Talk:Free will
This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Reginod (talk | contribs) at 19:34, March 14, 2007. It may differ significantly from current revision.
It is a logical inconsistancy to claim that foreknowledge of an individual's actions allows that individual to possess free will. If the will is known, it is not free. If the will is free, it cannot be known.
Thus, if a deity has foreknowledge of an individual's actions, then that deity has denied the individual's free will.
If an individual's will is genuinely free, then any claim that a deity can have prior knowledge of an individual's actions is false.
Free will and an omniscient deity are mutually exclusive. If either is encompassed by a theologically honest position, the other must be denied. --OmnusErudito 14:24, 14 March 2007 (EDT)
- This argument assumes that the future is capable of being the subject of knowledge (a fairly widely held assumption, but one I, and many other philosophers, reject). That is, it assumes that a statement about the future is true or false, rather than indeterminate. If the future is indeterminate then an omniscient deity would be able to know all that is knowable and still not know what I am going to do in the future. Of course, this position raises problems with respect to prophesy and that may be a problem for some theists (but not necessarily for all theists if they reject prophesy or if they view prophesy as a promise of what God intends to do in the future). So, while you are right, free will and the common understanding of an omniscient deity are at odds, free will and an omniscient deity are not necessarily at odds.--Reginod 15:34, 14 March 2007 (EDT)