Changes

===Mission creep===

===Mission creep===

UN Security Council Resolution 1973, passed in March 2011, does not authorise participating members to support the anti-Gaddafi forces, to defend armed groups, or to oust Gaddafi. Nor does it authorise a ground invasion or military occupation. Strategic analyst Anthony Cordesman notes the similiarities between Libya nd Iraq and the loose uncoordinated coalitions "failure to plan for the decisive and lasting use of force, failure to plan for the civil side of military operations and to support stability operations, and focus on short term goals without a realistic plan for a successful strategic and post-conflict  outcome." Cordesman notes,

UN Security Council Resolution 1973, passed in March 2011, does not authorise participating members to support the anti-Gaddafi forces, to defend armed groups, or to oust Gaddafi. Nor does it authorise a ground invasion or military occupation. Strategic analyst Anthony Cordesman notes the similiarities between Libya nd Iraq and the loose uncoordinated coalitions "failure to plan for the decisive and lasting use of force, failure to plan for the civil side of military operations and to support stability operations, and focus on short term goals without a realistic plan for a successful strategic and post-conflict  outcome." Cordesman notes,

{{Cquote|the lives and futures of some 6.6 million Libyans are at stake. The Franco-Anglo-American gamble now seems far too likely to fail at their expense. Moreover, it seems likely to  drag the other nations that support the operation into their failure -- along with part of the reputation of NATO and credibility of the UN.... gambling on Qaddafi caving in has created a far more serious [[humanitarian]] crisis for the Libyan people than would ever have occurred if the Coalition had acted decisively from the start ...The humanitarian cost of humanitarian restraint is all too clear: Hundreds of Libyan and foreign workers have been killed...hundreds of thousands lack jobs, security, and safe conditions of life....an enduring war of attrition will turn a minor humanitarian crisis into a major one ...This kind of operation cannot be “surgical’ – if “surgical” now means minimizing bloodshed regardless of whether the patient dies. Hard, and sometimes brutal, choices need to be made between limited civilian casualties and collateral damage during the decisive use of force and an open-ended war of attrition that will produce far higher cumulative civilian casualties and collateral damage.<ref>http://csis.org/publication/libya-will-farce-stay-us-and-france-and-britain</ref>}}

{{Cquote|the lives and futures of some 6.6 million Libyans are at stake. The Franco-Anglo-American gamble now seems far too likely to fail at their expense. Moreover, it seems likely to  drag the other nations that support the operation into their failure -- along with part of the reputation of NATO and credibility of the UN.... gambling on Qaddafi caving in has created a far more serious humanitarian crisis for the Libyan people than would ever have occurred if the Coalition had acted decisively from the start ...The humanitarian cost of humanitarian restraint is all too clear: Hundreds of Libyan and foreign workers have been killed...hundreds of thousands lack jobs, security, and safe conditions of life....an enduring war of attrition will turn a minor humanitarian crisis into a major one ...This kind of operation cannot be “surgical’ – if “surgical” now means minimizing bloodshed regardless of whether the patient dies. Hard, and sometimes brutal, choices need to be made between limited civilian casualties and collateral damage during the decisive use of force and an open-ended war of attrition that will produce far higher cumulative civilian casualties and collateral damage.<ref>http://csis.org/publication/libya-will-farce-stay-us-and-france-and-britain</ref>}}

Cordesman notes mission creep and boots on the ground ultimately lead to nation building:

Cordesman notes mission creep and boots on the ground ultimately lead to [[nation building]]:

{{Cquote|France, Britain, and the US now have a special obligation to both finish what they started in military terms, and deal with the aftermath. A post-conflict Libya will need extensive help in building a workable political  system, in rebuilding the capability to govern, in both rebuilding the existing economy and correcting for decades of Qaddafi’s reckless and constantly shifting eccentricities.}}

{{Cquote|France, Britain, and the US now have a special obligation to both finish what they started in military terms, and deal with the aftermath. A post-conflict Libya will need extensive help in building a workable political  system, in rebuilding the capability to govern, in both rebuilding the existing economy and correcting for decades of Qaddafi’s reckless and constantly shifting eccentricities.}}