Changes

The following is the agreed upon data by commentators and investigating bodies such as ICAO which concluded that the deviation was not intentional but due to a lack of situational awareness, and such as the opposite understanding that the deviation  and intrusion into Soviet air space was intentional for purposes of saving on fuel by "shortcutting", or intelligence gathering.

The following is the agreed upon data by commentators and investigating bodies such as ICAO which concluded that the deviation was not intentional but due to a lack of situational awareness, and such as the opposite understanding that the deviation  and intrusion into Soviet air space was intentional for purposes of saving on fuel by "shortcutting", or intelligence gathering.

'''The Horizontal Situation Indicator:'''  From Bethel and on, alert pilots could have known much—starting with the Horizonal Situation Indicator The Horizontal Situation Indicator’s needle would have alerted the pilots of their course deviation. This is because the cockpit HSI console needle, capable of showing deviation only up to eight miles, would be “pegged” all the way to the side. The pilots, thus,  could have known that they were at least eight miles off course. An aircraft HSI generally has an image of a plane directly above the Horizontal Situation Indicator’s needle when the aircraft is on course. A needle pointing to the left or to the right of the image would indicate that the plane is deviated left or right of the course. KAL 007’s HSI’s needle would have been pegged all the way to the right (North). ICAO expanded on the Horizontal Situation Indicator’s capability of showing course deviation. The pilots could have known that they were off course by looking at the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) in front of each of them. Though the HSI was primarily designed to show the aircraft’s situation with regard to the horizon, the 747’s HSI contained an indicator to register deviation from plotted course. “Indications [of being on course] available to the crew would have been a reducing or zero track bar displacement with the HSI display set to INS and a similar reducing or zero cross track error on the CDUs [consoles]. There would have been a similar effect with the VOR track displacement…” <ref>ICAO report 1993, p. 42, sect. 2.4.4.</ref>

'''The Horizontal Situation Indicator:'''  From Bethel and on, alert pilots could have known much—starting with the Horizonal Situation Indicator The Horizontal Situation Indicator's needle would have alerted the pilots of their course deviation. This is because the cockpit HSI console needle, capable of showing deviation only up to eight miles, would be “pegged” all the way to the side. The pilots, thus,  could have known that they were at least eight miles off course. An aircraft HSI generally has an image of a plane directly above the Horizontal Situation Indicator's needle when the aircraft is on course. A needle pointing to the left or to the right of the image would indicate that the plane is deviated left or right of the course. KAL 007's HSI's needle would have been pegged all the way to the right (North). ICAO expanded on the Horizontal Situation Indicator's capability of showing course deviation. The pilots could have known that they were off course by looking at the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) in front of each of them. Though the HSI was primarily designed to show the aircraft's situation with regard to the horizon, the 747's HSI contained an indicator to register deviation from plotted course. “Indications [of being on course] available to the crew would have been a reducing or zero track bar displacement with the HSI display set to INS and a similar reducing or zero cross track error on the CDUs [consoles]. There would have been a similar effect with the VOR track displacement…” <ref>ICAO report 1993, p. 42, sect. 2.4.4.</ref>

Despite this, strangely enough, at 13:49, the pilots were reporting that they were on course! “007, Bethel at forty niner.” Fifty minutes after takeoff, military radar at King Salmon, Alaska acquired KAL 007 at more than 12.6 miles off course. It had exceeded its permissible leeway of deviation by six times! (Two nautical miles an hour error is the permissible drift from course set by INS.)  

Despite this, strangely enough, at 13:49, the pilots were reporting that they were on course! “007, Bethel at forty niner.” Fifty minutes after takeoff, military radar at King Salmon, Alaska acquired KAL 007 at more than 12.6 miles off course. It had exceeded its permissible leeway of deviation by six times! (Two nautical miles an hour error is the permissible drift from course set by INS.)  

'''Difficulties in making required reports:'''  Furthermore, pilot and copilot could also have been aware of the aircraft’s serious deviation because now, much more than 12 miles off course, KAL 007 was too far off course for the pilots to make their required Very High Frequency (VHF) radio reports, and had to relay these reports via KAL Flight 015, just minutes behind it and on course (KAL 007,increasingly off course, would have to rely on KAL 015 three times to transmit its reports to Anchorage Air Traffic Control). That could  have alerted them.  

'''Difficulties in making required reports:'''  Furthermore, pilot and copilot could also have been aware of the aircraft's serious deviation because now, much more than 12 miles off course, KAL 007 was too far off course for the pilots to make their required Very High Frequency (VHF) radio reports, and had to relay these reports via KAL Flight 015, just minutes behind it and on course (KAL 007,increasingly off course, would have to rely on KAL 015 three times to transmit its reports to Anchorage Air Traffic Control). That could  have alerted them.  

At one point in this section of its flight, (14:43 GMT) KAL 007 put a call through a navigational “hookup,” the International Flight Service Station on High Frequency. Flight 007, now too distant to speak directly with Anchorage Controller through Very High Frequency, was transmitting its message indirectly using High Frequency.  At another point of this section of the flight, at waypoint NABIE, KAL 007 was too far north to make radar contact with the Very High Frequency Air Traffic Control relay station on St. Paul’s Island. KAL 015 relayed for KAL 007. The message was a change in the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) for the next waypoint called NEEVA—delaying by four minutes the ETA that KAL 015 had previously relayed on behalf of KAL 007. Since a revised ETA could only be calculated by means of readout information presented by KAL 007’s Inertial Navigation Systems Control Display unit, pilot and copilot were once again presented with the opportunity of verifying their position and becoming aware of their enormous deviation.  

At one point in this section of its flight, (14:43 GMT) KAL 007 put a call through a navigational “hookup,” the International Flight Service Station on High Frequency. Flight 007, now too distant to speak directly with Anchorage Controller through Very High Frequency, was transmitting its message indirectly using High Frequency.  At another point of this section of the flight, at waypoint NABIE, KAL 007 was too far north to make radar contact with the Very High Frequency Air Traffic Control relay station on St. Paul's Island. KAL 015 relayed for KAL 007. The message was a change in the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) for the next waypoint called NEEVA—delaying by four minutes the ETA that KAL 015 had previously relayed on behalf of KAL 007. Since a revised ETA could only be calculated by means of readout information presented by KAL 007's Inertial Navigation Systems Control Display unit, pilot and copilot were once again presented with the opportunity of verifying their position and becoming aware of their enormous deviation.  

'''Contrary wind conditions of KAL 007 and KAL 015:'''  KAL 007 had now passed out of Kamchatka air space and was now a few minutes into international air space over the Sea of Okhutsk and heading in the direction of Terpenie Bay on the west shore of Sakhalin Island. At the same minute (18:05 GMT) that Maj. Osipovich in his Su-15 interceptor has fallen in behind KAL 007 and reports to his ground conroller, "am observing", KAL 007, off course, and KAL 015, on course many miles away, and about 15 minutes beind KAL 007, compare wind velocity and direction. KAL 015 is enountering tailwinds while KAL 007 is encountering headwinds  

'''Contrary wind conditions of KAL 007 and KAL 015:'''  KAL 007 had now passed out of Kamchatka air space and was now a few minutes into international air space over the Sea of Okhutsk and heading in the direction of Terpenie Bay on the west shore of Sakhalin Island. At the same minute (18:05 GMT) that Maj. Osipovich in his Su-15 interceptor has fallen in behind KAL 007 and reports to his ground conroller, "am observing", KAL 007, off course, and KAL 015, on course many miles away, and about 15 minutes beind KAL 007, compare wind velocity and direction. KAL 015 is enountering tailwinds while KAL 007 is encountering headwinds  

KAL 015: "Um Um We are now having an unexpected strong tailwind How much do you get there? How much and which direction?" KAL 007: "206. Ask him how many knots?..." KAL 007: "Ah! You got so much! We still got headwind. Headwind 215 degrees, 15 knots." KAL 015: "Is it so? But according to flight plan wind direction 360, 15 knots approximately." KAL 007: "Well, it may be like this."  Capt. Chun, by accepting these irreconcilables, has lost his last chance to escape.

KAL 015: "Um Um We are now having an unexpected strong tailwind How much do you get there? How much and which direction?" KAL 007: "206. Ask him how many knots?..." KAL 007: "Ah! You got so much! We still got headwind. Headwind 215 degrees, 15 knots." KAL 015: "Is it so? But according to flight plan wind direction 360, 15 knots approximately." KAL 007: "Well, it may be like this."  Capt. Chun, by accepting these irreconcilables, has lost his last chance to escape.

'''Weather radar: ''' There was one last navigational aid to warn the crew. With consoles at the knees of both pilot and copilot, the plane’s weather radar could have alerted them, both over Kamchatka and later over Sakhalin, to the fact that they were no longer flying over water, as they ought to have been. Weather radar has two modes—land mapping for clear weather, when it would be possible to look down and see water or land masses as well as the contours of the coast lines and the weather surveillance mode for cloudy weather, when it is necessary to “see through” clouds in order to detect dangerous thunderstorms. In land mapping mode, KAL 007 had only to make sure that the land mass of Kamchatka and the Island string of the Kurile chain would remain to the right. That night, however, KAL 007’s weather radar was probably not in land mapping mode, for the weather was inclement. The International Civil Aviation Organization’s meteorological analysis would conclude that, “there was extensive coverage of low, medium, and high level clouds over southern Kamchatka associated with an active cold front.(ICAO 1983, section 1.7.1., p. 9.)”  ICAO’s analysis of KAL 007’s weather radar functioning would state, “it was concluded that the radar was not functioning properly or that the ground mapping capability was not used."<ref>ICAO 1983, p. 45. Section 2.9.1.</ref>

'''Weather radar: ''' There was one last navigational aid to warn the crew. With consoles at the knees of both pilot and copilot, the plane's weather radar could have alerted them, both over Kamchatka and later over Sakhalin, to the fact that they were no longer flying over water, as they ought to have been. Weather radar has two modes—land mapping for clear weather, when it would be possible to look down and see water or land masses as well as the contours of the coast lines and the weather surveillance mode for cloudy weather, when it is necessary to “see through” clouds in order to detect dangerous thunderstorms. In land mapping mode, KAL 007 had only to make sure that the land mass of Kamchatka and the Island string of the Kurile chain would remain to the right. That night, however, KAL 007's weather radar was probably not in land mapping mode, for the weather was inclement. The International Civil Aviation Organization's meteorological analysis would conclude that, “there was extensive coverage of low, medium, and high level clouds over southern Kamchatka associated with an active cold front.(ICAO 1983, section 1.7.1., p. 9.)”  ICAO's analysis of KAL 007's weather radar functioning would state, “it was concluded that the radar was not functioning properly or that the ground mapping capability was not used."<ref>ICAO 1983, p. 45. Section 2.9.1.</ref>

An indicator, according to ICAO, of lack of pilot awareness of their flight's deviation from route is the bantering and casual light conversation conducted at the times that awareness of deviation and location would have brought great tension. An example is the time  (18:05 GMT) of Maj Ospovich observing KAL 007 while pulling in behind it, then locking on. KAL 007 Flight Crew: "I have heard that there is currency exchange at your airport." "In the airport currency exchange? What kind of money?" "Dollar to Korean money." "That's in the domestic building too, domestic building too."

An indicator, according to ICAO, of lack of pilot awareness of their flight's deviation from route is the bantering and casual light conversation conducted at the times that awareness of deviation and location would have brought great tension. An example is the time  (18:05 GMT) of Maj Ospovich observing KAL 007 while pulling in behind it, then locking on. KAL 007 Flight Crew: "I have heard that there is currency exchange at your airport." "In the airport currency exchange? What kind of money?" "Dollar to Korean money." "That's in the domestic building too, domestic building too."

'''August 31/September 1, 1983 was the worst possible night''' for KAL 007 to “bump the buffer” for a complexity of reasons—all of them ominous. It was but a few short hours before the time that Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Soviet Chief of General Staff, had set for the test firing of the SS-25, an illegal (according to SALT II agreements) mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The SS-25 was to be launched from Plesetsk, the launch site in northwest Russia which was used for test firing of solid fuel propellant ICBMs—24 minutes later to land in the Klyuchi target area on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Home to the Soviet Far East Fleet Inter Continental Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine base, as well as several air bases and Air Defense Missile launching batteries, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky on the southern coast of Kamchatka was bristling with weaponry.

'''August 31/September 1, 1983 was the worst possible night''' for KAL 007 to “bump the buffer” for a complexity of reasons—all of them ominous. It was but a few short hours before the time that Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Soviet Chief of General Staff, had set for the test firing of the SS-25, an illegal (according to SALT II agreements) mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The SS-25 was to be launched from Plesetsk, the launch site in northwest Russia which was used for test firing of solid fuel propellant ICBMs—24 minutes later to land in the Klyuchi target area on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Home to the Soviet Far East Fleet Inter Continental Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine base, as well as several air bases and Air Defense Missile launching batteries, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky on the southern coast of Kamchatka was bristling with weaponry.

Prior to his appointment as Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of the General Staff, General Ogarkov had been Chief of the Main Operation Directorate of the General Staff and, as such, had begun and had directed the Strategic Deception Department, or “Maskirovka,” which was charged with hiding Salt 2 violations from United States intelligence. On August 31/September 1, Soviet aerial “jammers” under Maskirovka were sent aloft to prevent United States intelligence eyes and ears from obtaining the illegal SS 25’s telemetry data. The SS-25 was in violation of the SALT II agreements on three counts:  

Prior to his appointment as Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of the General Staff, General Ogarkov had been Chief of the Main Operation Directorate of the General Staff and, as such, had begun and had directed the Strategic Deception Department, or “Maskirovka,” which was charged with hiding Salt 2 violations from United States intelligence. On August 31/September 1, Soviet aerial “jammers” under Maskirovka were sent aloft to prevent United States intelligence eyes and ears from obtaining the illegal SS 25's telemetry data. The SS-25 was in violation of the SALT II agreements on three counts:  

<blockquote>

<blockquote>

1. It was a new kind of ICBM (the first mobile one ever launched).

1. It was a new kind of ICBM (the first mobile one ever launched).

'''Osipovich: (18:22:17)''' I am going around it.  I’m already moving in front of the target.

'''Osipovich: (18:22:17)''' I am going around it.  I’m already moving in front of the target.

'''Titovnin:''' Increase speed, 805 [call sign of Osipovich’s Sukhoi-15].

'''Titovnin:''' Increase speed, 805 [call sign of Osipovich's Sukhoi-15].

'''Osipovich: (18:22:23)''' I have increased speed.

'''Osipovich: (18:22:23)''' I have increased speed.

====Inside the Cabin====

====Inside the Cabin====

Congressman [[Larry McDonald]], seated in an aisle seat of the first class section was most likely unharmed though there may well have been wounded or dead in the rear section struck by missile fragments. There was a sufficient supply of oxygen for comfortable breathing. Aviation Specialist Dr. Malcolm Brenner explains: '''“Crew members and passengers would have about one minute of expected useful consciousness unless they successfully began receiving oxygen from an oxygen mask'''.” Well within that critical “one minute of expected useful consciousness,” the oxygen masks had already deployed and, because of the upward pitch of the aircraft’s nose for most of its ascent leg of the 1 minute and 13 second arc upward, the masks were drifting back toward or behind the heads of the passengers, within easy reach (If airline regulations had been followed, adults would have donned their masks first before putting them on their children).  

Congressman [[Larry McDonald]], seated in an aisle seat of the first class section was most likely unharmed though there may well have been wounded or dead in the rear section struck by missile fragments. There was a sufficient supply of oxygen for comfortable breathing. Aviation Specialist Dr. Malcolm Brenner explains: '''“Crew members and passengers would have about one minute of expected useful consciousness unless they successfully began receiving oxygen from an oxygen mask'''.” Well within that critical “one minute of expected useful consciousness,” the oxygen masks had already deployed and, because of the upward pitch of the aircraft's nose for most of its ascent leg of the 1 minute and 13 second arc upward, the masks were drifting back toward or behind the heads of the passengers, within easy reach (If airline regulations had been followed, adults would have donned their masks first before putting them on their children).  

At 6:26:34, thirty-two seconds after missile detonation, the following consecutive messages were broadcast over the public address system in English, Korean, and Japanese: '''“Attention, Emergency Descent. Put out your cigarette. This is an Emergency Descent. Put the mask on your nose and mouth and adjust the headbands.”''' When one of the flight crew  radioed Tokyo Airport, one minute and two seconds after missile detonation, his breathing was already "accentuated" as he was then speaking through the mike located in his oxygen mask,''' '' "Korean Air 007 ah… We are… Rapid compressions. Descend to 10,000.” ''''' Two expert witnesses testified at a Court of Appeals trial on the issue of pre-death pain and suffering. Captain James McIntyre, an experienced Boeing 747 pilot and aircraft accident investigator, testified that Flight 007's tail was struck by shrapnel from a proximity missile. This shrapnel probably caused a hole smaller than two feet in diameter, resulting in decompression but leaving the passengers sufficient time to don oxygen masks. McIntyre testified that, based upon his estimate of the extent of damage the aircraft sustained, all passengers survived the initial impact of the shrapnel from the missile explosion. In McIntyre's expert opinion, at least twelve minutes elapsed between the impact of the shrapnel and the crash of the plane, and the passengers remained conscious throughout.<ref>UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Nos. 907, 1057 August Term, 1994 {Argued: April 5, 1995 Decided: July 12, 1995, Docket Nos. 94-7208,94-7218}</ref>

At 6:26:34, thirty-two seconds after missile detonation, the following consecutive messages were broadcast over the public address system in English, Korean, and Japanese: '''“Attention, Emergency Descent. Put out your cigarette. This is an Emergency Descent. Put the mask on your nose and mouth and adjust the headbands.”''' When one of the flight crew  radioed Tokyo Airport, one minute and two seconds after missile detonation, his breathing was already "accentuated" as he was then speaking through the mike located in his oxygen mask,''' '' "Korean Air 007 ah… We are… Rapid compressions. Descend to 10,000.” ''''' Two expert witnesses testified at a Court of Appeals trial on the issue of pre-death pain and suffering. Captain James McIntyre, an experienced Boeing 747 pilot and aircraft accident investigator, testified that Flight 007's tail was struck by shrapnel from a proximity missile. This shrapnel probably caused a hole smaller than two feet in diameter, resulting in decompression but leaving the passengers sufficient time to don oxygen masks. McIntyre testified that, based upon his estimate of the extent of damage the aircraft sustained, all passengers survived the initial impact of the shrapnel from the missile explosion. In McIntyre's expert opinion, at least twelve minutes elapsed between the impact of the shrapnel and the crash of the plane, and the passengers remained conscious throughout.<ref>UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Nos. 907, 1057 August Term, 1994 {Argued: April 5, 1995 Decided: July 12, 1995, Docket Nos. 94-7208,94-7218}</ref>

# KAL 007 was able to regain its pre-hit altitude almost exactly. (It is highly unlikely that KAL 007 regained exact altitude after its arc by chance.)'''  

# KAL 007 was able to regain its pre-hit altitude almost exactly. (It is highly unlikely that KAL 007 regained exact altitude after its arc by chance.)'''  

# KAL 007 was able to regain its pre-missile hit rate of forward acceleration'''.  

# KAL 007 was able to regain its pre-missile hit rate of forward acceleration'''.  

# Captain Chun was able to bring KAL 007’s nose (pitch) to the plane’s exact level of flight.'''  

# Captain Chun was able to bring KAL 007's nose (pitch) to the plane's exact level of flight.'''  

# For over 4 minutes (18:31 - 18:35), KAL 007 maintained level flight altitude of 5,000 meters only to begin a spiral descent over tiny Moneron Island, 3 1/2 miles E-W by 4 1/2 miles N-S - the only land mass in the whole Tatar straits.'''

# For over 4 minutes (18:31 - 18:35), KAL 007 maintained level flight altitude of 5,000 meters only to begin a spiral descent over tiny Moneron Island, 3 1/2 miles E-W by 4 1/2 miles N-S - the only land mass in the whole Tatar straits.'''

# Material evidence that passengers had enough time to prepare for emergency water ditching [http://www.rescue007.org/faq.htm#12]'''

# Material evidence that passengers had enough time to prepare for emergency water ditching [http://www.rescue007.org/faq.htm#12]'''

A Boeing 747, at nearly twice the size of an RC-135 and with its distinctive cockpit hump, is unmistakable for anything else in the air, and in 1983 none were in service with the U.S. military.

A Boeing 747, at nearly twice the size of an RC-135 and with its distinctive cockpit hump, is unmistakable for anything else in the air, and in 1983 none were in service with the U.S. military.

'''Assassination theory:''' The most prominent passenger on KAL 007 was a United States Congressman from Georgia, Democrat [[Larry McDonald]], a fiery anti-communist who was recently made the president of the John Birch Society, an organization dedicated to exposing the truth of communism and the Soviet Union.  The theory goes was that the Soviets had wanted to silence McDonald, and being aware of his presence on the flight (he was on his way to Seoul for the 30th year anniversary of the U.S./South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty) sent the fighters aloft; it was sheer luck that the plane had drifted into Soviet airspace.  About fifteen minutes behind was another flight, KAL 015, carrying to the anniversary celebration senators Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), Steve Symms (R-Idaho), and Congressman Caroll Hubbard (D-Kentucky), all anti-communist like McDonald and also attending the ceremony in Seoul.

'''Assassination theory:''' The most prominent passenger on KAL 007 was a United States Congressman from Georgia, Democrat [[Larry McDonald]], a fiery anti-communist who was recently made the president of the John Birch Society, an organization dedicated to exposing the truth of communism and the Soviet Union.  The theory goes was that the Soviets had wanted to silence McDonald, and being aware of his presence on the flight (he was on his way to Seoul for the 30th anniversary of the U.S./South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty) sent the fighters aloft; it was sheer luck that the plane had drifted into Soviet airspace.  About fifteen minutes behind was another flight, KAL 015, carrying to the anniversary celebration senators Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), Steve Symms (R-Idaho), and Congressman Caroll Hubbard (D-Kentucky), all anti-communist like McDonald and also attending the ceremony in Seoul.

The theory specified that the Soviets knew of McDonald's activities and wished to silence him, despite the presence of several more tempting targets on the other flight.  There is no known evidence that the Soviets were even aware that McDonald was on the plane at all.  They would find out after the news media broke the story on September 1.

The theory specified that the Soviets knew of McDonald's activities and wished to silence him, despite the presence of several more tempting targets on the other flight.  There is no known evidence that the Soviets were even aware that McDonald was on the plane at all.  They would find out after the news media broke the story on September 1.

'''Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 529

'''Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 529

August 21, 1995'''—Carrolton, Georgia

August 21, 1995'''—Carrolton, Georgia

21 minutes into its flight, Flight 529’s left engine has fallen apart or exploded. Parts of the propeller blades are wedged against the wing and the front part of the cowling is destroyed. The captain and seven passengers will die. The copilot will survive with burns over 80% of his body.

21 minutes into its flight, Flight 529's left engine has fallen apart or exploded. Parts of the propeller blades are wedged against the wing and the front part of the cowling is destroyed. The captain and seven passengers will die. The copilot will survive with burns over 80% of his body.

'''Captain'''. [To copilot]'' Help me. Help me hold it. Help me hold it. Help me hold it.''  

'''Captain'''. [To copilot]'' Help me. Help me hold it. Help me hold it. Help me hold it.''