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Facing imminent defeat, Stalin asked China to intervene on October 1. US troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7. They briefly reached the Yalu River on November 21 before they were turned back by the Chinese. By June 1951, the military line stabilized at approximately the 38th parallel, the pre-war dividing line.
 
Facing imminent defeat, Stalin asked China to intervene on October 1. US troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7. They briefly reached the Yalu River on November 21 before they were turned back by the Chinese. By June 1951, the military line stabilized at approximately the 38th parallel, the pre-war dividing line.
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The "forgotten war" is remembered mainly for two episodes. One was Truman's decision to cross the 38th parallel in October 1950.<ref>Truman made the decision to invade North Korea in secret on September 11, 1950 on the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, just before the Inchon landing. The staff of the National Security Council advised against it. Going to the "gates of Vladivostok" was likely to provoke a Soviet response, according to George Kennan, a leading Soviet specialist of the time. (Chi Young Pak, ''Korea and the United Nations'') As an alternative, the French and British proposed a defensive line across the waist of Korea, located just north of Pyongyang.</ref> This is remembered as a lesson in American hubris, resulting in a Chinese counterattack. Learning all the wrong lessons, Vietnam-era policymakers never violated Vietnam's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had far less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea.  
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== Lessons of Korea ==
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The saying that "generals fight the last war" was quite popular at this time, so it is ironic that the Korean War is such a good example of it. The "forgotten war" is remembered mainly for two episodes.
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One episode was Truman's decision to cross the 38th parallel in October 1950.<ref>Truman made the decision to invade North Korea in secret on September 11, 1950 on the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, just before the Inchon landing. The staff of the National Security Council advised against it. Going to the "gates of Vladivostok" was likely to provoke a Soviet response, according to George Kennan, a leading Soviet specialist of the time. (Chi Young Pak, ''Korea and the United Nations'') As an alternative, the French and British proposed a defensive line across the waist of Korea, located just north of Pyongyang.</ref> This is remembered as a lesson in American hubris, resulting in a Chinese counterattack. Learning all the wrong lessons, Vietnam-era policymakers never violated Vietnam's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had far less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea.  
    
The other well-remembered episode was Truman's dismissal of General [[Douglas MacArthur|General MacArthur]] in April 1951. This is remembered as a president asserting civilian authority, with Truman supposedly saving the world from a nuke-crazed general. In fact, the dispute had nothing to with nuclear weapons. This episode led President Lyndon Johnson to divide up authority among various generals in Vietnam
 
The other well-remembered episode was Truman's dismissal of General [[Douglas MacArthur|General MacArthur]] in April 1951. This is remembered as a president asserting civilian authority, with Truman supposedly saving the world from a nuke-crazed general. In fact, the dispute had nothing to with nuclear weapons. This episode led President Lyndon Johnson to divide up authority among various generals in Vietnam
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No modern conventional war has been won without air superiority, but air power alone has never won a war, and the first months of the Korean War were a case in point.  Air strikes by bombers and fighter-bombers slowed the North Korean advance, but the communist troops were just too numerous to stop, especially with the South Korean resistance crumbling.  UN troops, mostly American, were sent in to help hold the line, but they were outnumbered, and forced back.  In August, the lines finally stabilized along the Naktong River, establishing the Pusan perimeter.
 
No modern conventional war has been won without air superiority, but air power alone has never won a war, and the first months of the Korean War were a case in point.  Air strikes by bombers and fighter-bombers slowed the North Korean advance, but the communist troops were just too numerous to stop, especially with the South Korean resistance crumbling.  UN troops, mostly American, were sent in to help hold the line, but they were outnumbered, and forced back.  In August, the lines finally stabilized along the Naktong River, establishing the Pusan perimeter.
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One lesson America learn correctly was never again to allow its military to demobilize as completely as it was at the beginning of the Korean War. The pattern of demobilization at end of war followed by unpreparedness at the beginning of the next had been a reoccurring one in American history.
    
=== Pusan perimeter ===
 
=== Pusan perimeter ===
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