke out in 1914--Americans wer astonished and were officially neutral. By 1915, Americans were paying much more attention to the war. The German atrocities against civilians in belgium and especially the illegal u-boat sinking of the British passenger liner ''[[Lusitania]]'' was the eye-opener for most people regarding German brutality.<ref> International law said that in wartime it was permissible to sink a merchant or passenger ship only after the creew and passengers were give time to get into life boats. The ''Lusitania'' sank in 15 minutes and most passengers drowned.</ref>  

In 1915, a strong "Preparedness" movement emerged. It argued that the United States needed to immediately build up strong naval and land forces for defensive purposes; an unspoken assumption was that America would fight sooner or later. General [[Leonard Wood]] (still on active duty after serving a term as Chief of Staff of the Army), ex-president [[Theodore Roosevelt]], and former secretaries of war [[Elihu Root]] and [[Henry Stimson]] were the driving forces behind Preparedness, along with many of the nation's most prominent bankers, industrialists, lawyers and scions of prominent families. Indeed there emerged an "Atlanticist" foreign policy establishment, a group of influential Americans drawn primarily from upper-class lawyers, bankers, academics, and politicians of the Northeast, committed to a strand of Anglophile internationalism.<ref> John P. Finnegan, ''Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914-1917'' (1975)</ref>   

Representative was Paul D. Cravath, one of New York's foremost corporation lawyers. For Cravath, in his mid-fifties when the war began, the conflict served as an epiphany, sparking an interest in international affairs that dominated his remaining career. Fiercely Anglophile, he strongly supported American intervention in the war and hoped that close Anglo-American cooperation would be the guiding principle of postwar international organization.<ref>Priscilla Roberts, "Paul D. Cravath, the First World War, and the Anglophile Internationalist Tradition." ''Australian Journal of Politics and History'' 2005 51(2): 194-215. Issn: 0004-9522 Fulltext in Ebsco </ref>

Representative was Paul D. Cravath, one of New York's foremost corporation lawyers. For Cravath, in his mid-fifties when the war began, the conflict served as an epiphany, sparking an interest in international affairs that dominated his remaining career. Fiercely Anglophile, he strongly supported American intervention in the war and hoped that close Anglo-American cooperation would be the guiding principle of postwar international organization.<ref>Priscilla Roberts, "Paul D. Cravath, the First World War, and the Anglophile Internationalist Tradition." ''Australian Journal of Politics and History'' 2005 51(2): 194-215. Issn: 0004-9522 Fulltext in Ebsco </ref>

===Compromise reached===

===Compromise reached===

The upshot was a compromise passed in May 1916, as the war raged on and Berlin was debating whether America was so weak it could be ignored. The Army was to double in size to 11,300 officers and 208,000 men, with no reserves, and a National Guard that would be enlarged in five years to 440,000 men. Summer camps on the Plattsburg model were authorized for new officers, and the government was given $20 million to build a nitrate plant of its own. Preparedness supporters were downcast, the antiwar people were jubilant. America would now be too weak to go to war. Colonel Robert L. Bullard privately complained that "Both sides [Britain and Germany] treat us with scorn and contempt; our fool, smug conceit of superiority has been exploded in our faces and deservedly." The House gutted the naval plans as well, defeating a "big navy" plan by 189 to 183, and scuttling the battleships. The [[battle of Jutland]] (May 31/June 1, 1916) saw the main German fleet nearly sunk by the stronger British fleet. Only brilliant seamanship and luck allowed it to escape. Arguing this battle proved the validity of Mahanian doctrine, the navalists took control in the Senate, broke the House coalition, and authorized a rapid three-year buildup of all classes of warships. A new weapons system, naval aviation, received $3.5 million, and the government was authorized to build its own armor-plate factory. The very weakness of American military power encouraged Berlin to start its unrestricted submarine attacks in 1917. It knew this meant war with America, but it could discount the immediate risk because the US Army was negligible and the new warships would not be at sea until 1919 by which time the war would be over, with Germany victorious. The notion that armaments led to war was turned on its head: refusal to arm in 1916 led to war in 1917.

The upshot was a compromise passed in May 1916, as the war raged on and Berlin was debating whether America was so weak it could be ignored. The Army was to double in size to 11,300 officers and 208,000 men, with no reserves, and a National Guard that would be enlarged in five years to 440,000 men. Summer camps on the Plattsburg model were authorized for new officers, and the government was given $20 million to build a nitrate plant of its own. Preparedness supporters were downcast, the antiwar people were jubilant. America would now be too weak to go to war. Colonel Robert L. Bullard privately complained that "Both sides [Britain and Germany] treat us with scorn and contempt; our fool, smug conceit of superiority has been exploded in our faces and deservedly." The House gutted the naval plans as well, defeating a "big navy" plan by 189 to 183, and scuttling the battleships. The [[battle of Jutland]] (May 31/June 1, 1916) saw the main German fleet nearly sunk by the stronger British fleet. Only brilliant seamanship and luck allowed it to escape. Arguing this battle proved the validity of Mahanian doctrine, the navalists took control in the Senate, broke the House coalition, and authorized a rapid three-year buildup of all classes of warships. A new weapons system, naval aviation, received $3.5 million, and the government was authorized to build its own armor-plate factory. The very weakness of American military power encouraged Berlin to start its unrestricted submarine attacks in 1917. It knew this meant war with America, but it could discount the immediate risk because the US Army was negligible and the new warships would not be at sea until 1919 by which time the war would be over, with Germany victorious. The notion that armaments led to war was turned on its head: refusal to arm in 1916 led to war in 1917.

==Further reading==

==Further reading==

* Clifford, J. Garry. ''Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburgh Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920'' (1972)  

* Clifford, J. Garry. ''Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburgh Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920'' (1972)