Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil
The problem of evil is a topic of much debate in Christian theology and the philosophy of religion. While the problem can be expressed in many ways, a good enough general expression of the logical problem of evil follows:
If God exists and is the God of orthodox theism, then He is omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect. Therefore, if evil exists in this universe, God will know of it. Because God is omnipotent, God would have the ability to forestall it, if He so chose. But a morally perfect being would always choose to prevent evils befalling others, if it were possible. Therefore, the God of orthodox theism does not exist upon the supposition that evil exists- that is to say, God does not simultaneously have the properties of omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection.
The conclusion - that God does not exist - can be resisted by denying any of the premises of the argument. Theists may reject any of the divine attributes, the existence of evil, or the moral inference.
Denying the Premises
Some philosophers have suggested that, perhaps, the solution to the problem of evil is to say that God in fact lacks one of the commonly presumed divine attributes. However, it is not much of a solution at all. If God lacks omnipotence, then He is reduced to the status of an impartial observer, or at any rate a constrained being that can only do finitely much to ameliorate the bad conditions that His creatures must suffer. If God instead lacks omniscience, then He is unable to know what He ought to do in certain situations. Such a situation might even mean that God, in trying to help one of his creations, might inadvertently harm them instead. Finally, if God is not morally perfect, then we are in the thrall of either a negligent or positively evil deity. It is not difficult to see why this suggestion is unpopular amongst traditional theists.
Alternatively, one might deny that evil exists. Perhaps we call those things we do not like "moral evils" without justification. But it strikes at the heart of our intuitions about what it means for something to be morally wrong if something like the torture of innocent persons would not count. For that reason, this move is not any more popular than the last.
The last premise to deny would be the moral premise: that there are no cases in which a perfect being would allow some evil to exist. This objection to the argument is the most promising, because it will, if it succeeds, not come at the expense of any deep-seated moral beliefs. Its proponents generally aim to establish that there are some cases in which allowing some evil to occur is morally justified - namely, those cases in which the allowance makes possible some greater good, or prevents some greater evil. A possible reason why God might allow moral evil (evils done by moral agents), for instance, is that it is a necessary consequence of His allowing humans to exercise freedom of the will, a "greater good."
While the debate is anything but settled, it is usually accepted that no one has firmly established that the logical problem of evil succeeds in proving that God cannot exist.