Changes

On August 31, 2006, a year after proposing to terminate MacLean, the TSA retroactively labeled the July 2003 information he disclosed as SSI. <ref>[http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=3161282 U.S. Labels 2003 Leaked Memo 'Sensitive'], Larry Margasak, ''Associated Press'', May 10, 2007</ref>  TSA labeled MacLean's disclosure as SSI over three years after it was made public. <ref>[http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/MacLeanFinalOrderSSI.pdf TSA's August 31, 2006 Final Order on Sensitive Security Information], Andrew Colsky, ''Transportation Security Administration'', August 31, 2006</ref>  The [[Government Accountability Office]] (GAO) has criticized the DHS for failing to have clear policies and oversight of its SSI designations, and using vague standards for its use. <ref>[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05677.pdf Clear Policies and Oversight Needed for Designation of Sensitive Security Information], Steven J. Pecinovsky, ''Government Accountability Office'', June 1, 2005</ref>  If DHS and the [[Department of Justice]] (DOJ) succeed with their removal of MacLean, these pseudo-classification markings will be abused to retroactively mark information as "sensitive" to then retaliate against whistleblowers, possibly decreasing the flow of critical information to the public. <ref>[http://pogo.org/p/government/rmaclean-dhs.html Retroactive Labeling in Robert MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security], Nick Schwellenbach, ''Project On Government Oversight'', May 5, 2007</ref>

On August 31, 2006, a year after proposing to terminate MacLean, the TSA retroactively labeled the July 2003 information he disclosed as SSI. <ref>[http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=3161282 U.S. Labels 2003 Leaked Memo 'Sensitive'], Larry Margasak, ''Associated Press'', May 10, 2007</ref>  TSA labeled MacLean's disclosure as SSI over three years after it was made public. <ref>[http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/MacLeanFinalOrderSSI.pdf TSA's August 31, 2006 Final Order on Sensitive Security Information], Andrew Colsky, ''Transportation Security Administration'', August 31, 2006</ref>  The [[Government Accountability Office]] (GAO) has criticized the DHS for failing to have clear policies and oversight of its SSI designations, and using vague standards for its use. <ref>[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05677.pdf Clear Policies and Oversight Needed for Designation of Sensitive Security Information], Steven J. Pecinovsky, ''Government Accountability Office'', June 1, 2005</ref>  If DHS and the [[Department of Justice]] (DOJ) succeed with their removal of MacLean, these pseudo-classification markings will be abused to retroactively mark information as "sensitive" to then retaliate against whistleblowers, possibly decreasing the flow of critical information to the public. <ref>[http://pogo.org/p/government/rmaclean-dhs.html Retroactive Labeling in Robert MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security], Nick Schwellenbach, ''Project On Government Oversight'', May 5, 2007</ref>

==Transporation Security Administration and Department of Justice's Arguments==

==Transportation Security Administration and Department of Justice's Arguments==

TSA and DOJ make four general arguments:  1) That Robert MacLean was trained in the safeguarding of SSI and that the information he disclosed did not require any markings despite [[Code of Federal Regulations]] (CFRs) that mandate the contrary.  2) He caused the TSA to disrupt their operations in order to cancel their plan to remove FAMs from nonstop, long distance flights.  3) Had TSA decided continue with their plan despite public and congressional outrage, MacLean's disclosure would have alerted all terrorists that nonstop, long distance flight would not be staffed with FAMs. (4) Finally, the government argues that front-line law enforcement field officers do not have the authority, education or experience to determine if policies endanger public safety and national security - that such determinations can only be made by the agency's senior executives.

TSA and DOJ make four general arguments:  1) That Robert MacLean was trained in the safeguarding of SSI and that the information he disclosed did not require any markings despite [[Code of Federal Regulations]] (CFRs) that mandate the contrary.  2) He caused the TSA to disrupt their operations in order to cancel their plan to remove FAMs from nonstop, long distance flights.  3) Had TSA decided continue with their plan despite public and congressional outrage, MacLean's disclosure would have alerted all terrorists that nonstop, long distance flight would not be staffed with FAMs. (4) Finally, the government argues that front-line law enforcement field officers do not have the authority, education or experience to determine if policies endanger public safety and national security - that such determinations can only be made by the agency's senior executives.