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| | On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added: | | On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added: |
| | {{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}} | | {{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}} |
| − | When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9140-17.cfm essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]], the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the "[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols]" of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over the document, I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref> | + | When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9140-17.cfm essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]], the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the "[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols]" of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref> |
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| − | Another secret agreement<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the communiqué" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would bring their two delegations [''sic''—actually three delegations—the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [[#refYUNHiss|YUN 1990]]: 18 (PDF 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. Later urging [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] to tell the [[U.S.]] delegation to the UN founding conference "the whole truth" about this agreement (which he called "this X-matter"), Stettinius would advise [[FDR]] (who would be dead in less than a month) to have Hiss with him when he broke the news to the [[American]] delegates.<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 305-306</ref> This agreement would [http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Yalta_Conference.aspx not be disclosed] until 1947. | + | Another secret agreement<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the [[#refYalta45|communiqué]]" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would bring their two delegations [''sic''—actually three delegations—the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [[#refYUNHiss|YUN 1990]]: 18 (PDF 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. Later urging [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] to tell the [[U.S.]] delegation to the UN founding conference "the whole truth" about this agreement (which he called "this X-matter"), Stettinius would advise [[FDR]] (who would be dead in less than a month) to have Hiss with him when he broke the news to the [[American]] delegates.<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 305-306</ref> This agreement would [http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Yalta_Conference.aspx not be disclosed] until 1947. |
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| | According to James Byrnes, then director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, he and others returned from Yalta to Washington on February 10, but Roosevelt stayed behind with a select few—including Hiss: | | According to James Byrnes, then director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, he and others returned from Yalta to Washington on February 10, but Roosevelt stayed behind with a select few—including Hiss: |
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| | [[image:Montana de cadaveres en un gulag sovietico.jpg|thumb|300px|left|Mountain of corpses in a Soviet gulag. | | [[image:Montana de cadaveres en un gulag sovietico.jpg|thumb|300px|left|Mountain of corpses in a Soviet gulag. |
| − | ''Image source: [http://www.cubaencuentro.com/es/cultura/articulos/la-condena-del-silencio-y-el-olvido-iii-38610 CubaCuentro.com]'']][http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/mar/24/yalta-and-potsdam-agreements-publication Yet another] "secret codicil," dated March 31, 1945 (less than two weeks before [[FDR]]'s death), [http://www.jstor.org/pss/2149110 forced] "[http://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis/archive/issue.asp?year=1988&month=12 repatriation]" of some [[#refHornberger95|two million]] refugees ([http://www.capitalcentury.com/1945.html including] [[#refHerman95|1.5 million POWs]]) for [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/lubini.htm slave] [http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_3_transcript.pdf labor] or [[#refHerman95|death in the Gulag]].<ref>"V. REPARATION: The following protocol has been approved: Protocol: On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind... 2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in... (c) [http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1945YALTA.html Use of German labor]." "Stalin then brought up the question of reparations in kind and in manpower.... The latter, of course, referred to forced labor.... [T]he Russians were using many thousands of prisoners in what was reported to be virtual slave camps...." William D. Leahy, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=e-dmAAAAMAAJ I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time]'' (Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 302. Cf. Nikolai Tolstoy, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=u-dvAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 The Secret Betrayal]'' (New York: Scribner, 1978) ISBN 0684156350; Julius Epstein, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=_3kNAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present]'' (Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair Co., 1973) ISBN 978-0815964070. Stettinius apparently paid little attention to the issue, evidently leaving the details up to Hiss: When historian Walter Johnson asked him about the Yalta agreement on slave labor, Stettinius referred him to Hiss. ERS and WJ, November 13, 1948, Edward R. Stettinius Jr. Papers, [http://www2.lib.virginia.edu/small/collections/manuscripts_and_rare_books.html Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library], University of Virginia</ref> That agreement was kept secret from the American people [[#refHornberger95|for 50 years]]. As William Henry Chamberlin, a one-time [http://www.providence.edu/library/archives/chamberlin/rppc_mswilliamhenrychamberlin.html supporter of the Bolshevik regime], concluded: | + | ''Image source: [http://www.cubaencuentro.com/es/cultura/articulos/la-condena-del-silencio-y-el-olvido-iii-38610 CubaCuentro.com]'']][http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/mar/24/yalta-and-potsdam-agreements-publication Yet another] "secret codicil," dated March 31, 1945 (less than two weeks before [[FDR]]'s death), [http://www.jstor.org/pss/2149110 forced] "[http://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis/archive/issue.asp?year=1988&month=12 repatriation]" of some [[#refHornberger95|two million]] refugees ([http://www.capitalcentury.com/1945.html including] [[#refHerman95|1.5 million POWs]]) for [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/lubini.htm slave] [http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_3_transcript.pdf labor] or [[#refHerman95|death in the Gulag]].<ref>"V. REPARATION: The following protocol has been approved: Protocol: On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind... 2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in... (c) [[#refYalta45|Use of German labor]]." "Stalin then brought up the question of reparations in kind and in manpower.... The latter, of course, referred to forced labor.... [T]he Russians were using many thousands of prisoners in what was reported to be virtual slave camps...." William D. Leahy, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=e-dmAAAAMAAJ I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time]'' (Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 302. Cf. Nikolai Tolstoy, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=u-dvAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 The Secret Betrayal]'' (New York: Scribner, 1978) ISBN 0684156350; Julius Epstein, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=_3kNAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present]'' (Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair Co., 1973) ISBN 978-0815964070. Stettinius apparently paid little attention to the issue, evidently leaving the details up to Hiss: When historian Walter Johnson asked him about the Yalta agreement on slave labor, Stettinius referred him to Hiss. ERS and WJ, November 13, 1948, Edward R. Stettinius Jr. Papers, [http://www2.lib.virginia.edu/small/collections/manuscripts_and_rare_books.html Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library], University of Virginia</ref> That agreement was kept secret from the American people [[#refHornberger95|for 50 years]]. As William Henry Chamberlin, a one-time [http://www.providence.edu/library/archives/chamberlin/rppc_mswilliamhenrychamberlin.html supporter of the Bolshevik regime], concluded: |
| | {{cquote|The Yalta Agreement … represented, in two of its features, the endorsement by the United States of the principle of human slavery. One of these features was the recognition that German labor could be used as a source of reparations … And the agreement that Soviet citizens who were found in the Eastern zones of occupation should be handed over to Soviet authorities amounted, for the many Soviet refugees who did not wish to return, to the enactment of a fugitive slave law.<ref>William Henry Chamberlain, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=hZ12AAAAMAAJ Beyond Containment]'' (H. Regnery Co., 1953), p. 42</ref>}} | | {{cquote|The Yalta Agreement … represented, in two of its features, the endorsement by the United States of the principle of human slavery. One of these features was the recognition that German labor could be used as a source of reparations … And the agreement that Soviet citizens who were found in the Eastern zones of occupation should be handed over to Soviet authorities amounted, for the many Soviet refugees who did not wish to return, to the enactment of a fugitive slave law.<ref>William Henry Chamberlain, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=hZ12AAAAMAAJ Beyond Containment]'' (H. Regnery Co., 1953), p. 42</ref>}} |
| | Asked if he had "drafted or participated in the drafting" of parts of the Yalta agreement, Hiss would testify, "I think it is accurate and not an immodest statement to say that I did to some extent, yes."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 656 (PDF 166)</ref> | | Asked if he had "drafted or participated in the drafting" of parts of the Yalta agreement, Hiss would testify, "I think it is accurate and not an immodest statement to say that I did to some extent, yes."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 656 (PDF 166)</ref> |