I'm concerned with the content of this page. Popper may be remembered commonly as a proponent of falsification, which he of course was, but his work on the philosophy of science was mostly about falsificationism; that is, that empirical statements are <i>never</i> confirmed, merely disconfirmed, and that theory choice and scientific practice can be operated in a strictly rational way. The stuff about the swans seems like a pretty poor rephrasing of Hempel's paradox. [[User:Brainslug|Brainslug]] 12:40, 7 May 2007 (EDT) | I'm concerned with the content of this page. Popper may be remembered commonly as a proponent of falsification, which he of course was, but his work on the philosophy of science was mostly about falsificationism; that is, that empirical statements are <i>never</i> confirmed, merely disconfirmed, and that theory choice and scientific practice can be operated in a strictly rational way. The stuff about the swans seems like a pretty poor rephrasing of Hempel's paradox. [[User:Brainslug|Brainslug]] 12:40, 7 May 2007 (EDT) |