| − | During the invasion of [[Manchuria]] (in 1931) and the war against China (1937–45), Japan took over other countries by force. By the late 1930s, Hirohito moved squarely into the camp of the 'renovationist' group who were tending toward an ever expanding war in China. However, he opposed going to war with the United States in 1941, not out of pacifist tendencies but because he had a realistic concern about a probable Japanese defeat. He pressed for talks with Washington and welcomed the neutrality agreement with [[Moscow]] in April 1941 as a means of avoiding a recurrence of dangerous border clashes with the [[Soviet Union]]. He strongly opposed joining [[Germany]] in its war against the Soviets in June 1941, and helped replace the hawkish foreign minister.<ref>Stephen S. Large, ''Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan'' (1992) p. 103-8.</ref> Yet because his power was so circumscribed by the decision-making structure of the government, and he had no answer to the American oil embargo, by late summer 1941 he became fatalistic about going to war. He had little role in the replacement of Prime Minister Konoe by the war cabinet of General [[Hideki Tojo|Hideki Tōjō]] (1884-1948), who demanded war. Hirohito continued to oppose going to war until the last minute, but pressure from his military bureaucracy forced his hand and Tōjō had his way and the attack was made on [[Pearl Harbor]].<ref>Noriko Kawamura, "Emperor Hirohito and Japan's Decision to Go to War with the United States: Reexamined." ''Diplomatic History'' 2007 31(1): 51-79.</ref> | + | During the invasion of [[Manchuria]] (in 1931) and the war against China (1937–45), Japan took over other countries by force. By the late 1930s, Hirohito moved squarely into the camp of the 'renovationist' group who were tending toward an ever-expanding war in China. However, he opposed going to war with the United States in 1941, not out of pacifist tendencies but because he had a realistic concern about a probable Japanese defeat. He pressed for talks with Washington and welcomed the neutrality agreement with [[Moscow]] in April 1941 as a means of avoiding a recurrence of dangerous border clashes with the [[Soviet Union]]. He strongly opposed joining [[Germany]] in its war against the Soviets in June 1941, and helped replace the hawkish foreign minister.<ref>Stephen S. Large, ''Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan'' (1992) p. 103-8.</ref> Yet because his power was so circumscribed by the decision-making structure of the government, and he had no answer to the American oil embargo, by late summer 1941 he became fatalistic about going to war. He had little role in the replacement of Prime Minister Konoe by the war cabinet of General [[Hideki Tojo|Hideki Tōjō]] (1884-1948), who demanded war. Hirohito continued to oppose going to war until the last minute, but pressure from his military bureaucracy forced his hand and Tōjō had his way and the attack was made on [[Pearl Harbor]].<ref>Noriko Kawamura, "Emperor Hirohito and Japan's Decision to Go to War with the United States: Reexamined." ''Diplomatic History'' 2007 31(1): 51-79.</ref> |
| | The emperor played an increasingly influential role in the war; in eleven major episodes he was deeply involved in supervising the actual conduct of war operations. Hirohito pressured the High Command to order an early attack on the [[Philippines]] in 1941-42, including the fortified [[Bataan]] peninsula. He secured the deployment of army air power in the [[Guadalcanal]] campaign. Following Japan's withdrawal from Guadalcanal he demanded a new offensive in [[New Guinea]], which was duly carried out but failed badly. Unhappy with the navy's conduct of the war, he criticized its withdrawal from the central [[Solomon Islands]] and demanded naval battles against the Americans for the losses they had inflicted in the Aleutians. The battles were disasters. Finally, it was at his insistence that plans were drafted for the recapture of [[Saipan]] and, later, for an offensive in the battle of [[Okinawa]].<ref>Herbert Bix, "Emperor Hirohito's war," ''History Today,'' (Dec 1991), Vol. 41, Issue 12</ref> | | The emperor played an increasingly influential role in the war; in eleven major episodes he was deeply involved in supervising the actual conduct of war operations. Hirohito pressured the High Command to order an early attack on the [[Philippines]] in 1941-42, including the fortified [[Bataan]] peninsula. He secured the deployment of army air power in the [[Guadalcanal]] campaign. Following Japan's withdrawal from Guadalcanal he demanded a new offensive in [[New Guinea]], which was duly carried out but failed badly. Unhappy with the navy's conduct of the war, he criticized its withdrawal from the central [[Solomon Islands]] and demanded naval battles against the Americans for the losses they had inflicted in the Aleutians. The battles were disasters. Finally, it was at his insistence that plans were drafted for the recapture of [[Saipan]] and, later, for an offensive in the battle of [[Okinawa]].<ref>Herbert Bix, "Emperor Hirohito's war," ''History Today,'' (Dec 1991), Vol. 41, Issue 12</ref> |