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The '''Spanish-American War''' was a short conflict of a few months duration in 1898, between the [[United States]] and [[Spain]].  Although President [[William McKinley]] strongly opposed war, the Spanish were unable to meet American demands regarding the systematic, massive mistreatment of Cubans.  When the [[Battleship Maine]] suddenly exploded in Havana Harbor (no one to this day knows why), the American people zeroed in on the Cuban crisis and demanded action.  When the war came –"a splendid little war," one official called it--it lasted only six months, and was marked by dramatic American victories at sea in the Philippines and on land and sea near Cuba. The war drew Americans together, especially the Southerners whose patriotism had been in doubt since the Civil War a generation earlier. The [[Spanish-American War]] represented a significant turning point in America's position in the world. Besides acquiring Puerto Rico in the Caribbean and the Philippine Islands in the Pacific, territorial possessions that created new defensive responsibilities, the United States demonstrated that it had built up its naval capacity sufficiently to defeat an established European power. The war ended Spanish colonial rule in [[Cuba]] and the [[Phillipines]], and gave Spain a respite from the bitter internal struggles in the 1890s, thus postponing a civil war until the 1930s.

The '''Spanish-American War''' was a short conflict of a few months duration in 1898, between the [[United States]] and [[Spain]].  Although President [[William McKinley]] strongly opposed war, the Spanish were unable to meet American demands regarding the systematic, massive mistreatment of Cubans.  When the [[Battleship Maine]] suddenly exploded in Havana Harbor (no one to this day knows why), the American people zeroed in on the Cuban crisis and demanded action.  When the war came –"a splendid little war," one official called it—it lasted only six months, and was marked by dramatic American victories at sea in the Philippines and on land and sea near Cuba. The war drew Americans together, especially the Southerners whose patriotism had been in doubt since the Civil War a generation earlier. The Spanish-American War represented a significant turning point in America's position in the world. Besides acquiring Puerto Rico in the Caribbean and the Philippine Islands in the Pacific, territorial possessions that created new defensive responsibilities, the United States demonstrated that it had built up its naval capacity sufficiently to defeat an established European power. The war ended Spanish colonial rule in [[Cuba]] and the [[Phillipines]], and gave Spain a respite from the bitter internal struggles in the 1890s, thus postponing a civil war until the 1930s.

==Background==

==Background==

With the declaration of war the Spanish admiral took his squadron into Subic Bay only to discover that the commander there still needed another six weeks to mount his guns on Isla Grande at the bay's entrance. On 28 April, Montojo learned that the Americans had left Mirs Bay bound for the Philippines. After calling a council of his captains, he returned with his ships to Manila. Seventeen guns, including nine obsolete muzzleloaders, guarded the two passages into the Manila Bay. The Spanish attempted to mine the main channel, but the water was so deep and the entrance so wide that neither mines nor shore batteries were an effective barrier to enemy ships passing through during the night. Of the more than 200 guns near the city of Manila, only twelve were breech-loaders positioned to fire out to sea. Montojo rejected the idea of fighting under the guns of the city because civilian structures would likely be hit by American fire. The Spanish decided to anchor their ships in the shallow waters under the guns of the Cavite arsenal, on a small peninsula seven miles southwest of Manila. Deeply pessimistic about his fleet's chances of survival, Montojo believed the position gave his men the best chance to escape from their vessels should they be sunk in the upcoming battle.

With the declaration of war the Spanish admiral took his squadron into Subic Bay only to discover that the commander there still needed another six weeks to mount his guns on Isla Grande at the bay's entrance. On 28 April, Montojo learned that the Americans had left Mirs Bay bound for the Philippines. After calling a council of his captains, he returned with his ships to Manila. Seventeen guns, including nine obsolete muzzleloaders, guarded the two passages into the Manila Bay. The Spanish attempted to mine the main channel, but the water was so deep and the entrance so wide that neither mines nor shore batteries were an effective barrier to enemy ships passing through during the night. Of the more than 200 guns near the city of Manila, only twelve were breech-loaders positioned to fire out to sea. Montojo rejected the idea of fighting under the guns of the city because civilian structures would likely be hit by American fire. The Spanish decided to anchor their ships in the shallow waters under the guns of the Cavite arsenal, on a small peninsula seven miles southwest of Manila. Deeply pessimistic about his fleet's chances of survival, Montojo believed the position gave his men the best chance to escape from their vessels should they be sunk in the upcoming battle.

Consul Williams accurately reported that Montojo intended to fight his squadron while under the guns in Subic Bay, and Dewey sent two of his cruisers ahead to reconnoiter. Finding Subic Bay empty, and in defiance of the reports of mines in the chan-nel, the Americans pressed on into Manila Bay during the night of 30 April. In the early morning hours of 1 May, the U.S. warships discovered the Spanish squadron near Cavite. Leaving his two auxiliaries in the bay guarded by McCulloch, Dewey formed his remaining ships into a line and steamed for the enemy force. The Spanish opened the battle at 5:15 a.m., firing at the oncoming American ships. Dewey steamed his squadron in an oval pattern along the five-fathom curve, pouring a heavy fire into the outgunned and obsolete Spanish force. The enemy replied with wildly inaccurate gunfire from their ships and two 5.9-inch guns at Sangley Point. The Americans scored critical hits on the larger Spanish warships, setting them ablaze. After nearly two hours of fire, Dewey ordered his captains to withdraw, acting on reports from the crew that his ships were running low on ammunition.

Consul Williams accurately reported that Montojo intended to fight his squadron while under the guns in Subic Bay, and Dewey sent two of his cruisers ahead to reconnoiter. Finding Subic Bay empty, and in defiance of the reports of mines in the chan-nel, the Americans pressed on into Manila Bay during the night of 30 April. In the early morning hours of 1 May, the U.S. warships discovered the Spanish squadron near Cavite. Leaving his two auxiliaries in the bay guarded by McCulloch, Dewey formed his remaining ships into a line and steamed for the enemy force. The Spanish opened the battle at 5:15 a.m., firing at the oncoming American ships. Dewey steamed his squadron in an oval pattern along the five-fathom curve, pouring a heavy fire into the outgunned and obsolete Spanish force. The enemy replied with wildly inaccurate gunfire from their ships and two 5.9-inch guns at Sangley Point. The Americans scored critical hits on the larger Spanish warships, setting them ablaze. After nearly two hours of fire, Dewey ordered his captains to withdraw, acting on reports from the crew that his ships were running low on ammunition.

Dewey took his squadron five miles off Sangley Point and signaled his captains to come on board to report the condition of their ships. The commodore discovered that his squadron had sustained very little damage and that it had plenty of ammunition to continue the battle. After allowing the crewmen to enjoy a light meal, Dewey ordered his ships to re-engage the remnants of Montojo's shattered squadron. The Spanish admiral had pulled his surviving vessels into the shallow waters of Bacoor Bay behind Cavite to make a final stand. Hitting the Spanish ships in their new anchorage proved difficult for the larger warships, so Dewey ordered the gunboats ''Concord'' and ''Petrel'', with their shallow draft, to finish off the enemy at close range. The garrison at Cavite raised a white flag at about 12:15, and the firing ended shortly thereafter.

Dewey took his squadron five miles off Sangley Point and signaled his captains to come on board to report the condition of their ships. The commodore discovered that his squadron had sustained very little damage and that it had plenty of ammunition to continue the battle. After allowing the crewmen to enjoy a light meal, Dewey ordered his ships to re-engage the remnants of Montojo's shattered squadron. The Spanish admiral had pulled his surviving vessels into the shallow waters of Bacoor Bay behind Cavite to make a final stand. Hitting the Spanish ships in their new anchorage proved difficult for the larger warships, so Dewey ordered the gunboats ''Concord'' and ''Petrel'', with their shallow draft, to finish off the enemy at close range. The garrison at Cavite raised a white flag at about 12:15, and the firing ended shortly thereafter.

* Duvon C. Corbitt, "Cuban Revisionist Interpretations of Cuba's Struggle for Independence," ''Hispanic American Historical Review'' 32 (August 1963): 395-404.

* Duvon C. Corbitt, "Cuban Revisionist Interpretations of Cuba's Struggle for Independence," ''Hispanic American Historical Review'' 32 (August 1963): 395-404.

* Edward P. Crapol, "Coming to Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth-Century American Foreign Relations," ''Diplomatic History'' 16 (Fall 1992): 573-97;  

* Edward P. Crapol, "Coming to Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth-Century American Foreign Relations," ''Diplomatic History'' 16 (Fall 1992): 573-97;  

*Hugh DeSantis, "The Imperialist Impulse and American Innocence, 1865-1900," in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker, eds., ''American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review'' (1981), pp. 65-90

*Hugh DeSantis, "The Imperialist Impulse and American Innocence, 1865-1900," in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker, eds., ''American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review'' (1981), pp. 65–90

* James A. Field Jr., "American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter' in Almost Any Book," ''American Historical Review'' 83 (June 1978): 644-68, past of the "AHR Forum," with responses  

* James A. Field Jr., "American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter' in Almost Any Book," ''American Historical Review'' 83 (June 1978): 644-68, past of the "AHR Forum," with responses  

* Joseph A. Fry, "William McKinley and the Coming of the Spanish American War: A Study of the Besmirching and Redemption of an Historical Image," ''Diplomatic History'' 3 (Winter 1979): 77-97

* Joseph A. Fry, "William McKinley and the Coming of the Spanish American War: A Study of the Besmirching and Redemption of an Historical Image," ''Diplomatic History'' 3 (Winter 1979): 77-97

* Thomas G. Paterson, "United States Intervention in Cuba, 1898: Interpretations of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War," ''History Teacher'' 29 (May 1996): 341-61;  

* Thomas G. Paterson, "United States Intervention in Cuba, 1898: Interpretations of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War," ''History Teacher'' 29 (May 1996): 341-61;  

* Louis A. Pérez Jr.; ''The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography'' (1998) [http://www.questia.com/read/25040869?title=The%20War%20of%201898%3a%20The%20United%20States%20and%20Cuba%20in%20History%20and%20Historiography online edition]  

* Louis A. Pérez Jr.; ''The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography'' (1998) [http://www.questia.com/read/25040869?title=The%20War%20of%201898%3a%20The%20United%20States%20and%20Cuba%20in%20History%20and%20Historiography online edition]  

* Ephraim K. Smith, "William McKinley's Enduring Legacy: The Historiographical Debate on the Taking of the Philippine Islands," in James C. Bradford, ed., ''Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath'' (1993), pp. 205-49

* Ephraim K. Smith, "William McKinley's Enduring Legacy: The Historiographical Debate on the Taking of the Philippine Islands," in James C. Bradford, ed., ''Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath'' (1993), pp. 205–49