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Plantinga introduced, in his 1967 work <i>God and Other Minds</i>, a "defense" of theism against the argument from evil that hinges on free will. Rather than attempt to produce a theodicy that positively accounts for the existence of evil, Plantinga prefers to establish only that the existence of God and evil are jointly <i>possible</i>, in a broadly logical sense. If his move succeeds, he will not prove that God exists, but he will prove that theistic belief is not irrational given the existence of evil.<br>
Plantinga introduced, in his 1967 work <i>God and Other Minds</i>, a "defense" of theism against the argument from evil that hinges on free will. Rather than attempt to produce a theodicy that positively accounts for the existence of evil, Plantinga prefers to establish only that the existence of God and evil are jointly <i>possible</i>, in a broadly logical sense. If his move succeeds, he will not prove that God exists, but he will prove that theistic belief is not irrational given the existence of evil.<br>
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Plantinga argues that God has a sufficient reason to allow some moral evil: only in this way can He make possible the greater moral good of human freedom. He means to discredit theological compatiblism - the view that God can allow human freedom and prevent moral evil. The theological compatiblist position claims that God may create free moral agents whom he knows will always choose to do the right thing. To argue against this position, Plantinga produces a logically possible proposition that would ensure even God cannot ensure free moral agents always do the right thing.<br><br>
Plantinga argues that God has a sufficient reason to allow some moral evil: only in this way can He make possible the greater moral good of human freedom. He means to discredit theological compatiblism - the view that God can allow human freedom and prevent moral evil. The theological compatiblist position claims that God may create free moral agents whom he knows will always choose to do the right thing. To argue against this position, Plantinga produces a logically possible proposition that, if true would suggest even God cannot ensure free moral agents always do the right thing.<br><br>
Suppose God creates an agent with the intent that this agent freely chooses the good all the time. Now, if the agent is to <i>freely</i> choose some good, she must actually be free to choose it or to refrain from choosing it. Further suppose that there is a world - the world God wants to make actual - in which that agent does choose the good all the time. This world can only be made actual if its predecessor - a "world segment" that includes all of the world's states of affairs save the agent's choice - is first made actual (before it can be true that an agent chooses the right thing in a situation, the agent must be presented with the situation at hand).<br><br>
Suppose God creates an agent with the intent that this agent freely chooses the good all the time. Now, if the agent is to <i>freely</i> choose some good, she must actually be free to choose it or to refrain from choosing it. Further suppose that there is a world - the world God wants to make actual - in which that agent does choose the good all the time. This world can only be made actual if its predecessor - a "world segment" that includes all of the world's states of affairs save the agent's choice - is first made actual (before it can be true that an agent chooses the right thing in a situation, the agent must be presented with the situation at hand).<br><br>
But if a world segment is made actual, then, if the agent is free with respect to the decision that must be made, God cannot control whether the agent will <i>freely</i> choose to do right or wrong. The upshot, according to Plantinga, is that theological compatiblism must be false - for God to determine that an agent will do right all the time is inconsistent with that agent freely choosing to do right all the time. Plantinga thinks the proposition "God determines that an agent will always freely chooses to do right" is analogous to "God creates a married bachelor."<br><br>
But if a world segment is made actual, then, if the agent is free with respect to the decision that must be made, God cannot control whether the agent will <i>freely</i> choose to do right or wrong. The upshot, according to Plantinga, is that theological compatiblism must be false - for God to determine that an agent will do right all the time is inconsistent with that agent freely choosing to do right all the time. Plantinga thinks the proposition "God determines that an agent will always freely choose to do right" is analogous to "God creates a married bachelor."<br><br>
Plantinga furthers his defense in ''God, Freedom and Evil.'' If it is <i>logically possible</i> that all agents are depraved (will go wrong with respect to some action or other) in any world in which they exist, then it is logically possible that God could, no matter which agents he caused to exist, never create a world with human freedom and no moral evil.<br><br>
Plantinga furthers his defense in ''God, Freedom and Evil.'' If it is <i>logically possible</i> that all agents are depraved (will go wrong with respect to some action or other) in any world in which they exist, then it is logically possible that God could, no matter which agents he caused to exist, never create a world with human freedom and no moral evil.<br><br>
He thinks there is no reason to question the possibility of "transworld depravity," and thus concludes that his defense fends off the problem of evil. Many philosophers - both theistic and atheistic - agree with this assessment, although there is no settled consensus on the matter. The problem of evil will not likely go away so easily, as the matter of non-moral evils (diseases, predation and natural disasters, for instance) cannot be solved by Plantinga's defense.
He thinks there is no reason to question the possibility of "transworld depravity," and thus concludes that his defense fends off the problem of evil. Many philosophers - both theistic and atheistic - agree with this assessment, although there is no settled consensus on the matter. The problem of evil will not likely go away so easily, as the matter of non-moral evils (diseases, predation and natural disasters, for instance) cannot be solved by Plantinga's defense.
== References ==
== References ==