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Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest, alleging the existence of a "[http://www.usdiplomacy.org/history/service/chinahands.php Communist conspiracy] within the [State] Department." Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944, [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists] I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in that field thereafter."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 657 (PDF 167)</ref>

Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest, alleging the existence of a "[http://www.usdiplomacy.org/history/service/chinahands.php Communist conspiracy] within the [State] Department." Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944, [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists] I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in that field thereafter."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 657 (PDF 167)</ref>

On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. "The Russians came to the table with ample knowledge of our purposes and attitudes," write [http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/SYMP_2009_agenda.pdf Robert Louis Benson] and [[#refBenson95|Cecil Phillips]], "through information provided to them by traitors whose deeds ultimately were revealed in [[Venona project|Venona]]."<ref>Robert Louis Benson and Cecil Phillips, ''[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB278/01.PDF History of Venona]'' (Fort George Meade, Md.: National Security Agency, 1995), p. 13</ref> According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:

On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. "The Russians came to the table with ample knowledge of our purposes and attitudes," write [http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/SYMP_2009_agenda.pdf Robert Louis Benson] and [[#refBenson95|Cecil Phillips]], "through information provided to them by traitors whose deeds ultimately were revealed in [[Venona project|Venona]]."<ref>[[#refBP95|Benson, Phillips 1995]]: 13</ref> According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:

{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}}

{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}}

When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9140-17.cfm essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]], the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the "[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols]" of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>

When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9140-17.cfm essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]], the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the "[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols]" of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>