Changes

After the death of [[Jacob Golos]], KGB Case Officer [[Iskhak Akhmerov]] urged Silvermaster to arrange for direct KGB contact with Currie, but Silvermaster resisted. Currie sent a warning that American cryptanalysts were on the verge of breaking the Soviet diplomatic code.  The KGB [[Venona]] cables also demonstrate Currie did turn over documents to the KGB.  An August 1943 New York KGB cable reports to Moscow that Currie had given [[George Silverman]] a memorandum that was either involving the State Department. In June 1944 the New York KGB reported receipt of two items from Currie. One was information on President Roosevelt's reasons for keeping [[Charles de Gaulle]] at arm's length. The other told the Soviets that Roosevelt was willing to accept Stalin's demand that the USSR keep the half of Poland that it had received under the [[Nazi-Soviet Pact]] and that FDR would put pressure on the London Polish government-in-exile to make concessions.  President Roosevelt had personally assured Polish-Americans, prior to the 1944 election, of his support for the Polish cause. Currie's private information let Stalin know that he could disregard these public stands and need not make serious concessions to the Poles.

After the death of [[Jacob Golos]], KGB Case Officer [[Iskhak Akhmerov]] urged Silvermaster to arrange for direct KGB contact with Currie, but Silvermaster resisted. Currie sent a warning that American cryptanalysts were on the verge of breaking the Soviet diplomatic code.  The KGB [[Venona]] cables also demonstrate Currie did turn over documents to the KGB.  An August 1943 New York KGB cable reports to Moscow that Currie had given [[George Silverman]] a memorandum that was either involving the State Department. In June 1944 the New York KGB reported receipt of two items from Currie. One was information on President Roosevelt's reasons for keeping [[Charles de Gaulle]] at arm's length. The other told the Soviets that Roosevelt was willing to accept Stalin's demand that the USSR keep the half of Poland that it had received under the [[Nazi-Soviet Pact]] and that FDR would put pressure on the London Polish government-in-exile to make concessions.  President Roosevelt had personally assured Polish-Americans, prior to the 1944 election, of his support for the Polish cause. Currie's private information let Stalin know that he could disregard these public stands and need not make serious concessions to the Poles.

[[Pavel Fitin]], head of KGB foreign intelligence, told its New York office in March that it wanted more out of Currie. Fitin acknowledged that “[Currie] trusts [Silvermaster], informs him not only orally, but also by handing over documents”.  But, said Fitin, “up to now [Currie's] relations with [Silvermaster] were expressed, from our point of view, only in common feelings and personal sympathies. [unrecovered code groups] question of more profound relations and an understanding by [Currie] of [Silvermaster's] role. If [Silvermaster] dues not get [Currie's] transfer to our worker, then he [unrecovered code groups] raising with [Currie] the question of [Currie's] closer complicity with [Silvermaster].”

[[Pavel Fitin]], head of KGB foreign intelligence, told its New York office in March that it wanted more out of Currie. Fitin acknowledged that “[Currie] trusts [Silvermaster], informs him not only orally, but also by handing over documents”.  But, said Fitin, “up to now [Currie's] relations with [Silvermaster] were expressed, from our point of view, only in common feelings and personal sympathies. [unrecovered code groups] question of more profound relations and an understanding by [Currie] of [Silvermaster's] role. If [Silvermaster] does not get [Currie's] transfer to our worker, then he [unrecovered code groups] raising with [Currie] the question of [Currie's] closer complicity with [Silvermaster].”

In late 1945, the FBI opened an investigation of [[Anatoly Gorsky]], a KGB officer operating out of the Soviet embassy in Washington under the guise of being a Soviet diplomat. A report on the investigation in February 1946 cited several meetings between Gorsky and Currie. Currie admitted to the FBI in 1947 he had met at least four times with Gorsky in 1945.  Years later it was discovered that Currie also met with [[Vasily Zarubin]] in August 1943 which coincides with mysterious [[Vasily_Zarubin#Markov|"Mr. Guver" letter]] in which a Soviet KGB officer stated that Zarubin “has some high level agent in the office of the White House.” <ref>John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, ''Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America'' (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 146-147.</ref>   

In late 1945, the FBI opened an investigation of [[Anatoly Gorsky]], a KGB officer operating out of the Soviet embassy in Washington under the guise of being a Soviet diplomat. A report on the investigation in February 1946 cited several meetings between Gorsky and Currie. Currie admitted to the FBI in 1947 he had met at least four times with Gorsky in 1945.  Years later it was discovered that Currie also met with [[Vasily Zarubin]] in August 1943 which coincides with mysterious [[Vasily_Zarubin#Markov|"Mr. Guver" letter]] in which a Soviet KGB officer stated that Zarubin “has some high level agent in the office of the White House.” <ref>John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, ''Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America'' (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 146-147.</ref>