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Your changes are excellent but it's not clear to me why you say the Nash equilibrium is sub-optimal for the [[prisoner's dilemma]]. Could you elaborate on that a bit more? Thanks.--[[User:Aschlafly|Aschlafly]] 19:38, 5 May 2007 (EDT)
Your changes are excellent but it's not clear to me why you say the Nash equilibrium is sub-optimal for the [[prisoner's dilemma]]. Could you elaborate on that a bit more? Thanks.--[[User:Aschlafly|Aschlafly]] 19:38, 5 May 2007 (EDT)
:Well, the prisoner's dilemma is one of those cases where the Nash equilibrium is not the Pareto optimal solution.
:The optimal case would be for both participants to stay silent (in the specific example in the article, both would get six months). However, this is not a Nash equilibrium: If A knows that B chose to stay silent, A would switch to "confess" and improve his own outcome (causing a 10 year punishment for B).
:The only Nash equilibrium is the "confess/confess" scenario (in which both prisoners get a 2 year punishment), which is sub-optimal, compared to the possible outcome if both participants cooperated.
:I could insert this into the article here, but it would be slightly redundant since this is explained in the PD article (with a fancy table and all that). --[[User:JLindon|JLindon]] 20:54, 5 May 2007 (EDT)