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'''Philosophical naturalism''' is the doctrine that the [[Nature|natural world]] is all there is.  It is also called metaphysical naturalism and ontological naturalism. It is a [[logic]]al result (but not a necessary result

'''Philosophical naturalism''' is the doctrine that the [[Nature|natural world]] is all there is.  It is also called metaphysical naturalism and ontological naturalism. It is a [[logic]]al result (but not a necessary result

<ref>"necessary": absolutely needed; essential; indispensable; inevitable; requisite</ref><ref name=dictionary>Definitions in footnote used in this article, unless otherwise attributed, are drawn from ''The Reader's Digest Great Encyclopedic Dictionary, including Funk & Wagnalls Standard College Dictionary'', 1966, The Readers's Digest Association, Pleasantville, New York. Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 66-21606.</ref>) of [[methodological naturalism]], the doctrine which assumes ''[[a priori]]''<ref> "a priori": "'''1'''. ''Logic'' Proceeding, as an argument, from cause to effect, or from an assumption to its logical conclusion: opposed to ''a posteriori''. '''2'''. Prior to, and thus independent of, experience; innate. '''3'''. Previous to examination, or with insufficient examination. [< L, from what is before]" The Readers Digest Great Encyclopedic Dictionary (1966) p. 72b | a priori</ref> ("from the first" or "from the beginning") that there is no way to contact, detect, or otherwise [[Empiricism|empirically]] observe the [[supernatural]]. While most [[Philosophy of science|philosophers of science]] adhere strictly to this view and positively deny that any supernatural or [[Miracle|miraculous]] effects or forces are possible, a small minority of them also believe that the [[reality]] of [[existence]] includes ''invisible, supernatural and immaterial reality or realities'' and that there are other ways of knowing the supernatural besides empirical observation.

<ref>"necessary": absolutely needed; essential; indispensable; inevitable; requisite</ref><ref name=dictionary>Definitions in footnote used in this article, unless otherwise attributed, are drawn from ''The Reader's Digest Great Encyclopedic Dictionary, including Funk & Wagnalls Standard College Dictionary'', 1966, The Readers's Digest Association, Pleasantville, New York. Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 66-21606.</ref>) of [[methodological naturalism]], the doctrine which assumes ''[[a priori]]''<ref>"a priori": "'''1'''. ''Logic'' Proceeding, as an argument, from cause to effect, or from an assumption to its logical conclusion: opposed to ''a posteriori''. '''2'''. Prior to, and thus independent of, experience; innate. '''3'''. Previous to examination, or with insufficient examination. [< L, from what is before]" The Readers Digest Great Encyclopedic Dictionary (1966) p. 72b | a priori</ref> ("from the first" or "from the beginning") that there is no way to contact, detect, or otherwise [[Empiricism|empirically]] observe the [[supernatural]]. While most [[Philosophy of science|philosophers of science]] adhere strictly to this view and positively deny that any supernatural or [[Miracle|miraculous]] effects or forces are possible, a small minority of them also believe that the [[reality]] of [[existence]] includes ''invisible, supernatural and immaterial reality or realities'' and that there are other ways of knowing the supernatural besides empirical observation.

Philosophical naturalists go one step beyond methodological naturalism and reject the existence of the supernatural altogether, citing "an utter lack of empirical [[evidence]]". They maintain that only natural forces can affect things natural and make changes in nature, and only according to the [[Physics|laws of nature]], "''the laws of nature''" being both those laws discovered by science to be operating in nature and those laws not yet discovered but which will be discovered in the future. Philosophical naturalism is therefore a [[philosophy]] of acquiring knowledge. Because of their insistence that there is an utter lack of scientific (''empirical'') evidence to support [[religion]], most philosophical naturalists are also [[Atheism|atheists]].

Philosophical naturalists go one step beyond methodological naturalism and reject the existence of the supernatural altogether, citing "an utter lack of empirical [[evidence]]". They maintain that only natural forces can affect things natural and make changes in nature, and only according to the [[Physics|laws of nature]], "''the laws of nature''" being both those laws discovered by science to be operating in nature and those laws not yet discovered but which will be discovered in the future. Philosophical naturalism is therefore a [[philosophy]] of acquiring knowledge. Because of their insistence that there is an utter lack of scientific (''empirical'') evidence to support [[religion]], most philosophical naturalists are also [[Atheism|atheists]].

<ref name=agent>'''agency''': Active power or operation; activity; means; instrumentality; the function of an agent. [< L ''agentia'' < ''agere'' to do]<br/>'''agent''': One who or that which acts or has the power to act, contrasted to ''patient''; an efficient [[Cause and effect|cause of anything]]; actor (that which acts or that which produces action); doer; any force, substance, or organism that causes a material change; a means by which something is done; instrument (instrumentality of). [< L ''agens, agentis,'' ppr. (present participle) of ''agere'' to do]</ref>

<ref name=agent>'''agency''': Active power or operation; activity; means; instrumentality; the function of an agent. [< L ''agentia'' < ''agere'' to do]<br/>'''agent''': One who or that which acts or has the power to act, contrasted to ''patient''; an efficient [[Cause and effect|cause of anything]]; actor (that which acts or that which produces action); doer; any force, substance, or organism that causes a material change; a means by which something is done; instrument (instrumentality of). [< L ''agens, agentis,'' ppr. (present participle) of ''agere'' to do]</ref>

beyond the known forces of nature; lying outside the natural order; above nature; distinguished from ''[[preternatural]]''

beyond the known forces of nature; lying outside the natural order; above nature; distinguished from ''[[preternatural]]''

<ref name=preter>'''preternatural''': diverging from or exceeding the common order of nature, but not outside the natural order; distinguished from ''supernatural''.

;<ref name=preter>'''preternatural''': diverging from or exceeding the common order of nature, but not outside the natural order; distinguished from ''supernatural''.

<br/>[< L ''praeter'' beyond < ''prae'' before (in the forefront of, chief, prominent, preeminent, exalted) preter- + natural < F ''naturel'' < L ''naturalis'' < ''natura'', nature, character]</ref>; believed to be miraculous or caused by the immediate exercise of divine power; pertaining to the miraculous.

<br/>[< L ''praeter'' beyond < ''prae'' before (in the forefront of, chief, prominent, preeminent, exalted) preter- + natural < F ''naturel'' < L ''naturalis'' < ''natura'', nature, character]</ref> believed to be miraculous or caused by the immediate exercise of divine power; pertaining to the miraculous.

<br/>[< Med.L (from Medieval Latin) < L ''super''- above + ''natura'' nature]

<br/>[< Med.L (from Medieval Latin) < L ''super''- above + ''natura'' nature]

:Philosophical naturalists understand the meaning of "supernatural" as "not natural", as "not existing", "not part of Existence".

:Philosophical naturalists understand the meaning of "supernatural" as "not natural", as "not existing", "not part of Existence".

:Christians understand the meaning of "supernatural" as "superior to created physical nature", "above physical nature", and as "not subject to the natural laws of the physical spaciotemporal Universe" created by God; the ''laws of Existence'' understood as including the natural laws of the (''inferior, subject'') order of physical existence as subsumed by (included within) the supernatural laws of the (''superior, governing'') order of spiritual existence<ref>Just as by way of analogy the laws of [[Classical mechanics|Newtonian mechanics]] are subsumed by the laws of [[Quantum mechanics]].</ref>; God being understood as the One Origin of all Existence, self-caused, self-contained, self-consistent, whose Word is the one truth and law of Existence, and who "''cannot contradict himself''".<ref>See 2 Timothy 2:13; Hebrews 1:2-3 and 7:7; and James 1:17. Compare John 1:1-2.</ref>

:Christians understand the meaning of "supernatural" as "superior to created physical nature", "above physical nature", and as "not subject to the natural laws of the physical spaciotemporal Universe" created by God; the ''laws of Existence'' understood as including the natural laws of the (''inferior, subject'') order of physical existence as subsumed by (included within) the supernatural laws of the (''superior, governing'') order of spiritual existence;<ref>Just as by way of analogy the laws of [[Classical mechanics|Newtonian mechanics]] are subsumed by the laws of [[Quantum mechanics]].</ref> God being understood as the One Origin of all Existence, self-caused, self-contained, self-consistent, whose Word is the one truth and law of Existence, and who "''cannot contradict himself''".<ref>See 2 Timothy 2:13; Hebrews 1:2-3 and 7:7; and James 1:17. Compare John 1:1-2.</ref>

'''cause''': The agent or force producing an effect; a person, occasion, condition, etc. giving rise to a result or action; contrasted to ''effect''.

'''cause''': The agent or force producing an effect; a person, occasion, condition, etc. giving rise to a result or action; contrasted to ''effect''.

<br/>[< NL (New Latin) ''teleologia'' < Gk. ''telos'', teleos'' end + ''logos'' discourse]</ref>  

<br/>[< NL (New Latin) ''teleologia'' < Gk. ''telos'', teleos'' end + ''logos'' discourse]</ref>  

Such an absolute belief in naturalism is commonly referred to as metaphysical naturalism.

Such an absolute belief in naturalism is commonly referred to as metaphysical naturalism.

<ref> Kurtz, Paul (Spring 1998). "Darwin Re-Crucified: Why Are So Many Afraid of Naturalism?". Free Inquiry 18 (2).</ref>

<ref>Kurtz, Paul (Spring 1998). "Darwin Re-Crucified: Why Are So Many Afraid of Naturalism?". Free Inquiry 18 (2).</ref>

=== "Metaphysical naturalism"===

=== "Metaphysical naturalism"===

=== "Methodological naturalism"===

=== "Methodological naturalism"===

In science, the assuming of naturalism as a valid approach in working methods, without necessarily considering naturalism as an absolute truth with philosophical entailments, is called '''methodological naturalism'''.<ref> Schafersman, Steven D. (1996). "Naturalism is Today An Essential Part of Science". Methodological naturalism is the adoption or assumption of naturalism in scientific belief and practice without really believing in naturalism.</ref>  

In science, the assuming of naturalism as a valid approach in working methods, without necessarily considering naturalism as an absolute truth with philosophical entailments, is called '''methodological naturalism'''.<ref>Schafersman, Steven D. (1996). "Naturalism is Today An Essential Part of Science". Methodological naturalism is the adoption or assumption of naturalism in scientific belief and practice without really believing in naturalism.</ref>  

Thus, in contrast to metaphysical naturalism, methodological naturalism refers exclusively to the methodology of science, for which metaphysical naturalism provides only one possible ontological foundation. Compare [[Agnosticism]].

Thus, in contrast to metaphysical naturalism, methodological naturalism refers exclusively to the methodology of science, for which metaphysical naturalism provides only one possible ontological foundation. Compare [[Agnosticism]].

These early philosophers subscribed to principles of [[Empiricism|empirical]] investigation that strikingly anticipate [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]]. [[Thales]] is considered to be the father of [[science]], because he was the first to offer explanations of natural events without attributing them to [[supernatural]] causes.

These early philosophers subscribed to principles of [[Empiricism|empirical]] investigation that strikingly anticipate [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]]. [[Thales]] is considered to be the father of [[science]], because he was the first to offer explanations of natural events without attributing them to [[supernatural]] causes.

<ref> Jonathan Barnes's introduction to Early Greek Philosophy (Penguin)</ref>

<ref>Jonathan Barnes's introduction to Early Greek Philosophy (Penguin)</ref>

This eventually led to fully-developed systems such as [[Epicureanism]], which sought to explain everything that exists as the product of atoms moving in a void ([[Atomism]]), or the advanced Aristotelianism of [[Strato of Lampsacus]] (c. 335 - 269 B.C.), who sought to explain everything that exists as the inevitable outcome of uncreated natural forces or tendencies.

This eventually led to fully-developed systems such as [[Epicureanism]], which sought to explain everything that exists as the product of atoms moving in a void ([[Atomism]]), or the advanced Aristotelianism of [[Strato of Lampsacus]] (c. 335 - 269 B.C.), who sought to explain everything that exists as the inevitable outcome of uncreated natural forces or tendencies.

==== India====

==== India====

In classical Indian philosophies, naturalism was the foundation of two of six orthodox schools of [[Hinduism]], ([[Vaisheshika]], [[Nyaya]]), and of one [[heterodox]] school ([[Carvaka]]).

In classical Indian philosophies, naturalism was the foundation of two of six orthodox schools of [[Hinduism]], ([[Vaisheshika]], [[Nyaya]]), and of one [[heterodox]] school ([[Carvaka]]).

<ref> A Chatterjee (2012), Naturalism in Classical Indian Philosophy, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)</ref>  

<ref>A Chatterjee (2012), Naturalism in Classical Indian Philosophy, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)</ref>  

<ref> Dale Riepe (1996), Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120812932, pages 227-246</ref>

<ref>Dale Riepe (1996), Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120812932, pages 227-246</ref>

The Vaisheshika school is traced back to 2nd century B.C.

The Vaisheshika school is traced back to 2nd century B.C.

<ref> Oliver Leaman (1999), Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy. Routledge, ISBN 978-0415173629, page 269</ref>

<ref>Oliver Leaman (1999), Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy. Routledge, ISBN 978-0415173629, page 269</ref>

<ref> J Ganeri (2012), The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0199652365</ref>

<ref>J Ganeri (2012), The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0199652365</ref>

==== China====

==== China====

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries enthusiasm for the naturalistic study of nature picked up as more and more Christians turned their attention to discovering what they came to regard as the "secondary causes" that God employed in operating the world. [[Galileo Galilei]] (1564–1642), an Italian [[Catholic]], one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature "''never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her.''"

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries enthusiasm for the naturalistic study of nature picked up as more and more Christians turned their attention to discovering what they came to regard as the "secondary causes" that God employed in operating the world. [[Galileo Galilei]] (1564–1642), an Italian [[Catholic]], one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature "''never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her.''"

<ref> Ronald L. Numbers (2003). "Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs." In: ''When Science and Christianity Meet'', edited by David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, p. 267.</ref>

<ref>Ronald L. Numbers (2003). "Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs." In: ''When Science and Christianity Meet'', edited by David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, p. 267.</ref>

A number of philosophers during the [[Enlightenment]], including [[Francis Bacon]] and [[Voltaire]], outlined philosophical justifications for removing "''appeal to supernatural forces''" from investigation of the natural world.

A number of philosophers during the [[Enlightenment]], including [[Francis Bacon]] and [[Voltaire]], outlined philosophical justifications for removing "''appeal to supernatural forces''" from investigation of the natural world.

When [[Pierre Simon Laplace|Pierre Simon de Laplace]] was asked about the lack of any mention of God in his work on celestial mechanics, he is said to have replied, "''I had no need of that hypothesis''."

When [[Pierre Simon Laplace|Pierre Simon de Laplace]] was asked about the lack of any mention of God in his work on celestial mechanics, he is said to have replied, "''I had no need of that hypothesis''."

<ref> Rouse Ball, W. W. [1908] (2003) "Pierre Simon Laplace (1749–1827)", in A Short Account of the History of Mathematics, 4th ed., Dover, ISBN 0-486-20630-0</ref>

<ref>Rouse Ball, W. W. [1908] (2003) "Pierre Simon Laplace (1749–1827)", in A Short Account of the History of Mathematics, 4th ed., Dover, ISBN 0-486-20630-0</ref>

It was only when the political advances of the Age of Enlightenment made genuine [[free speech]] possible again that a few intellectuals (like [[Paul-Henri Thiry|Baron d'Holbach]] in the 18th Century) publicly renewed the case for Metaphysical Naturalism, under the label of Materialism. Later, with scientific advances in [[Quantum mechanics|quantum physics]], this developed into the more far-reaching doctrine of Physicalism which excludes [[Supernaturalism]]. Subsequent scientific revolutions would offer for biology, geology, physics, and other natural sciences, modes of explanation that were not inherently theistic.

It was only when the political advances of the Age of Enlightenment made genuine [[free speech]] possible again that a few intellectuals (like [[Paul-Henri Thiry|Baron d'Holbach]] in the 18th Century) publicly renewed the case for Metaphysical Naturalism, under the label of Materialism. Later, with scientific advances in [[Quantum mechanics|quantum physics]], this developed into the more far-reaching doctrine of Physicalism which excludes [[Supernaturalism]]. Subsequent scientific revolutions would offer for biology, geology, physics, and other natural sciences, modes of explanation that were not inherently theistic.

[[Steven Schafersman]], president of [[Texas Citizens for Science]], an advocacy group opposing [[creationism]] in (government-funded) [[Public schools in the United States|public schools]],

[[Steven Schafersman]], president of [[Texas Citizens for Science]], an advocacy group opposing [[creationism]] in (government-funded) [[Public schools in the United States|public schools]],

<ref> Williams, Sally (July 4, 2007). "The God curriculum". London: The Telegraph. Retrieved 2008-12-26.</ref>  

<ref>Williams, Sally (July 4, 2007). "The God curriculum". London: The Telegraph. Retrieved 2008-12-26.</ref>  

claims the progressive adoption of methodological naturalism—and later of metaphysical naturalism—followed the advances of science and the increase of its explanatory power.

claims the progressive adoption of methodological naturalism—and later of metaphysical naturalism—followed the advances of science and the increase of its explanatory power.

<ref> Schafersman, Steven D. (1996). "Naturalism is Today An Essential Part of Science". Section "The Origin of Naturalism and Its Relation to Science". Naturalism did not exist as a philosophy before the nineteenth century, but only as an occasionally adopted and non-rigorous method among natural philosophers. It is a unique philosophy in that it is not ancient or prior to science, and that it developed largely due to the influence of science.</ref>  

<ref>Schafersman, Steven D. (1996). "Naturalism is Today An Essential Part of Science". Section "The Origin of Naturalism and Its Relation to Science". Naturalism did not exist as a philosophy before the nineteenth century, but only as an occasionally adopted and non-rigorous method among natural philosophers. It is a unique philosophy in that it is not ancient or prior to science, and that it developed largely due to the influence of science.</ref>  

These developments also caused the diffusion of philosophical positions such as [[existentialism]] which were associated with metaphysical naturalism.

These developments also caused the diffusion of philosophical positions such as [[existentialism]] which were associated with metaphysical naturalism.

<ref> Schafersman, Steven D. (1996). "Naturalism is Today An Essential Part of Science". Section "The Origin of Naturalism and Its Relation to Science". "''Naturalism is almost unique in that it would not exist as a philosophy without the prior existence of science. It shares this status, in my view, with the philosophy of existentialism.''"</ref>

<ref>Schafersman, Steven D. (1996). "Naturalism is Today An Essential Part of Science". Section "The Origin of Naturalism and Its Relation to Science". "''Naturalism is almost unique in that it would not exist as a philosophy without the prior existence of science. It shares this status, in my view, with the philosophy of existentialism.''"</ref>

In the twentieth century a focus on questions of meaning and [[Semantics|semantic]] issues played a role in many different philosophical movements (from [[logical positivism]] to ordinary [[Linguistics|language philosophy]]). It was widely thought that linguistic approaches might untie some age-old philosophical knots. [[Willard Van Orman Quine]], [[George Santayana]], and other philosophers in the 20th century argued that the success of naturalism in science meant that scientific methods should also be used in philosophy. According to this view, Science and Philosophy are said to form a continuum.

In the twentieth century a focus on questions of meaning and [[Semantics|semantic]] issues played a role in many different philosophical movements (from [[logical positivism]] to ordinary [[Linguistics|language philosophy]]). It was widely thought that linguistic approaches might untie some age-old philosophical knots. [[Willard Van Orman Quine]], [[George Santayana]], and other philosophers in the 20th century argued that the success of naturalism in science meant that scientific methods should also be used in philosophy. According to this view, Science and Philosophy are said to form a continuum.

The term naturalism in current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. It has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. The self-proclaimed 'naturalists' from that period included [[John Dewey]], [[Ernest Nagel]], [[Sidney Hook]] and [[Roy Wood Sellars]]. For them, nature is the only reality. There is no such thing as 'supernatural'. The scientific method is to be used to investigate all reality, including the human spirit:

The term naturalism in current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. It has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. The self-proclaimed 'naturalists' from that period included [[John Dewey]], [[Ernest Nagel]], [[Sidney Hook]] and [[Roy Wood Sellars]]. For them, nature is the only reality. There is no such thing as 'supernatural'. The scientific method is to be used to investigate all reality, including the human spirit:

<blockquote>"So understood, 'naturalism' is not a particularly informative term... The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily... reject 'supernatural' entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the 'human spirit'."

<blockquote>"So understood, 'naturalism' is not a particularly informative term... The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily... reject 'supernatural' entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the 'human spirit'."

<ref> Papineau, David "Naturalism", in "The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy"</ref> </blockquote>

<ref>Papineau, David "Naturalism", in "The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy"</ref> </blockquote>

These philosophers aimed to ally philosophy more closely with science. They urged the [[Scientific consensus|opinion]] that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing ‘supernatural’, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the ‘human spirit’ (Krikorian 1944, Kim 2003). See [[Hypothesis]].

These philosophers aimed to ally philosophy more closely with science. They urged the [[Scientific consensus|opinion]] that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing ‘supernatural’, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the ‘human spirit’ (Krikorian 1944, Kim 2003). See [[Hypothesis]].

<br/>[< L ''innovatus'', pp. of ''innovare'' to renew < ''in-'' in + ''novare'' to make new, alter < ''novus'' new: innovation < L ''innovatio, -onis'']</ref>  

<br/>[< L ''innovatus'', pp. of ''innovare'' to renew < ''in-'' in + ''novare'' to make new, alter < ''novus'' new: innovation < L ''innovatio, -onis'']</ref>  

unheard of in ancient or medieval schools of thought. The term "methodological naturalism" had been used in 1937 by [[Edgar S. Brightman]] in an article in ''[[The Philosophical Review]]'' as a contrast to "naturalism" in general, but there the idea was not really developed to its more recent distinctions.

unheard of in ancient or medieval schools of thought. The term "methodological naturalism" had been used in 1937 by [[Edgar S. Brightman]] in an article in ''[[The Philosophical Review]]'' as a contrast to "naturalism" in general, but there the idea was not really developed to its more recent distinctions.

<ref> ASA March 2006 – Re: Methodological Naturalism</ref>

<ref>ASA March 2006 – Re: Methodological Naturalism</ref>

According to [[Ronald Numbers]], it was coined in 1983 by [[Paul de Vries]], a [[Wheaton College]] philosopher. De Vries distinguished between what he called "methodological naturalism," a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism," which "denies the existence of a transcendent God."

According to [[Ronald Numbers]], it was coined in 1983 by [[Paul de Vries]], a [[Wheaton College]] philosopher. De Vries distinguished between what he called "methodological naturalism," a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism," which "denies the existence of a transcendent God."

<ref> Nick Matzke: On the Origins of Methodological Naturalism. The Pandas Thumb (March 20, 2006)</ref>

<ref>Nick Matzke: On the Origins of Methodological Naturalism. The Pandas Thumb (March 20, 2006)</ref>

=== Recent philosophy and scientific motivation===

=== Recent philosophy and scientific motivation===

'''Methodological Naturalism''' is the assumption that observable events in nature are explained only by natural causes, without assuming either the existence or non-existence of the supernatural, and so considers supernatural explanations for such events to be outside science. It holds that the scientific method (''hypothesize, predict, test, repeat'') is the only effective way to investigate reality, and that such empirical methods will only ascertain natural facts, whether supernatural facts exist or not.

'''Methodological Naturalism''' is the assumption that observable events in nature are explained only by natural causes, without assuming either the existence or non-existence of the supernatural, and so considers supernatural explanations for such events to be outside science. It holds that the scientific method (''hypothesize, predict, test, repeat'') is the only effective way to investigate reality, and that such empirical methods will only ascertain natural facts, whether supernatural facts exist or not.

<ref> It is analogous to an attempt to use a ''thermometer'' to determine the temperature of a hotly contested physical hypothesis defended by some on the basis of their interpretation of the evidence and repudiated by others on the basis of their interpretation of the very same evidence. A thermometer is the wrong instrument to use, but a statistical analysis of the status and number of experts debating the hypothesis under review and a linguistic and semantical analysis of arguments contained in the papers presented on the matter can ascertain the perceived degree of significance and the temper of the scientific establishment as to whether or not the debate was received coolly or with heated enthusiasm. A [[Geiger counter]] cannot measure distance to the [[Moon]]. [[Calculus|''The Calculus'']] cannot be used to determine the potential of a candidate newly elected to a senate seat.</ref>  

<ref>It is analogous to an attempt to use a ''thermometer'' to determine the temperature of a hotly contested physical hypothesis defended by some on the basis of their interpretation of the evidence and repudiated by others on the basis of their interpretation of the very same evidence. A thermometer is the wrong instrument to use, but a statistical analysis of the status and number of experts debating the hypothesis under review and a linguistic and semantical analysis of arguments contained in the papers presented on the matter can ascertain the perceived degree of significance and the temper of the scientific establishment as to whether or not the debate was received coolly or with heated enthusiasm. A [[Geiger counter]] cannot measure distance to the [[Moon]]. [[Calculus|''The Calculus'']] cannot be used to determine the potential of a candidate newly elected to a senate seat.</ref>  

'''Absolute Methodological Naturalism''' is the view that it is in some sense impossible for any empirical method to discover supernatural facts, even if there are some.

'''Absolute Methodological Naturalism''' is the view that it is in some sense impossible for any empirical method to discover supernatural facts, even if there are some.

'''Ethical Naturalism''' (or '''Moral Naturalism''') is the meta-ethical theory

'''Ethical Naturalism''' (or '''Moral Naturalism''') is the meta-ethical theory

<ref>"meta-ethical": Beyond or past (coming after) the classical study and philosophy of human conduct, with its emphasis on the determination of right and wrong; beyond or past (coming after) the principles of right conduct, especially with reference to a specific profession, mode of life, etc. (Essentially, "''after or beside determinations of right and wrong''".)

<ref>"meta-ethical": Beyond or past (coming after) the classical study and philosophy of human conduct, with its emphasis on the determination of right and wrong; beyond or past (coming after) the principles of right conduct, especially with reference to a specific profession, mode of life, etc. (Essentially, "''after or beside determinations of right and wrong''".)

<br/>[< Gk. < ''meta'' after, beside, with + ethic < L ''ethicus'' < Gk. ''ethikos'' < ''ethos'' character] </ref>

<br/>[< Gk. < ''meta'' after, beside, with + ethic < L ''ethicus'' < Gk. ''ethikos'' < ''ethos'' character]</ref>

that ethical terms can be defined without the use of ethical terms (such as "good", "right", etc.), and moreover that these non-ethical terms refer to natural properties (as opposed to relating the ethical terms in some way to the will of God).

that ethical terms can be defined without the use of ethical terms (such as "good", "right", etc.), and moreover that these non-ethical terms refer to natural properties (as opposed to relating the ethical terms in some way to the will of God).

Methodological naturalism concerns itself not with claims about what exists but with methods of learning what nature is. It is strictly the idea that all scientific endeavors—all hypotheses and events—are to be explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events. The genesis of nature (for example, by an act of God) is not addressed. This second sense of naturalism seeks only to provide a framework within which to conduct the scientific study of the laws of nature. Methodological naturalism is a way of acquiring knowledge. It is a distinct system of thought concerned with a cognitive approach to reality, and is thus a philosophy of knowledge. Studies by sociologist [[Elaine Ecklund]] suggest that religious scientists in practice apply methodological naturalism. They report that their religious beliefs affect the way they think about the implications - often moral - of their work, but not the way they practice science.

Methodological naturalism concerns itself not with claims about what exists but with methods of learning what nature is. It is strictly the idea that all scientific endeavors—all hypotheses and events—are to be explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events. The genesis of nature (for example, by an act of God) is not addressed. This second sense of naturalism seeks only to provide a framework within which to conduct the scientific study of the laws of nature. Methodological naturalism is a way of acquiring knowledge. It is a distinct system of thought concerned with a cognitive approach to reality, and is thus a philosophy of knowledge. Studies by sociologist [[Elaine Ecklund]] suggest that religious scientists in practice apply methodological naturalism. They report that their religious beliefs affect the way they think about the implications - often moral - of their work, but not the way they practice science.

<ref> Belief Net, "What do scientists say"</ref>

<ref>Belief Net, "What do scientists say"</ref>

<ref> Elaine Ecklund's book "Science versus Religion: What do scientists really think"</ref>

<ref>Elaine Ecklund's book "Science versus Religion: What do scientists really think"</ref>

In a series of articles and books from 1996 onward, [[Robert T. Pennock]] wrote using the term "methodological naturalism" to clarify that the scientific method confines itself to natural explanations without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural, and is not based on [[dogma]]tic metaphysical naturalism (as claimed by creationists and proponents of [[intelligent design]], in particular [[Phillip E. Johnson]]). Pennock's testimony as an expert witness

In a series of articles and books from 1996 onward, [[Robert T. Pennock]] wrote using the term "methodological naturalism" to clarify that the scientific method confines itself to natural explanations without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural, and is not based on [[dogma]]tic metaphysical naturalism (as claimed by creationists and proponents of [[intelligent design]], in particular [[Phillip E. Johnson]]). Pennock's testimony as an expert witness

<ref> Kitzmiller trial: testimony of Robert T. Pennock</ref>

<ref>Kitzmiller trial: testimony of Robert T. Pennock</ref>

at the [[Kitzmiller vs. Dover Area School District|Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District]] trial was cited by the Judge in his Memorandum Opinion concluding that "Methodological naturalism is a 'ground rule' of science today":

at the [[Kitzmiller vs. Dover Area School District|Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District]] trial was cited by the Judge in his Memorandum Opinion concluding that "Methodological naturalism is a 'ground rule' of science today":

<ref> Kitzmiller v. Dover: Whether ID is Science</ref>

<ref>Kitzmiller v. Dover: Whether ID is Science</ref>

<blockquote>"Expert testimony reveals that since the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries, science has been limited to the search for natural causes to explain natural phenomena.... While supernatural explanations may be important and have merit, they are not part of science." Methodological naturalism is thus "a self-imposed convention of science." It is a "ground rule" that "requires scientists to seek explanations in the world around us based upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify."

<blockquote>"Expert testimony reveals that since the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries, science has been limited to the search for natural causes to explain natural phenomena.... While supernatural explanations may be important and have merit, they are not part of science." Methodological naturalism is thus "a self-imposed convention of science." It is a "ground rule" that "requires scientists to seek explanations in the world around us based upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify."

<ref> Judge John E. Jones, III Decision of the Court Expert witnesses were John F. Haught, Robert T. Pennock, and Kenneth R. Miller. Links in the original to specific testimony records have been deleted here.</ref></blockquote>

<ref>Judge John E. Jones, III Decision of the Court Expert witnesses were John F. Haught, Robert T. Pennock, and Kenneth R. Miller. Links in the original to specific testimony records have been deleted here.</ref></blockquote>

== Falsifiability as a limiting principle in scientific research==

== Falsifiability as a limiting principle in scientific research==

Because of their insistence that there is an utter lack of scientific (''empirical'') evidence to support religion, most philosophical naturalists are also atheists, while a minority are theists. While scientists and historians admit and simply acknowledge the possibility that unique phenomena or events have actually occurred in [[history]] and in nature, and that some of them have been reliably attested by first-hand [[witness]]es and recorded as factual in oral or written [[tradition]] or in documented [[testimony]], the fact that they are unique and therefore unrepeatable and unpredictable makes them ''[[Falsifiability|non-falsifiable]]'', and this excludes them as subjects of scientific study.

Because of their insistence that there is an utter lack of scientific (''empirical'') evidence to support religion, most philosophical naturalists are also atheists, while a minority are theists. While scientists and historians admit and simply acknowledge the possibility that unique phenomena or events have actually occurred in [[history]] and in nature, and that some of them have been reliably attested by first-hand [[witness]]es and recorded as factual in oral or written [[tradition]] or in documented [[testimony]], the fact that they are unique and therefore unrepeatable and unpredictable makes them ''[[Falsifiability|non-falsifiable]]'', and this excludes them as subjects of scientific study.

<ref> for example, the [[Great Flood|Flood]], the miraculous events of the [[Egyptian plagues|Exodus]], the [[Resurrection of Jesus Christ|resurrection of Jesus]].</ref>

<ref>for example, the [[Great Flood|Flood]], the miraculous events of the [[Egyptian plagues|Exodus]], the [[Resurrection of Jesus Christ|resurrection of Jesus]].</ref>

An obvious example of a contradiction to the [[paradigm]] of ''falsifiability'' in science is the established scientific study of the [[Big Bang theory]] of the ''origin of the universe'' ([[cosmogony]]), which by definition is not proven to be a repeatable event or phenomenon, but for which many scientists claim there is substantial supporting evidence; even while many of them, in accord with philosophical naturalism, deny that it has a supernatural divine cause. In Logic this is an example of the fallacy of ''[[special pleading]]''. Philosophical naturalism is thus a contrast to the theology of [[Deism]] which [[postulate]]s a divine cause of a wholly [[Mechanics|mechanistic]] universe (a "cosmos", from Greek ''kosmos'', "order", system or mechanism) subject entirely to the operation of created [[Intelligent design|laws of nature]], a view of existence described in the Bible in 2 Peter 3:3-4.<blockquote>First of all you must understand this, that scoffers will come in the last days with scoffing, following their own passions and saying, "Where is the promise of his coming? For ever since the fathers fell asleep, all things have continued as they were from the beginning of creation." ([[Revised Standard Version#Revised Standard Version, Catholic Edition RSVCE|RSVCE]])</blockquote>

An obvious example of a contradiction to the [[paradigm]] of ''falsifiability'' in science is the established scientific study of the [[Big Bang theory]] of the ''origin of the universe'' ([[cosmogony]]), which by definition is not proven to be a repeatable event or phenomenon, but for which many scientists claim there is substantial supporting evidence; even while many of them, in accord with philosophical naturalism, deny that it has a supernatural divine cause. In Logic this is an example of the fallacy of ''[[special pleading]]''. Philosophical naturalism is thus a contrast to the theology of [[Deism]] which [[postulate]]s a divine cause of a wholly [[Mechanics|mechanistic]] universe (a "cosmos", from Greek ''kosmos'', "order", system or mechanism) subject entirely to the operation of created [[Intelligent design|laws of nature]], a view of existence described in the Bible in 2 Peter 3:3-4.<blockquote>First of all you must understand this, that scoffers will come in the last days with scoffing, following their own passions and saying, "Where is the promise of his coming? For ever since the fathers fell asleep, all things have continued as they were from the beginning of creation." ([[Revised Standard Version#Revised Standard Version, Catholic Edition RSVCE|RSVCE]])</blockquote>

<ref>Anthony Zee, ''Fearful Symmetry'' (New York: Macmillan. 1986), 280-81</ref>  

<ref>Anthony Zee, ''Fearful Symmetry'' (New York: Macmillan. 1986), 280-81</ref>  

and [[Kurt Gödel]],

and [[Kurt Gödel]],

<ref> Hao Wang, ''A Logical Journey: From Godel to Philosophy'' (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 316</ref>  

<ref>Hao Wang, ''A Logical Journey: From Godel to Philosophy'' (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 316</ref>  

and [[Robert Spitzer]], S.J., PhD.  

and [[Robert Spitzer]], S.J., PhD.  

<ref>''[[New Proofs for the Existence of God|New Proofs for the Existence of God: Contributions of Contemporary Physics and Philosophy]]'', Robert Spitzer, S.J., PhD. (President, Magis Center of Reason and Faith), June 29, 2010, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., ISBN 10:0802863833 ISBN 13:978-0802863836, 320 pages. Rev. Spitzer is the lecturing speaker in the DVD video series ''The Heavens Proclaim the Glory of God'', 2011, Eternal Word Television Network EWTN, 4 Disc Set, approximately 6.5 hours, based on the same book.</ref>  

<ref>''[[New Proofs for the Existence of God|New Proofs for the Existence of God: Contributions of Contemporary Physics and Philosophy]]'', Robert Spitzer, S.J., PhD. (President, Magis Center of Reason and Faith), June 29, 2010, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., ISBN 10:0802863833 ISBN 13:978-0802863836, 320 pages. Rev. Spitzer is the lecturing speaker in the DVD video series ''The Heavens Proclaim the Glory of God'', 2011, Eternal Word Television Network EWTN, 4 Disc Set, approximately 6.5 hours, based on the same book.</ref>  

point out that the [[Inductive reasoning|inductive]] argument from the order of nature itself, its inherent "symmetry" and not simply the laws of nature, and what is called "fine-tuning" in physics, leads one inexorably (relentlessly, unavoidably) to the conclusion that existence includes the immaterial (or non-material) supernatural, and that the rationality and intelligibility of the [[Universe|cosmos]] is rooted in the Mind of God

point out that the [[Inductive reasoning|inductive]] argument from the order of nature itself, its inherent "symmetry" and not simply the laws of nature, and what is called "fine-tuning" in physics, leads one inexorably (relentlessly, unavoidably) to the conclusion that existence includes the immaterial (or non-material) supernatural, and that the rationality and intelligibility of the [[Universe|cosmos]] is rooted in the Mind of God

<ref>Flew, ''There is a God'', page 169</ref> :

:<ref>Flew, ''There is a God'', page 169</ref>  

"''immortal, invisible, God only wise, in light inaccessible, hid from our eyes''".

"''immortal, invisible, God only wise, in light inaccessible, hid from our eyes''".

<ref> "Immortal, Invisible, God Only Wise". Text: 1 Timothy 1:17; Walter C. Smith, 1824-1908. Tune: ST DENIO. Roberts' ''Canaidu y Cyssegr'', 1839</ref>  

<ref>"Immortal, Invisible, God Only Wise". Text: 1 Timothy 1:17; Walter C. Smith, 1824-1908. Tune: ST DENIO. Roberts' ''Canaidu y Cyssegr'', 1839</ref>  

These have reasoned ''[[a posteriori]]''

These have reasoned ''[[a posteriori]]''

<ref> "a posteriori": "'''1'''. ''Logic'' Reasoning from facts to principles or from effect to cause: opposed to ''a priori''. '''2'''. [[Inductive reasoning|Inductive]]; empirical. [< L, from the later]"</ref>  

<ref>"a posteriori": "'''1'''. ''Logic'' Reasoning from facts to principles or from effect to cause: opposed to ''a priori''. '''2'''. [[Inductive reasoning|Inductive]]; empirical. [< L, from the later]"</ref>  

with [[rational]] [[logic]] from all the available evidence that the natural world is not all there is. This has been pointed out with impeccable logic in the Bible:{{cquote|"If through delight in the beauty of these things they assumed them to be gods,/ let them know how much better than these is their Lord,/ for the author of beauty created them./ And if they were amazed at their power and working,/ let them perceive from them/ how much more powerful is he who formed them./ For from the greatness and beauty of created things/ comes a corresponding perception of their Creator./ Yet these men are little to be blamed,/ for perhaps they go astray/ while seeking God and desiring to find him./ For as they live among his works they keep searching,/ and they trust in what they see, because the things that are seen are beautiful./ Yet again, not even they are to be excused;/ for if they had the power to know so much/ that they could investigate the world,/ how did they fail to find sooner the Lord of these things?" Wisdom 13:3-9 (RSVCE)

with [[rational]] [[logic]] from all the available evidence that the natural world is not all there is. This has been pointed out with impeccable logic in the Bible:{{cquote|"If through delight in the beauty of these things they assumed them to be gods,/ let them know how much better than these is their Lord,/ for the author of beauty created them./ And if they were amazed at their power and working,/ let them perceive from them/ how much more powerful is he who formed them./ For from the greatness and beauty of created things/ comes a corresponding perception of their Creator./ Yet these men are little to be blamed,/ for perhaps they go astray/ while seeking God and desiring to find him./ For as they live among his works they keep searching,/ and they trust in what they see, because the things that are seen are beautiful./ Yet again, not even they are to be excused;/ for if they had the power to know so much/ that they could investigate the world,/ how did they fail to find sooner the Lord of these things?" Wisdom 13:3-9 (RSVCE)

[[Alvin Plantinga]], Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Notre Dame,

[[Alvin Plantinga]], Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Notre Dame,

<ref> [http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/alvin-plantinga/ Alvin Plantinga, Philosophy Department, Notre Dame]</ref>

<ref>[http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/alvin-plantinga/ Alvin Plantinga, Philosophy Department, Notre Dame]</ref>

and a Christian, has become a well-known critic of naturalism.

and a Christian, has become a well-known critic of naturalism.

<ref>Beilby, J.K. (2002). Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. G - Reference,Information and Interdisciplinary Subjects Series. Cornell University Press. p. 9. ISBN 9780801487637. LCCN 2001006111.</ref>

<ref>Beilby, J.K. (2002). Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. G - Reference,Information and Interdisciplinary Subjects Series. Cornell University Press. p. 9. ISBN 9780801487637. LCCN 2001006111.</ref>

[[Robert T. Pennock]] contends

[[Robert T. Pennock]] contends

<ref> Robert T. Pennock, Supernaturalist Explanations and the Prospects for a Theistic Science or "How do you know it was the lettuce?"</ref>

<ref>Robert T. Pennock, Supernaturalist Explanations and the Prospects for a Theistic Science or "How do you know it was the lettuce?"</ref>

that as supernatural agents and powers "''are above and beyond the natural world and its agents and powers''" and "''are not constrained by natural laws''", only logical impossibilities constrain what a supernatural agent could not do. He states: "''If we could apply natural knowledge to understand supernatural powers, then, by definition, they would not be supernatural''". As the supernatural is necessarily a mystery to us, it can provide no grounds on which to judge scientific models. "''Experimentation requires observation and control of the variables.... But by definition we have no control over supernatural entities or forces.''" Science does not deal with meanings; the closed system of scientific reasoning cannot be used to define itself. Allowing science to appeal to untestable supernatural powers would make the scientist's task meaningless, undermine the discipline that allows science to make progress, and "''would be as profoundly unsatisfying as the ancient Greek playwright's reliance upon the ''[[deus ex machina]]'' to extract his hero from a difficult predicament.''"

that as supernatural agents and powers "''are above and beyond the natural world and its agents and powers''" and "''are not constrained by natural laws''", only logical impossibilities constrain what a supernatural agent could not do. He states: "''If we could apply natural knowledge to understand supernatural powers, then, by definition, they would not be supernatural''". As the supernatural is necessarily a mystery to us, it can provide no grounds on which to judge scientific models. "''Experimentation requires observation and control of the variables.... But by definition we have no control over supernatural entities or forces.''" Science does not deal with meanings; the closed system of scientific reasoning cannot be used to define itself. Allowing science to appeal to untestable supernatural powers would make the scientist's task meaningless, undermine the discipline that allows science to make progress, and "''would be as profoundly unsatisfying as the ancient Greek playwright's reliance upon the ''[[deus ex machina]]'' to extract his hero from a difficult predicament.''"

[[W. V. Quine]] describes naturalism as the position that there is no higher tribunal for [[Truth (logic)|truth]] than natural science itself. There is no better method than the scientific method for judging the claims of science, and there is neither any need nor any place for a "first philosophy", such as (abstract) metaphysics or epistemology, that could stand behind and justify science or the scientific method. Therefore, philosophy should feel free to make use of the findings of scientists in its own pursuit, while also feeling free to offer criticism when those claims are ungrounded, confused, or inconsistent. In Quine's view, philosophy is "continuous with" science and both are empirical.

[[W. V. Quine]] describes naturalism as the position that there is no higher tribunal for [[Truth (logic)|truth]] than natural science itself. There is no better method than the scientific method for judging the claims of science, and there is neither any need nor any place for a "first philosophy", such as (abstract) metaphysics or epistemology, that could stand behind and justify science or the scientific method. Therefore, philosophy should feel free to make use of the findings of scientists in its own pursuit, while also feeling free to offer criticism when those claims are ungrounded, confused, or inconsistent. In Quine's view, philosophy is "continuous with" science and both are empirical.

<ref> Lynne Rudder (2013). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. Oxford University Press. p. 5. ISBN 0199914745.</ref>  

<ref>Lynne Rudder (2013). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. Oxford University Press. p. 5. ISBN 0199914745.</ref>  

Naturalism is not itself a dogmatic belief that the modern view of science is entirely correct. Instead, it simply holds that science is the best way to explore the processes of the universe and that those processes are what modern science is striving to understand. However, this Quinean Replacement Naturalism finds relatively few supporters among philosophers.

Naturalism is not itself a dogmatic belief that the modern view of science is entirely correct. Instead, it simply holds that science is the best way to explore the processes of the universe and that those processes are what modern science is striving to understand. However, this Quinean Replacement Naturalism finds relatively few supporters among philosophers.

<ref> Feldman, Richard (2012). "Naturalized Epistemology". In Zalta, Edward N.. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 ed.). Retrieved 2014-06-04. Quinean Replacement Naturalism finds relatively few supporters.</ref>

<ref>Feldman, Richard (2012). "Naturalized Epistemology". In Zalta, Edward N.. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 ed.). Retrieved 2014-06-04. Quinean Replacement Naturalism finds relatively few supporters.</ref>

== Naturalist explanations of the resurrection of Jesus Christ: The "swoon hypothesis"==

== Naturalist explanations of the resurrection of Jesus Christ: The "swoon hypothesis"==

*Conservapedia article [[Christian apologetics]]

*Conservapedia article [[Christian apologetics]]

</ref>  

</ref>  

<ref> P.E. Easterling, E. J. Kenney (general editors), ''The Cambridge History of Latin Literature'', page 892 (Cambridge University Press, 1982, reprinted 1996). ISBN 0-521-21043-7</ref>  

<ref>P.E. Easterling, E. J. Kenney (general editors), ''The Cambridge History of Latin Literature'', page 892 (Cambridge University Press, 1982, reprinted 1996). ISBN 0-521-21043-7</ref>  

but (possibly) actual event is one who denies that his resurrection from death had a supernatural cause and proposes instead an entirely natural cause which has been "misinterpreted" as being supernatural. Among them are those [[liberal]]ist Christian participants in the ''[[Jesus Seminar]]'', and the number of 20th century critics who dismiss Jesus' resurrection by proposing the "[[swoon theory]]" in which they suggest that the Lord did not actually die on the cross, but lapsed into a [[Coma (Medical condition)|comatose]] or [[catatonic]] state like [[catalepsy]] which resembles death, and then revived. This 200-year-old hypothesis is generally rejected by Christians, who cite St. Paul:  

but (possibly) actual event is one who denies that his resurrection from death had a supernatural cause and proposes instead an entirely natural cause which has been "misinterpreted" as being supernatural. Among them are those [[liberal]]ist Christian participants in the ''[[Jesus Seminar]]'', and the number of 20th century critics who dismiss Jesus' resurrection by proposing the "[[swoon theory]]" in which they suggest that the Lord did not actually die on the cross, but lapsed into a [[Coma (Medical condition)|comatose]] or [[catatonic]] state like [[catalepsy]] which resembles death, and then revived. This 200-year-old hypothesis is generally rejected by Christians, who cite St. Paul:  

<blockquote>"If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If for this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most to be pitied." 1 Corinthians 15:17-19 (RSVCE).</blockquote>

<blockquote>"If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If for this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most to be pitied." 1 Corinthians 15:17-19 (RSVCE).</blockquote>

==== Ahmed Deedat====

==== Ahmed Deedat====

:Perhaps the biggest proponent of the swoon hypothesis over the past 20 years has been Muslim preacher [[Ahmed Deedat]] of South Africa in his book ''Crucifixion or Cruci-fiction''.<ref>[http://d1.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih_books/single/en_Crucifixion_Or_Cruci-fiction.pdf Crucifixion or Cruci-fiction] by Ahmed Deedat. Publisher: Islamic Book Service (September 1, 2011) Language: English ISBN-10: 8172310226 ISBN-13: 978-8172310226</ref> He takes a critical look at the events in the four Gospels and theorizes a scenario of events similar to the swoon hypothesis. The Islamic position on the subject of crucifixion—which is a form of [[Docetism]]—is highlighted in the [[Koran|Qur'an]]: "and for their unbelief, and their uttering against Mary a mighty calumny, and for their saying, 'We slew the Messiah, Jesus son of Mary, the Messenger of God'—yet they did not slay him, neither crucified him, only a likeness of that was shown to them".  Sura 4:157 Pickthall

:Perhaps the biggest proponent of the swoon hypothesis over the past 20 years has been Muslim preacher [[Ahmed Deedat]] of South Africa in his book ''Crucifixion or Cruci-fiction''.<ref>[http://d1.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih_books/single/en_Crucifixion_Or_Cruci-fiction.pdf Crucifixion or Cruci-fiction] by Ahmed Deedat. Publisher: Islamic Book Service (September 1, 2011) Language: English ISBN 8172310226 ISBN 978-8172310226</ref> He takes a critical look at the events in the four Gospels and theorizes a scenario of events similar to the swoon hypothesis. The Islamic position on the subject of crucifixion—which is a form of [[Docetism]]—is highlighted in the [[Koran|Qur'an]]: "and for their unbelief, and their uttering against Mary a mighty calumny, and for their saying, 'We slew the Messiah, Jesus son of Mary, the Messenger of God'—yet they did not slay him, neither crucified him, only a likeness of that was shown to them".  Sura 4:157 Pickthall

==== Ahmadiyya Islam perspective====

==== Ahmadiyya Islam perspective====

=== External links===

=== External links===

[http://britannica.com/topic/naturalism-philosophy Encyclopedia Britannica: Naturalism]  

* [http://britannica.com/topic/naturalism-philosophy Encyclopedia Britannica: Naturalism]  

 

* [http://iep.utm.edu/naturali Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Naturalism]

[http://iep.utm.edu/naturali Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Naturalism]

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Naturalism]

 

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/multiple-realizability/ Bickle, J., 2006, ‘Multiple Realizability’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)]

[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Naturalism]

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/epistemology-naturalized/ Feldman, R., 2006, ‘Naturalized Epistemology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]

 

* [http://infidels.org/library/modern/barbara_forrest/naturalism.html Forrest, Barbara. Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the Connection (2000) Barbara Forrest.] This article was originally published in Philo, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 2000), pp.&nbsp;7–29.

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/multiple-realizability/ Bickle, J., 2006, ‘Multiple Realizability’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)]

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/self-knowledge/ Gertler, B., 2003, ‘Self-Knowledge’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]

 

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries//folkpsych-simulation/ Gordon, R., 2004, ‘Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),]  

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/epistemology-naturalized/ Feldman, R., 2006, ‘Naturalized Epistemology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries//naturalism-moral/ Lenman, J., 2006, ‘Moral Naturalism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),]  

 

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/functionalism/ Levin, J., 2004, ‘Functionalism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

[http://infidels.org/library/modern/barbara_forrest/naturalism.html Forrest, Barbara. Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the Connection (2000) Barbara Forrest.] This article was originally published in Philo, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 2000), pp. 7-29.

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/fictionalism-modal/ Nolan, D., 2002, ‘Modal Fictionalism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

 

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/hermeneutics/ Ramberg, B. and Gjestal, K., 2005, ‘Hermeneutics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/self-knowledge/ Gertler, B., 2003, ‘Self-Knowledge’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/materialism-eliminative/ Ramsey, W., 2003, ‘Eliminative Materialism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

 

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/moral-non-naturalism/ Ridge, M., 2006, ‘Moral Non-Naturalism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries//folkpsych-simulation/ Gordon, R., 2004, ‘Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),]  

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/mental-causation/ Robb, D. and Heil, J., 2005, ‘Mental Causation’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

 

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/anomalous-monism/ Yalowitz, S., 2005, ‘Anomalous Monism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries//naturalism-moral/ Lenman, J., 2006, ‘Moral Naturalism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),]  

 

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/functionalism/ Levin, J., 2004, ‘Functionalism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

 

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/fictionalism-modal/ Nolan, D., 2002, ‘Modal Fictionalism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

 

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/hermeneutics/ Ramberg, B. and Gjestal, K., 2005, ‘Hermeneutics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

 

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/materialism-eliminative/ Ramsey, W., 2003, ‘Eliminative Materialism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

 

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/moral-non-naturalism/ Ridge, M., 2006, ‘Moral Non-Naturalism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

 

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/mental-causation/ Robb, D. and Heil, J., 2005, ‘Mental Causation’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

 

[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/anomalous-monism/ Yalowitz, S., 2005, ‘Anomalous Monism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).]  

=== online resources===

=== online resources===

Armstrong, D., 1968, ''A Materialist Theory of the Mind'', London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Armstrong, D., 1968, ''A Materialist Theory of the Mind'', London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Audi, Robert (1996). "Naturalism". In Borchert, Donald M. ''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement''. USA: Macmillan Reference. pp. 372–374.

Audi, Robert (1996). "Naturalism". In Borchert, Donald M. ''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement''. USA: Macmillan Reference. pp.&nbsp;372–374.

Bennet, K., 2003, ‘Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It’, ''Nous'', 37: 471-97.

Bennet, K., 2003, ‘Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It’, ''Nous'', 37: 471-97.

Blackburn, Simon (1988). "How To be an Ethical Anti-realist," ''Midwest Studies in Philosophy'' 12, pp. 361-375.

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